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Abstract 
In April 1941, the New Zealand Division of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force fought its first campaign in Greece. Not-withstanding the campaign's short 
duration it had significant effect on the New Zealand Division. The Division 
suffered over 2,500 casualties and it lost all of its heavy equipment. The Greek 
Campaign also exposed the duplicity of the British Government and High 
Command who sent the Division to Greece without fully informing the New 
Zealand Government of the risks that course would entail. As a Dominion within 
the Commonwealth, pursuing an independent foreign policy, the New Zealand 
Government wished to have its Expeditionary Force integrated with the British but 
also expected to be fully informed about the use of its military formations. The 
conduct of the Balkan campaign so excised the New Zealand Prime Minister Peter 
Fraser that he sought independent advice about General Freyberg' s competency and 
also sought an explanation on the conduct of the battle from the United Kingdom's 
Chief of Staff. 
Why did the New Zealand Government send its Army so far away from New 
Zealand when there was a potential threat in the Pacific from Japan? How well 
prepared were these citizen soldiers in training and equipment for the battles in 
Greece? To elucidate the above the purpose of this thesis is to answer the 
following five questions examining New Zealand's involvement in the Greek 
Campaign of 1941 : 
1. What was the political and strategic rationale of sending the 2nd New Zealand 
Division to Greece? 
2. How well did the training and composition of the New Zealand Division 
prepare them for war in Greece? 
3. How suitable for command were the major protagonists m the 2nd New 
Zealand Division? 
ii 
4. How well did the New Zealand Army's equipment compared with that of the 
German Arm.y-(das Heer)? 
5. How did the morale of the New Zealand citizen soldiers stand up after their first 
campaign? 
The method of research to answer these questions were: 
1. Interviewing, or sending questionnaires to survivors of the campaign; 
2. Interviewing experts who have an academic interest in the campaign; 
3. Examining original material in the National Archives, the Turnbull Library and 
the Kippenberger Memorial Library at Waiouru Army Museum; 
4. Obtaining relevant written material in book reviews and articles from libraries 
and private individuals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two disparate views on the Greek Campaign: 
When Hitler' s armies were fighting desperately to hold several crumbling fronts, he 
still had to have a dozen German divisions scattered throughout Yugoslavia. This fact 
afterwards led General Wilson to point out the similarity of the Corunna campaign of 
1808 to the Greek Campaign of 1941: 'The effect of the appearance of a small British 
force on the Dictator causing him to conunit larger forces than the situation demanded.' 
W G. McClymont. 
Eden stated in the House of Commons: "Our action had delayed Germany' s attack on 
Russia for several weeks." ... l suggest such a method of justification is similar to a 
punter who having bought by mistake the wrong ticket at the tote, finds the horse wins, 
and then goes about saying "What a clever boy am I!" 
Francis de Guingand 
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From when the :first 'flight arrived in Piraeus on 7 March 1941 until 28 April 1941 
when most of the survivors were evacuated from the beaches of Southern Greece, the 
New Zealand division was in Greece for seven and a half weeks. Of course, as with all 
the British campaigns that had taken place upon the continent of Europe up to that 
date, there were some that did not leave. Two hundred and ninety one New 
Zealanders were killed and 1,614 were captured along with all of the Division's heavy 
equipment. In 1941, the third year of the war, the British Government, and the British 
Army high command had still not displayed the degree of military competence that 
was essential for victory. It was fortunate that the professionalism and courage of the 
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force deterred the Germans from invading the British Isles. 
The British army officer cadre of the 1920's and 1930's was one that was more 
concerned with campaigning in, and administering Britain's Imperial and Mandated 
territories. In 1939 the British Army, although well disciplined and having an 
excellent cadre of non-commissioned officers and men did not have the officers in the 
High Command that could deal with the modern mechanised warfare that the German 
Army (das Heer) imposed upon Europe. Nor did not having the doctrine or the 
training and skills in inter-unit communication that was essential for a war of 
manoeuvre 
The three weeks of this campaign is not a period that is looked back with any pride or 
nostalgia by any of the survivors, and yet it is not a campaign that drew shame upon 
any of the Commonwealth' participants. In many ways it was, after France, the most 
important campaign for the Commonwealth nations in the first three years of the 
Second World War. Had the British not gone to Greece, General Richard O'Connor 
could have swept the Italians from Tripolitania. The British would not have had to 
make up the equipment that they lost in the Balkans. The Australians could have 
properly reinforced Johore with two extra divisions and even if the allies did not have 
the proper air cover it is debatable whether with these numbers of trained troops, the 
Japanese would have contemplated an invasion of the Kra peninsula. 
1 Commonwealth, although very rarely used at this time is applied in preference to the now anachronistic term, Imperial. 
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The Balkan campaign exposed the paucity of strategic and command skills of Winston 
Churchill and his senior British commanders. It also exposed the sycophantic 
behaviour of Britain's senior generals who seem to have preferred staying in their 
exalted positions whilst sacrificing ahnost fifteen thousand men and the equipment of 
two and half divisions in the Balkans. 
Any army, and the New Zealand's Division was New Zealand's army, is a microcosm 
of society and the New Zealand Division was almost exactly one percent of New 
Zealand's populatioIL A volunteer army that is raised quickly will inevitably bring into 
it, the mores and culture of the society from which it is formed. The vast majority of 
the expeditionary force' s manpower was predominantly civilian in peacetime. 
The Greek campaign can be divided in to three components: 
One, the arrival in Greece and disposition of the New Zealand Division between the 
Aliakmon line and the Olympus line; 
two, the battles at the Mount Olympus passes; 
three, the defence of the Thermopylae line and the evacuation. 
Chapter one will examine: 
the politica4 strategic and military situation in New Zealand in 1939; 
the inauguration and development of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Its 
composition, for no country, and especially a country with a population the size of 
New Zealand' s in 1939 can assemble such a force and bring it to battle with any 
rapidity, unless it wishes that force to be destroyed; 
the decision to send 2nd NZEF to the Middle East and a description of the German 
army. 
Chapter two examines the external political strategic and military decisions in Britain, 
Germany, the Mediterranean, Greece and Italy that brought New Zealand' s 2nd 
Division to the Balkans. 
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Chapter three examines: 
the New Zealand Division's deployment; 
its first contact with the enemy; 
the German advance through the Monastir Gap which necessitated the retreat of the 
Commonwealth force. 
Chapter four deals with the battles on the Olympus passes. 
Chapter six covers the retreat to, and the stand on the Thermopylae line. 
These three chapters cover the majority of the military phase of the Campaign and had 
it ended there the New Zealand Division would in the words of Professor Walter 
Murphy "Not have put a foot wrong."2 The three other chapters cover those aspects of 
the Greek Campaign that reflect upon the strengths and weaknesses of the New 
Zealand Division. 
Chapter five examines the two battles that 21 Battalion fought at Platamon and in the 
Pinios Gorge. These battles reflect the importance of the senior leadership on the 
conduct of a military unit such as a battalion. 
Chapter seven covers the battle at the Corinth Canal and how the 'ad-hoe' organisation 
almost brought disaster to the evacuation. 
Chapter eight covers the battle at K.alamata. In this battle some brave New Zealand, 
Australian and British solders, marooned by the incompetence of the British 
Movement Control, defeated a substantial German incursion into the port ofK.alamata. 
Through these chapters this thesis will examine New Zealand's involvement in the 
Greek Campaign of 1941. The thesis aims to answer five key questions. They are: 
2 W.E. Murphy to Author, comment August 2004. 
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1. What was the political and strategic rationale of sending the 2nd New Zealand 
Division to Greece? 
2. How well did the training and composition of the New Zealand Division prepare 
them for war in Greece? 
3. How suitable for command were the major protagonists in the 2nd New Zealand 
Division? 
4. How well did the New Zealand Army' s equipment compared with that of the 
German Army- (das Heer)? 
5. How did the morale of the New Zealand citizen soldiers stand up after their first 
campaign? 
Amongst the national myths and aggrandisement, the behaviour of the men in the New 
Zealand Division in the Greek Campaign demonstrated to the World that the New 
Zealand citizen soldier had unique qualities conferred by this country that 
distinguished him from soldiers of other nations. It is hoped that this thesis will bring 
some of them to the fore. 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
An elite division. 
7 
Nazi Germany invaded Poland on Friday I September 1939. This act of war was to 
have its consequences a world away, for at 9.30 p.m. (New Zealand time) on 3 
September it was announced in the New Zealand Gazette Extraordinary that New 
Zealand was at war with Nazi Germany. This was no random moment for it was 
timed to be in conjunction with Great Britain's declaration of War. As the New 
Zealand Government did not have a representative in Berlin the American Ambassador 
was requested to deliver the ultimatum to von Ribbentrop. History does not disclose 
Ribbentrop's reaction 
It was fortunate that New Zealand was twelve thousand miles away from Europe, for 
the contradictory policies of the 'inter-bellum' administrations and economic 
constraints had conspired to ensure that the New Zealand Armed Forces had been 
allowed to run down. The New Zealand division of the Royal Navy was in 1939, the 
only force that had an adequate defence capability with two cruisers: Achilles and 
Leander, and two sloops assigned to New Zealand waters. As for New Zealand's Air 
Force, it comprised of a few modem Wellington bombers that were still in Britain; the 
rest ofNew Zealand' s aeroplanes were obsolete. 
At the outbreak of World War II New Zealand was just emerging from a debilitating 
economic depression that had lasted almost two decades. New Zealand' s economic 
well being depended upon its Imperial links and not-withstanding emotional ties, 
there were excellent strategic and economic reasons for New Zealand throwing her 
lot in with the United Kingdom. New Zealand is a maritime nation with a very long 
coastline, a small population and the nearest neighbour; Australia is two thousand 
kilometres away. Joint action by fellow members of the Commonwealth ensured 
some protection. The Suez Canal was predominantly British owned and controlled. 
The numerous British bases in Egypt, ostensibly a neutral country, defended the 
canal, a major trade route of the Empire. It was logical to base the New Zealand 
division here, either as a protection against the Italians in Libya, or in the United 
Kingdom as a base for an attack on or defence from Germany. 
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After the end of World War I attitudes to military training had changed. In 1914 New 
Zealand men were so enthusiastic to join the struggle that ten percent of the 
population had flocked to the colours and when one considers that this proportion of 
the population was predominantly male and between the ages of eighteen and forty 
the percentage is even higher. In Christopher Pugsley's opinion: 
Service to King, Empire and country was a tenet of New Zealand society. It was a 
virtue extolled in most outward expressions of New Zealand society ... Young boys 
trained as school cadets from the age of eight years and remained involved in some 
form of military activity until the age of25 years.' 
Regrettably New Zealand casualties, in proportion to population. were comparable 
with those of Russia. Over half of the service men that served overseas became 
casualties. Over seventeen thousand men were killed, one sixty-fifth of the population. 
Another eight and a half thousand New Zealanders died in 1918 through the influenza 
pandemic. After the recessions of the 'twenties', and the Great Depression, which 
started in 1929, the nation was tired and demoralised. Initially there was the hope that 
no world war would ever be fought again. Then economic naivete and political 
mismanagement ensured that most of the population was concerned just with survival. 
In 1930 the United Party suspended the compulsory clauses of the 1909 Defonce Act 
and service in the reserves became voluntary. 
When it came to power in 1935 the first Labour administration had an ambivalent 
attitude to defence. Several of their senior parliamentarians such as Peter Fraser were 
anti-war and anti-conscription or pacifists during World War I. 
Harry Holland, Peter Fraser and others had been jailed for sedition in 1917, for their 
opposition to the war, and Walter Nash and Rev Clyde Carr were Christian pacifists.' 
Others in the cabinet, such as William Jordan, William Barnard and John A Lee had 
3 Pugsley, C.(1998). Gallipoli- The New Zealand Story. Reed:Auckland. p.30. 
4 McIntyre, W .D. (1988) }iew Zealand Prepares for War. Caxton Press. Christchurch, p. 14 L 
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served in the 1st New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). What they all had in 
common was a belief that the New Zealand defence policy needed to be examined. 
They also believed that New Zealand's survival was strongly tied to the League of 
Nations. William Jordan in particular, had a distinguished service in the League 
Assembly, taking a robustly independent line from that of Britain by opposing British 
policy on Ethiopia, Spain, China and reform of the League Covenant. 
Throughout the World, the late 1930's were times of growing uncertainty and in New 
Zealand there was an increasing disenchantment with the ineffectiveness of the 
collective security promised by the League of Nations. Four Territorial Force Colonels 
who had the temerity to criticise the Labour Government's lack of action over the 
parlous state of New Zealand defence capacity were summarily dismissed, although 
three were later reinstated when war broke out.5 The lack of compulsion and the lack 
of emphasis on service in the Territorial Army had a serious consequence that only a 
few of the field officers in 1939 were below the age of forty-five. This was going to 
have a significant affect upon the Division's performance in the Balkans. 
Not withstanding their World War I pacifism there was no gainsaying the patriotism or 
the feelings of kinship of New Zealand's Government with Britain in 1939. It was 
quickly agreed with Britain that New Zealand would raise a division to serve overseas. 
The problem was what to do with it? Any action by New Zealand was governed by 
the attitude of Japan. In 1939, Japan was seen as the major threat in the Pacific to the 
British and Commonwealth possessions. New Zealand had not been in favour of 
Britain dropping the 1902 naval treaty with Japan after World War I. But once the 
British had decided upon this course, New Zealand then became a strong supporter of 
the construction of a naval base in Singapore. In the 1930's New Zealand had watched 
with alarm as Japan became more right wing and bellicose. 
'The four criticised the reorganisation of the New Zealand Army by the Chief of the General Staff. Believing that they had no 
other alternative they published a public manifesto. Not withstanding its inept handling of the matter the Government had no 
alternative but to dismiss them. 
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In November 1939 the new Prime Minister, Peter Fraser after consultation at the 
Commonwealth conference, it was decided to dispatch a New Zealand division of ten 
motorised infantry battalions to Egypt. As Britain controlled the Suez Canal the Middle 
East loomed large in Britains strategic considerations. The canal was a conduit for the 
oil from the British owned Persian (Iran), Kurdistan and Burmese oilfields and for 
exports and imports from the Empire. 
New Zealand did not have the facilities to equip and train a whole division so it made 
excellent sense to transfer it to an area where this could take place. Because of the 
consistency of the weather, Egypt was an excellent choice as a place for training. 
Therefore it was decided that the first echelon of the Second New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force of which the New Zealand Division was the major component, 
would leave for Egypt in January 1940. The Government appointed Major General 
Bernard Freyberg to be the commander of this expeditionary force. In 1939 Freyberg 
had offered his services to the Dominion and expressed the hope that he might serve 
with his compatriots. With h.is bluff exterior and high voiced 'pornmy · accent 
Freyberg could have been the epitome of the 'blimpish' generals that the British were 
particularly good at producing. Instead, within this exterior was a sensitive, 
considerate and intelligent man for whom h.is soldiers' welfare was always paramount. 
Freyberg, although not born in New Zealand, had spent his boyhood and youth in this 
country. Major General Freyberg was once a New Zealand dentist with a territorial 
comm1ss1on. He had travelled across the world and gained a commission into the 
British Naval Division by buttonholing Winston Church.ill on Horse-Guards Parade. 
This piece of legerdemain endeared him to Church.ill, and despite vicissitudes they 
remain friends for the rest ofFreyberg's life. There was a legend that he had fought in 
Pancho Villa's Army in Mexico - one he did nothing to dispel. He referred to himself 
as a New Zealander, and identified strongly with his Division. Physically brave he 
appeared not to know that insidious fear that grips ordinary mortals in battle. He had 
swum ashore at Gallipoli to light flares to distract the Turks from the real area of the 
Anzac landing. Later on in the war, leading a charge on a horse, he seized the 
Dendres bridges at Lessines a few minutes before the start of the armistice. This was 
I I 
no mean achievement for a man who had amused striking 'whar:fies' with the 
uncertainty of his seat in 1912 when he rode as one of Massey's 'cossacks' in 
Wellington. Freyberg came out of World War I with the Victoria Cross, a bar to the 
Distinguished Service Order and nine wound stripes6. After World War I, Freyberg 
had joined the Grenadier Guards, and then been appointed the Lieutenant Colonel of 
the 1 st Manchester battalion and whilst a Colonel he wrote on a succinct book 'A Study 
of Unit Administration' about the correct method of victualing of soldiers. Freyberg 
finally rose to the rank of Major General in the British Army before being discharged 
due to a heart murmur in 1937. Upon the outbreak of War he was re-activated and 
because of his outstanding record and connection with New Zealand he was quickly 
seized upon by the New Zealand Government to command the New Zealand Division1 • 
Freyberg has had many critics of his military conduct, but history has shown that as a 
divisional general he was the equal of, if not better than most of his contemporaries, 
and in his concern for his men he was second to none. Always a realist about the 
efficiency of the German Army (das Heer), he somewhat startled his officers and other 
ranks with his assessment of the German Army. To meet the threat of this army he 
was determined to create an elite division, a division that would eventually serve in 
more campaigns in the western theatre of operations than any other. As soon as he 
took command, Freyberg showed his unconventional attitudes and his legendary 
concern for his soldiers. Units such as Dental and Field Ambulance were entirely 
staffed by non-regulars. Freyberg made no attempt to change this as he believed that a 
non-military view on certain aspects of soldiering was beneficial and this was certainly 
true for the New Zealand Division's Medical Services. In February 1941 Freyberg 
was also instrumental in establishing the New Zealand Services Club. Although 
rousing the ire of 'wowsers' in New Zealand when reports of drunkenness by soldiers 
filtered back home, he resisted its closure until the Division was well into Italy. 
The New Zealand Army of 1939 had only one hundred officers and four hundred and 
seventy eight other ranks in Regular Force. From its apogee in 1914, when from a 
"The British Anny would issue a chevron for each major combat wound that a soldier received. 
7 At the time Freyberg was GOC Salisbury Plains, but he had let Fraser know that he wished to serve with his fellow countrymen 
(His words). However, in 1940, there is some doubt about how much Freyberg actually regarded himself as a New Zealander. 
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population of just over a million, New Zealand was able to provide 17,500 reservists to 
serve overseas, the New Zealand Territorial Force had been allowed to run down 
during the 1930's. In March 1939 there were just over 10,000 men in the two Reserve 
schemes. By October 1939, under the impetus of War there were just under 15,000 
reservists who were to comprise the First echelon. 
What was the composition of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) that was 
to be sent overseas? The majority of this force had volunteered for the duration. The 
senior officers of the New Zealand Division were predominantly lawyers and 
schoolmasters with a leaven of regulars. The brigadiers came from various 
backgrounds: 4th Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Edward Puttick. Puttick was 
a somewhat younger man than Freyberg and had been a Colonel in New Zealand's 
regular force at the outbreak of war. A rather colourless individual, there appears to 
have been some resentment at Freyberg getting the command of the 2nd NZEF. He 
was an enigma to Howard Kippenberger, in that he appeared to have no interest in 
training or of doctrine: 
He seldom looked at training, almost never directed it, but he had a knack of knowing 
what was going on, and all his written work was informed and instructive.8 
He commanded the 4th Brigade in Greece and was in charge of the New Zealand 
Division in Crete, he later became the New Zealand Chief of General Staff. 
Brigadier James Hargest, commander of 5th Brigade was a farmer and National Party 
Member of Parliament. Kippenberger' s opinion was that he was easy going, good-
natured and rather self-indulgent. Due to his age and the lasting affects of shell shock 
(Hargest was fifty) Freyberg was not keen on his appointment, but because he was a 
Member of Parliament, he was foistered on Freyberg by the Government, 
notwithstanding that he had been turned down by a medical board. He had served with 
distinction in World War I with the Otago Regiment, and later was the Commanding 
8Kippenberger. H, to McClymont, M. Letter 6 March 1953. WA ll 3/16. National Archives. 
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Officer of the 2nd Otago Battalion. Kippenberger felt that he never really had a grip 
on the 5th Brigade. Accustomed to the static trench warfare in World War I he was 
somewhat fixed in his attitude to war and his hesitation in Crete contributed to the 
aerodrome at Maleme falling into German hands. It is Kippenberger' s opinion that no 
other Brigade would have lost Maleme aerodrome9 • 
Brigadier Harold Barraclough led the 6th Brigade to Greece. A lawyer by profession, 
he had served with distinction in World War I, rising to the command of 4 Battalion, 
New Zealand Rifle Brigade in World War I and gaining the Distinguished Service 
Order for being instrumental in driving back a German attack in Havrincourt. On 
November of 1918 he led his battalion over the castle walls of Le Quesnoy. A 
forceful, aggressive man, he lobbied constantly against the decline of New Zealand's 
preparedness for war .10 In August 1939, with the imminence of war apparent, he 
again volunteered his services and was accepted. 
Other senior officers who were to distinguish themselves in Greece were Lieutenant 
Colonels: William Inglis and Howard Kippenberger. William Inglis, 'Whisky Bill' 
was commissioned in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade in the First World War where he 
won the Military Cross. During the locust years of inter-war period he was a Reserve 
Lieutenant Colonel. Before he was able to go overseas he had to have an operation to 
make him fit for service. 11 He was perhaps too fixed in his ways for the rapid type of 
warfare in World War II. A telling anecdote is when the Division was under his 
command after Freyberg was wounded at Minqar Qaim he was found by Kippenberger 
having breakfast while the 4th Brigade was being destroyed at Ruweisat ridge. He 
also had a habit of disappearing for days at time to Cairo where no one could find 
him. 12 Another lawyer, Howard Kippenberger was an austere man in the 'cromwellian' 
mould. A private soldier in World War I, he had continued in the Territorial Force, 
enduring the neglect of the inter-war years to become a Lieutenant Colonel in the 
9 Kippenberger' s comments on the senior officers can be found in WA II 3/16 vol 2. Draft ofW.G . McClyrnonts To Greece.N.A 
'
0 Barrowclough was responsible fur the reinvigoration of the Defence League- a defence lobby group. 
11 It was is difficult to ascertain what type ofoperation this was. 
12 It was I.McL. Wards the historian and archivist, opinion that he had a mistress in Cairo. This caused Kippenberger's revised 
opinion of him 
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Reserves. To prepare himself for another war. he assiduously read military history. 
His outward severity was softened by his concern for his infantrymen and a refusal to 
take himself too seriously. 
The Commander of the Royal Artillery (CRA) was Brigadier Reginald Miles. A 
regular soldier, he was physically brave, energetic and a forceful leader, he was 
responsible for the professionalism of the artillery, which gave the Division its 
powerful 'punch' throughout the war. Until he was captured at Sidi Rezegh, 
Freyberg considered him his natural successor." The Commander of the New Zealand 
Army Service Corps (Logistics and Supply) was Brigadier Stanley Crump, a highly 
capable man and as with other senior officers he was a veteran of the 1 st New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force. Major Clifton commanded the Engineers and 
Lieutenant Colonel S.F. Allen the Signallers. S.F. Allen was later to be killed in the 
battle for Ruweisat ridge. Head of the Army Medical Corps was Lieutenant Colonel 
K. McCormick who was an Auckland surgeon, but was familiar to war, having served 
in World War L Under McCormick's aegis the Division developed a mobile hospital 
unit which always operated close to the front line. 
Because of the rapidity of the increase in size of the Army, the majority of the field 
and company officers were not from the Regular Force. Most of them had 
commissions from the Territorial Force, but some of the younger officers were 
commissioned on the strength of having experience in the School Cadet Force. Cadet 
Force was phenomenon of some New Zealand high schools and boarding schools that 
endured from just before World War I until the late 1960's. The writer Peter Winter 
has a stronger opinion: 
Our j1IDior officers, who had progressed from [boy) scouts to territorial in this naive 
anny, were arrogant in their newfound authority. With the stock phrase; 'You aren't 
paid to think soldier.'" 
n Miles escaped from Prisoner of War camp in I 943, only to conunit suicide in Spain, Professor W. Murphy believes that Miles 
was of the opinion that Freyberg had lost confidence in him after a fierce argument prior to the battle of Sidi Rezcgh. Miles may 
have also thought he compromised a French family when he crossed Vichy France in 1943. 
1
~ Winter. P.(l 989).bpendable lhe CreJ campaign- a.front line view.Moa Press Ltd. Tauranga. p.7. 
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This attitude quickly lost credence in Greece and Crete, where a more professional 
attitude was forced on young men who were expected to lead men from an egalitarian 
society. One of the reasons that New Zealanders fought so well, is because they came 
from a small, relatively poor, colonial country where there was a good chance of being 
known in the community. 'Mateship' was not so heavily emphasised in New Zealand 
as it was in Australia but it was considered bad form to let your mates down. The New 
Zealand Army never really came to terms with egalitarian leadership. Junior officers 
were tolerated if they were liked and ignored if they were not up to the job.15 
What sort of men were they, these New Zealanders who were to confront the German 
attack? Their non-commissioned officers were predominantly from the Territorial 
Force who had impressed their officers with their tough demeanour, and most of the 
men who enlisted were physically and mentally tough. The men who were to fill its 
ranks were products of the 'thirties'. Many were prematurely aged, hardened 
physically and mentally by the Depression, and cynical about authority. Keith 
Sinclair wrote: 
It is as hard now to recall New Zealand in 1932... the ragged anny of men 'on the 
dole', ... architects teachers carpenters, chipping weeds on the footpaths; malnutrition in 
the schools - and children stealing lunches, ex-servicemen begging outside a pub; the 
queue at the ' soup kitcben'.'6 
For many, the army was an opportunity for a decent set of clothes, boots, and the 
opportunity for medical and dental treatment. For the younger men it was an 
opportunity for adventure which is a greater recruiting sergeant than any call to 
patriotism. For the Maori members of Parliament such as Sir Apirana Ngata it was 
the opportunity for the Maori to contribute to the world struggle in order to be 
recognised as equals to the European settlers. 
15 Several interviewees commented on this. Agreement with the officer circumvented disobedience and then doing what the men thought 
was the sensible action. 
16Keith Sinclair.(1988). A History of New Zealand. Penguin: Auckland, p.258. 
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For countrymen of such a new country, they had a formidable reputation. In World 
War I they were: " ... in the judgement of many soldiers ... the best division in 
France."" The majority were city or town dwellers. Two thirds of them were 
unmarried; two thirds were Anglican in denomination, the other third comprised of 
Presbyterian, Catholic, Methodist and around one percent were Jewish. In World 
Wars I and II, New Zealanders were commonly described as being tall men., so it will 
come as a surprise to learn that the average height was 5 foot 8 eight inches ( 1. 72 
metres).'" Most were relatively young - the largest age group being twenty-one. (This 
is perhaps somewhat inaccurate as a lot of the younger men put up their ages to the 
requisite twenty one years to make them eligible to leave New Zealand.) However 
there was a leavening of experience with a substantial number of volunteers in their 
mid-twenties. Upon enlistment the largest numbers of recruits were labourers, then 
drivers and mechanics and a substantial number were salesmen. Some units had a 
disproportionate representation. Divisional Cavalry had a large number of farmers 
and farm labourers. A large number of the volunteers had previous military 
experience. In some units, for example the Divisional Artillery. over half had served 
in the territorial force.'" For instance two of the veterans interviewed for this thesis: 
D.G. Morrison and Harry Spencer, prior to the war had spent thirteen and seven years 
in the Territorial Force respectively. For Harry Spencer 'Camp Life' was especially 
halcyon., ammunition was acquired to go along with the issued Enfield 303 rifle and 
this put to good use hunting pigs in the hills surrounding Blenheim and Marlborough. 
Some had undertaken cadet training at school and some had served in the various 
Commonwealth armed forces, including the Royal Navy. One at least had served in 
the V,lhite Russian Army." 
18 J Vader (1974) Pumell's History of Second fVorld War The Anzac Soldier. Purnell. London (Attributed to Conan Doyle), 
p.3065. 
1
"The New Zealanders 1,1,··cre probably tall in comparison v.ith the English 'Tommy' and the French 'Poilu". General Haig 
described them as 'a sturdy, thickset type of man.' Pugsley, C. (2003). The An::ac Experience New Zeakmd. Australia and Empire 
jn the Firs/ World War, p.123. 
20 Statistics obtained from: 20 Mwphy,. W.E. ( 1966')0.fficial History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45. 2nd 
Di\-·isional Artiliery.War History Branch. Department ofinternal Affairs. Wellington. 
21 Murphy,. W.E. (1966) Official History ofl•iew Zealand m the Second World War 1939-45. 2nd Divisional Artillery. War- History 
Branch. Department of Internal Affairs. Wellington, p.13. 
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The New Zealanders who interviewed for this thesis, or left their recollections on an 
oral history: Peter Winter was working as a newspaper journalist, Max Ritter as a 
plumber, Karl Yortt and Stocker Boyd were bank officers. Dan Davin, a Rhode 
Scholar, was studying (or as the English would say reading) the 'Greats' at Oxford. 
Harry Spencer was a diesel 'shunter' driver with New Zealand railways, D.G. Morrison 
was a farmer, Harry Palmer worked at a dairy factory near Palmerston North, Jack 
Turvey worked at a Woollen Mills in Oamaru; Walter E. Murphy was a business analyst 
in London and A.H. Armour a lawyer. These men and many others came from many 
diverse occupations to form one of the largest bodies of men to leave the shores of this 
country. 
The New Zealand Division was to be clothed by New Zealand and the soldiers of the 
First echelon left New Zealand wearing the old style World War I tunic. In 1940 they 
would change into the 'battle-dress' recently adopted by the British who had discarded 
the four pocket, single breasted jacket that they had had since World War I (the 
Australians continued with this fashion). The New Zealand Division was until 1943 an 
infantry division. An infantry division had two arms for offensive action, its artillery 
and its infantry. The small arms were to be acquired from Australia and Britain. The 
famous short magazine Lee Enfield rifle (SMLE) and Vickers Medium machine gun 
were obtained from Australia and the Bren-gun from Britain. The Mark III SMLE 
Enfield rifle originated in 1907. It had done stalwart service in World War I and it had 
been responsible for the 'Kindertodt ' at Ypres in 1914 when German reservists walked 
into a hail of accurate rapid fire from the 'Old Contemptibles' .22 It may have been a 
World War I weapon, but it was still very effective. A skilled marksman would be 
capable of accurate aimed fire at ranges of one and a half kilometres with the rear sights 
calibrated in 200-yard intervals from 200 to 2000 yards (183 - 1830 metres). Its box 
magazine was capable of holding ten 303 rimmed rounds. The SMLE also had a 'cut-
out' that allowed an extra round to be loaded without using any of the rounds in the 
magazme. It is considered to have been one of the best military bolt-action rifles ever 
devised. Equally distinguishable was the sword bayonet. The blade was over twelve 
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inches long, and was a distinguishing feature of the New Zealand infantryman. The 
New Zealanders who retained 
Thompson (Tommy) sub-machine gun Mk 1928. 
the SMLE continued to use the 'sword bayonet' when the British moved away to the Number 
IV Lee-Enfield and went to the 'pig-sticker' spiked bayonet. Although the bayonet was used 
infrequently for the purpose that it was designed, the ' sword bayonet' was an excellent can 
opener, and very popular with the soldiers. The infantryman also carried the ' Mills ' bomb. 
Although it could not be thrown as far as the 
Lee-Enfield SMLE 303 Rifle. 
German 'potato masher ' with its round crenellated shape it was far more deadly. The section 
light machine gun, was the beloved and redoubtable Bren gun. An Enfield adaptation of the 
original weapon from Brno, Czecho-Slovakia it was an extremely effective weapon when 
used properly. Although not having the rate of fire of the maschinengewehr 34 or 42 
(popularly and incorrectly known as the Spandau) it was a reliable and efficient weapon. 
Firing a rimmed 303 round, it was a two man weapon, although some New Zealand soldiers 
used them 'tommy-gun' style in close encounters, which is quite remarkable as the gun was 
over twice the weight of the SMLE. Its cyclic rate of fire was 550 rounds per minute, 
although the well-trained soldier would fire in short five round bursts to prevent jamming and 
bouncing on its bipod. 
22 A term attributed to the kaiser Wilhelm II, who is supposed to have referred to the British Army in 1914 as ' that contemptible 
little anny'. For the ' kindertodt' see Macdonald, L. ( 1989). 1914.Penguin Books: London, p.365 . 
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Bren Gun. 
Just prior to going to Greece, some soldiers in the infantry platoon, - and they would 
have considered themselves lucky, were issued with the Thompson sub-machine gun. 
The 'tommy-gun' had a cachet from the Hollywood 'gangster' movies of the 1930' s. 
The Ml928 ' trench sweeper' was a heavy weapon, firing a low velocity large calibre 
0.45-inch round. The original 50 round drum was not particularly effective for 
military use, nor was the front pistol grip and was quickly replaced by the 20-30 round 
box magazine and the horizontal fore-grip. 
The weapon of the 27th (Machine-Gun) Battalion was the Vickers Machine Gun Mkl a 
medium machine-gun. Although not as glamorous as the German MG 34 and MG 42, it 
was an extremely reliable and efficient weapon. The 27th Battalion would often use 
mass indirect fire to 'beat' the enemy positions at extreme range. In five man teams the 
medium machine gun was particularly effective in Greece. This machine-gun was used 
on fixed lines for direct and in-direct fire. Several were lashed together on the ship 
carrying the 27 Battalion to Greece and brought down a German bomber. For the 
heavier equipment, the New Zealanders had to wait until they reached Maadi camp in 
Egypt. 
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Vickers Mk I M.G .. 
By early 1941 the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force was almost fully equipped. 
An attempt was made to issue all the troops with the full G l 098 equipment. By February it 
was fashionable for the well-dressed soldier to be wearing khaki drill by day and the new 
battle-dress uniform at night." 
The Divisional Cavalry performed the reconnaissance of the New Zealand Division. 
Although no longer endowed with horses, they still retained the elan of a cavalry 
regiment. The Divisional Cavalry were 'saddled' with the Marmon-Herrington Mk II 
Armoured car. This car was a South African assembled vehicle that was both 
comfortable and fast on a light truck chassis. Its power plant was a Canadian Ford V-8 
Engine, it was a reliable vehicle on the road but their armour and its Vickers 303 
machine gun were not up to confronting the excellent German armoured cars, the 
heavier armoured schwerer Panzerwagen SdKjZ232 or the leichter Panzerwagen 
SdKfz222. 
The Divisional Artillery obtained the MKII 25-pounder. There were few heavy British 
weapons that were equal to their German equivalents but this most certainly was. In the 
23 McClymont, W. G. (1953 ). The Official History of New Zealand in World War Il To Greece War History Branch Department 
ofimemal Affitirs. Wellington. P.8I. The synopsis of the complete equipment ofa unit, itemised and enumerated. 
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division there were seventy-two of these weapons with twenty-four guns in each of the 
three artillery Regiments. With eight guns to each battery, this gave the Division a 
Marmon-Herrington Armoured Car. 
formidable punch. A purpose built 'gun-howitzer' with a range of 13,400 yards (12,253 
metres) on supercharge, it was a distinctive weapon with its accompanying limber and 
' quad' tractor. It fired a twenty five-pound 3.45-inch (87.6-mm) round at a rate of four 
to seven rounds a minute. In Greece and later on in the desert it was often used as an 
anti-tank weapon. With its circular firing table it could rapidly be transferred to 
different targets. Attached to its quad tractor and limber it was a familiar sight to the 
New Zealanders in World War II. The infantry in Greece would come to bless the 
gunners of the Australian, New Zealand and Royal Horse Artillery field regiments who 
were prepared to fight their guns until the German tanks were in their lines. Its 
efficiency would certainly be needed as the two-pounder anti-tank weapon unless used 
properly would be found to be inadequate against the 30mm (1.25 inch) of armour of a 
German Mark IV or Mark III.24 
The platoons were issued with the British two inch or three inch mortars as an infantry 
support weapon. Both weapons could be carried in the Bren-gun Carrier. Initially this 
24 The writer and gunner Professor Walter Murphy believes that a lot of the anti-tank gunners did not know how to use their 
weapon properly. 
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Bren Gun Carrier 
weapon had a mediocre range of 1463 metres and could be out-shot by its German 
counterpart the 8-cm Grw 34 but later in the War more efficient propellants brought it 
up to a useful range of 2515 metres. Every company had a carrier platoon. This was 
the Bren gun (Universal) carrier on a Lloyd suspension. Although it was not able to 
'mix-it' with armoured vehicles it made an excellent cross-country vehicle for the larger 
machine guns and mortars of the infantry. In Greece they sometimes used to charge 
enemy tanks, generally unsuccessfully. 
The men of the First echelon were to have three months of basic training before going 
overseas. Lest it be thought that all New Zealanders were natural soldiers, J.L. Scoullar 
recalled a meeting that he had with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence in 
early 1940: 
Our politicians and the people generally believe the New Zealand soldier fit to take a 
place in battle as soon as weapons are placed in his hands. I had an hour and a half with 
the Minister of Defence and ... with Mr Savage the next morning in January 1940, 
trying to convince him that sending untrained men into battle was murder. The New 
Zealander is only the raw material of a good soldier. Train him and he is only the equal 
of any . .. We must destroy the illusion that every New Zealander is naturally a good 
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shot, a belief that has its origins in the idea oflife in the v,ide open spaces where meals 
are hilllted.25 
There was marching, physical training and of course bayonet drill. For most service 
personnel there is an instinctive distaste to impaling someone on the end of a bayonet. 
Bayonet training was an attempt to make the thrust an instinctive action. Some such as 
D.G. Morrison and Harry Spencer found the training adequate, but they were long time 
members of the Territorial Force and were used to Military Camps. More realistic 
training would occur in Egypt, where an attempt would be made to simulate the stress 
and chaos of battle. Others who had not been 'Territorials' and had volunteered in 1939 
thought that, apart from the marching, it was a waste of time; Peter Winter" recalls with 
disgust the "antics of a drunken cook [ a regular]... . .. chasing roasts of beef around the 
filthy kitchen floor with a carving fork ... "" Peter Winter was a member of Petrol 
Company and was later taken prisoner on Crete. His opinions of army life and senior 
officers are somewhat jaundiced. However as one who was considered for a 
commission and worked in the Historical Publication Branch for a short period his 
views are a legitimate contrast to some of the more anodyue accounts of the early years 
of the Division. 
The infantry components of the New Zealand Division's ten battalions were organised 
into three Brigades. The numbering followed consecutively the numbers of the three 
original Brigades in the 1st New Zealand Division stationed in New Zealand for home 
defence. A brigade was not expected to operate in isolation and if it was detached from 
the division it could expect other elements from the division to be attached. For 
instance a regiment of artillery (24 guns), anti-tank weapons, signals, divisional cavalry 
and engineers would be attached depending on circumstances. The 4th Brigade was 
commanded by Brigadier Puttick comprised of the 18, 19 and 20 Battalions. The 
battalions of 4th Brigade were commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonels Gray, a 
25McLeod, p.16. 
16 Winter, P. (1989) Expendable. The Crete campaign- a front line view.Moana Press Ltd. Tauranga, p.7 
27 Winter,p. 7 
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former barrister and solicitor, V arnham an newspaper manager and Kippenberger. The 
5th Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Hargest and comprised of the 21, 22, 23 and 
28 (Maori Battalion) battalions. They were commanded respectively by Lieutenant 
Colonels Macky a barrister and solicitor, Andrew a regular soldier since the end of 
World War I, Falconer a tobacconist and Dittmer who like Andrew was a regular soldier 
since the end of World War I. The 6th Brigade was commanded by Brigadier 
Barraclough and comprised of the 24 25 and 26 Battalions. Barraclough's three 
Battalion Commanders were Wilder, Shuttleworth and Page. 
A New Zealand infantry battalion was normally commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel 
and generally comprised of thirty-two officers and 744 other ranks (O.R.s). The front 
line fighting strength of the battalion was composed of four companies of ninety men 
in three platoons of thirty each. Each platoon was normally commanded by an officer 
generally a first or second lieutenant. Each company had a company headquarters 
platoon that was commanded by the Company commander, normally a captain with a 
staff of ten. There was also a tactical headquarters staffed by two officers and six 
company comprising of an administration staff of one officer and fourteen O.R.s. A 
mortar-platoon with one officer and ten 0.R.s an anti-aircraft platoon with one officer 
and fourteen O.R.s and a carrier platoon of one officer and twenty-two 0.R.s. There 
was also a reserve of five officers and eighty-two O.R.s. Should the battalion be 
destroyed, two officers and seventy-six 0.R.s would be left out of battle to form a 
cadre for its reconstruction. (See diagram page 25.) 
On the morning of 12 February 1940 the RMS Empress of Canada dropped anchor at 
Port Tewfik at the head of the Gulf of Suez. The Empress of Canada carried 809 
New Zealand service personnel who were predominantly the Head-Quarters 
contingent of the New Zealand Division and the 4th Field Regiment. As they 
disembarked, they were greeted by the British Ambassador to Egypt, Generals 
Freyberg and Wavell and Anthony Eden, a man who was to play such a prominent 
part in sending them to Greece. These were the advance guards for later arrivals. 
Those who travelled on the converted passenger liners such as the Empress of 
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Canada, Rangitata, Orion, Strathaird and Sobieski counted themselves fortunate in 
comparison with the squalid conditions of the Dunera "an army transport with all the 
simplicity and most of the discomforts of such ships."21 On the way to Egypt in the 
First echelon, some troopers (they were gunners), disgusted with the meat supply that 
had been sitting on the wharf in Bombay intended for their meals, occupied the bridge 
of the Troopship Ormonde. ''Their action was tantamount to mutiny; but it was 
warmly supported by other troops on board, including infantry."29 These were the 
men who were prepared to do their bit, but they were not prepared to put up with the 
living conditions that were inflicted on British regulars. After enduring a boring rail 
trip beside the Nile the first echelon marched into their first camp at Maadi camp 
behind the pipe band of the Cameron Highlanders. Maadi was ninety miles from Port 
Tewfik and eight miles from Cairo. From this location the pyramids were clearly 
visible. A camp was the appropriate term; Kippenberger describes the location as 
little more than a desert, "a sandy plateau overlooked by a rock strewn hillock. "30 
Kippenberger also conunents that this 'hill' was to be known as 'Bludgers Hill' as 
this was the initial headquarters of the 4th Brigade. Here the New Zealanders were to 
receive the first of their heavy equipment. The Divisional Cavalry received the 
utilitarian Bren-gun carrier and the antiquated Mark VIB Rolls Royce tanks. The 4th 
Field Regiment received the World War vintage 18-pounder gun and the 4.5-inch 
Howitzer. 
Relationships with the British in Egypt were initially very good. Wavell and Freyberg 
were quite close friends who would often mess together when Freyberg was in Egypt.3 1 
Desiring cordial relations with the British Freyberg released NZEF units to work with 
the British provided his permission was sought. To this purpose, New Zealand units 
took part in ensuring the internal security of British areas and the 4th Brigade was 
given the security of Cairo and the adjacent airfields to manage. Requests were made 
for use of the Divisional Signallers and of Railway troops, which were granted, but this 
28 Murphy. p.21. 
~ Murphy. p.14. 
30 Murphy, P.22. 
31Freyberg, P.( 1991) Bernard Freyberg V. C. Hodder & Stoughton. London, pp 187-8. 
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happy state of affairs did not last. In July of 1940 whilst Freyberg was in England, 
General Wavell proposed merging 16th Australian Brigade with the 4th New Zealand 
Brigade to form a 6th Australian Division. Wavell also proposed that the Divisional 
Cavalry and 27 (Machine Gun) battalion be put under the command of the 4th Indian 
Division. Freyberg quickly cabled Wavell an expression of his disapproval. 
[N]o such change can be made without the approval of the New Zealand Government, I 
hope these proposals will not be proceeded with. I do not wish to disclose to the New 
Zealand Government the proposals as outlined by you to break up the New Zealand 
Force, as they would make a most unfavourable impression in New Zealand official 
circles with repercussions you probably have not foreseen. 32 
Disapproval or not, when Freyberg returned to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 
September of 1940 he found, contrary to the New Zealand Governments Charter, (See 
appendix 1) that all that he had under his command were his Headquarter troops.. He 
found that Wavell was about to dissolve the New Zealand Division. 
[H]e had reverted to the First World War policy that Dominion troops were part of the 
British Army, and as such the supreme Commander was able to do what he wished 
with them. The over-riding policy was that they must conform to an overall plan, and 
that the New Zealand government's instructions to keep the Division together were, in 
effect, to be disregarded. 33 
To his shock the New Zealand Division had been dispersed to various areas in the 
Middle East: 
AH he [Freyberg] had left under his direct control was his own headquarters .... [TJhe original 
plan of dispersal, which he thought the CIGS had countennanded, had been enacted lillder 
another guise.34 
General Freyberg writes about his dealings with General Wavell m a letter to 
McClymont: 
32 McCleod, J. (1989). Myth And Reality The New Z,ea/and Soldier in World War II. Heinmann Reed: Auckland, p.174. 
32 Quoted in Freyberg, P .. p.235. 
33 
Freyberg, p.232. 
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General Wavell about that time was very secretive. He ... dealt with Government's 
direct. He had been very successful against the Italians in telling us nothing. I had lent 
the British forces all the units that they had asked for, for the defence of Egypt. When I 
wanted them back to train the NZ Div they put me off and then refused to let me have 
them. I took great exception to the fact that they had used these NZ Div 
signs[signallers], sappers and Tpt[Transport] on operations in the first desert battle 
without informing me or my Gov' t. I personally found Gen Wavell and his 
staff: . . . ,most unsatisfactory to deal with. 35 
Whilst in the United Kingdom Freyberg bad expressed his opinions to General Dill the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) about the inadvisability of attempting to 
split up the New Zealand contingent, obviously with little effect. Whether Dill, whom 
the Private Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan referred 
to as a 'ninny', actually referred Freyberg' s complaint to Wavell or not is one of 
conjecture. Lieutenant General Thomas Blarney' s opinion was that Freyberg was a 
fool to offer the New Zealand units piecemeal.36 He had been well aware, as a staff 
officer in World War I, of the arguments between Generals Monash and Haig over the 
use of the Australian contingents. In 1941 , Wavell was regarded as one of Britain' s 
most able soldiers, but he bad incurred the asperity of Churchill early on in the War. 
Other than the United Kingdom, the Middle East was the largest source of trained 
Regular troops and Churchill disagreed with the dispositions of the forces with which 
Wavell bad chosen to defend this region. Wavell did not help his case by his customary 
taciturnity and secrecy. Wavell is referred to being an 'intellectual' General. 
Undoubtedly he was well read and had published a biography of his hero Lord Allenby. 
He was also a man who was laconic to the point of inarticulateness. Wavell was also 
not a stranger to intrigue. In 1940 he and Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson 
conspired to remove Major General Percy Hobart from the command of the Mobile 
division (later to become the 7th Division - The Desert Rats). It is interesting to note 
that Hobart and his innovations had gained the attention of Churchill, who brought him 
34 
Freyberg, p233. 
35 Freyberg to McClymont, letter dated 15 November 1948. WA 11 3/16. N.A 
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back out of retirement to form the British 79th armoured division. Churchill never 
particularly cared for the taciturn Wavell, and appointed him to be the Commander in 
Chief in India as soon as possible. 
Freyberg, unlike Blarney was a serving officer in the British Army and therefore was in 
an invidious position. He felt that matters had come to such a state that an official Jetter 
to Lieutenant General Maitland Wilson would be in order. In it Freyberg states that the 
New Zealand Forces cannot be split up without the expressed permission of the New 
Zealand Government. To emphasise this point he enclosed a copy of the charter of the 
special powers vested in him (See appendix one). Freyberg wrote: 
The position is quite clear; in an emergency we will all work under anybody's 
command, and do any job for which we are trained and equipped. The Division cannot 
be used piecemeal. When the equipment has been completed up to an operational scale 
and has been in its position for at least a month, the NZEF will handed over by the New 
Zealand Government and placed under command of the Alf or BTE (British Troops 
Egypt). or it may even take part in some theatre of war not yet decided upon." 
Freyberg quickly found that old friendships count for naught when one is caught up in a 
power struggle. Even Anthony Eden turned his substantial charm in an attempt to 
subvert Freyberg from his perceived duty to New Zealand. 
Mr Eden asked why l would not let 4 New Zealand Brigade Group take part in the 
[coming] offensive, and I gave the ordinary common-sense reply that my job was to 
concentrate the New Zealanders for use as a Division. In a crisis, l would allow New 
Zealand Forces to be used piecemeal, but not otherwise. When I added that the New 
Zealand Government would not agree to breaking up the Division, l was given the 
astonishing reply, 'What, those dear old men, they would agree to anything.'" 
When looking back sixty years one can sympathise with Freyberg for all he really 
wanted was the best for his division. It must have come as a great disappointment to 
-;; Freyberg, p.235. 
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him to have an argument with his old friend Wavell ''when things were said that cannot 
be too quickly forgotten. ''3• 
Wavell had been planning a counter-attack on the Italians who were sitting immobile on 
the Egyptian border. He had hoped to use the 4th Brigade in this attack but had been 
disabused by the New Zealand Government (and presumably forcefully by Freyberg) 
who wanted the Division 'to go into action as a complete division under their own 
commander."«> This does not mean that elements of the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force were not used during the First Libyan campaign. The Army Supply Corps was 
utilised taking men and supplies to the Front and then transporting Italian prisoners back 
to the prison cages in the Delta Driver Peter Winter in Petrol Company spoke of the 
confusion of driving trucks through Cairo when there were no maps and as they left in 
five-minute intervals, no contact with the truck ahead or behind. The New Zealanders 
also first experienced the lack of knowledge that the average British soldier had with 
their transport. Most New Zealand soldiers, coming from a mobile society had some 
knowledge of how vehicles worked. They were astounded to find that the average 
British soldier (most who could not drive) did not know how to fix trucks and cars. In 
this milieu little-known elements of the Expeditionary Force came into their own. The 
Railway companies took over eighty miles of track between El Daba and Mersa Matruh. 
The Engineers in 6 Field Company built eighteen miles of water pipe-lines, whilst 
another group in the Fifth Field Park Company took over operating the water pump and 
supervising the pipe lines. Regrettably close proximity to the front line was bound to 
bring casualties. On Christmas Eve 1940 New Zealand Army Supply Troops in 
company with British and Cypriot soldiers were unloading the Christmas supplies from 
barges when the Italian Airforce bombed them. Thirteen New Zealand soldiers were 
killed. Other New Zealand soldiers to see action were members of the Long Range 
Desert Group (LRDG) . For this force the British provided the officers, who were 
experienced desert navigators in the Western Desert, the Egyptian Army provided the 
39 Freyberg, p.236. 
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vehicles and the New Zealand Army provided the soldiers for the first three patrols. •1 In 
between 4th Brigade's duties there were more training exercises and according to John 
McLeod: 
4 Brigade in their first divisional training exercise in April 1940 - [was] nothing short 
of a fiasco. The 4 Brigade attack was a total disaster. Major General Sir William 
Gentry, then a staff officer at Divisional Headquarters considered that 'the whole 
brigade would have been annihilated without any doubt. I've never forgotten them 
coming over the hill...all the machine guns there waiting for them".42 
The second echelon (5th Brigade) of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force was raised 
by early January 1940. Its' commander was Brigadier James Hargest. The second 
echelon was well at sea when the decision was made to divert it to Britain. The 
military situation in Europe had become so serious that it was decided not to take the 
Brigade through the Mediterranean but by the Cape of Good Hope route. On 16 June 
1940 the Convoy anchored in the Clyde. Coming as they did just after the evacuation 
of Dunkirk; the Australian and New Zealand contingents were met by a rapturous 
welcome. They were quickly entrained to southern England. InitiaHy they were at the 
British army base of Aldershot in southern England, they were then based at Mychett, 
behind the beaches of Kent and Sussex. From their camps the soldiers of 5th Brigade 
had a grandstand view of the 'Battle of Britain'. Some New Zealand soldiers on leave 
were caught up in the 'Blitz' the German bombing of the capital. Several helped dig 
for survivors when the 'Bank' Tube station took a direct hit. Not withstanding the 
tension of awaiting an invasion most the 5th Brigade regarded their time in southeast 
England as sublime. Lieutenant Stocker Boyd of the 7th Anti-tank Regiment spoke of 
how a considerate battery commander would always arrange for their route marches to 
end at a Kent country pub. Towards the end of 1940 it became apparent that the 
Germans were not going to invade England. Finally in December the Second Echelon 
was finally able to leave for Egypt, as affairs were afoot in the Middle East. 
" In 1943 New Zealanders were still being used in the LRDG, and after the fuilure ofthe Dodacanese expedition Freyberg 
insisted that they were returned to the 200 NZEF. 
42 McLeod, quoting General Sir William Gentry, p.16. 
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In October 1940 when the Third Echelon arrived in the Gulf of Suez from New 
Zealand; the Military situation had changed radically from when the First Echelon 
arrived. The British had been defeated in Norway and France. The German 
occupation of the northern French industrialised areas and the eastern seaboard now 
meant that the contest with the Italians for the control of the Mediterranean devolved 
onto the British Navy. During this period British relations with the Japanese had 
worsened. The Japanese had forced the British to close the Burma Road •3 and travel to 
British concessions in China through Japanese occupied areas was becoming difficult. 
The British were now in no condition to send a fleet to the Far East to guard their 
interests there. As the Foreign Secretary of Japan, Matsuoka commented to Hitler that 
this was an opportunity that could only occur for Japan in a thousand years. Given this 
situation with the Japanese, the New Zealand Government took a particularly long-
sighted view and decided to release the Third echelon to join the First Echelon in 
Egypt. 
It was early in 1941 that the New Zealand Division was separated from the 2nd New 
Zealand Expeditionary force. "There were four elements of 2NZEF: the 2nd New 
Zealand Division, non-divisional units, line of communication units, and Base units."44 
The 6th Brigade moved out of Maadi Camp to join the elements of the New Zealand 
Division at Helwan. Most of the 4th Brigade was in the Baggush box where it was to 
be used as a reserve should the desert offensive against the Italians falter. Maadi 
Camp, from now on, was to be used as the headquarters for the Base units and as a 
training depot for reinforcements. When the 4th Brigade returned to Helwan 
amenities and food had markedly improved. With this improvement came intensive 
training, mock attacks, and river crossings. Freyberg was still not happy with the 
performance of the skills of the infantryman: 
43 A significant proportion of materiel for the Republic of China went from the Port of Rangoon to Chunking in China. 
44 McGibbon, I. (Ed). (2000). The Oxford Companion to New Z-ealand Military History. Oxford University Press: Auckland. 
Pp 367-368. 
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In a refresher course for the riflemen of 4 and 6 Brigades in January 1941, Freyberg, 
appalled at the high proportion of failures, chided his brigadiers that "the standards of 
weapon training is very low". What particularly disturbed him was that the men who 
failed to qualify were those in the combat ur1its - men who would soon be at the sharp 
end of the war. Lieutenant Colonel J. R Page, Commanding Officer (CO) of 26 
Battalion, went so far as to admit that the failures in his Battalion "appeared hopeless 
caseS,n45 
Freyberg had reason to be concerned, he had hinted to his senior officers that the 
Division probably would not remain in the Western Desert for much longer. .. " On 17 
February 1941 Wavell informed him that the New Zealand Division would be moving 
to Greece as an advance guard. The force would be under the control of Lieutenant 
General Maitland Wilson_" Units of New Zealanders began to leave for Greece on the 
28th of February 1941. This was happening as other units were returning to the 
division_ The Signals Corps and Engineers were released by the British, and on 3rd 
March when the main body of 4th Brigade was leaving Helwan, The Second Echelon 
incorporating the 5th Brigade fresh from Britain steamed into Port T ewfil:. The 
Second echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force had arrived. They had been 
told by Brigadier Hargest that their stay in Egypt was to be short, but they did not 
know how short that was going to be, for in a few days after some training and re-
equipping, they too were to be on their way to Greece. Freyberg finally had his 
Division but they were yet to fight together. 
Although the New Zealanders did not have an armoured Brigade until 1943; in Greece 
they and the Australians would work in co-operation with the British J st Armoured 
Brigade. A mixture of regular and territorial units, it was comprised of: the 3rd Royal 
Tank Regiment; the 64th and 17th Medium Artillery Regiments; three regiments of 
Royal Horse Artillery; the anti-tank regiment was the Northumberland Hussars; an 
infantry battalion of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps (the Rangers) and the 1st Brigade's 
45McLeo4 p. l 7. 
46 Freybetg had noted in his papers that he expected that Greece would probably be an area of conflict 
47 The obvious choice was Richard O'Connor, but Wilson was a large man to the point of obesity and it was thought that his bulk 
would awe the Greek Generals. 
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reconnaissance unit was the 11th Hussars with their Vickers Mark V light tanks. The 
personnel of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment were upset to have their Cruiser A12's 
taken off of them and replaced with the 1935 model A9 or Al O cruiser tanks. This 
was to be no obstacle to the German Mark III or Mark IV's. Whilst in Greece, only 
one tank of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment was lost to enemy action. The others either 
threw their tracks or had to be destroyed when the brigade was evacuated. 
The New Zealanders and other Commonwealth troops would soon face the German 
army, the principal tool of Blitzkrieg; an army that had yet to taste defeat. The German 
army was not a homogenous force. Only ten percent of das Heer' was fully 
mechanised. The other ninety percent of the Army had to march. The soldier had to 
carry about his person over thirty six kilograms of equipment including his kit, blanket, 
tent half, rifle and ammunition. On campaign, his rations were equally as monotonous 
as that of the New Zealand soldier. The basic ration was bread, a loaf of Kommisbrot, 
baked in the field. The German army Field kitchens served one hot meal a day, usually 
at noon, although ersatz coffee or tea was provided mornings and evenings. Canned 
foods, sausage, cheese; marmalade and margarine were the fare for breakfast and 
supper.•9 Horses, normally drew artillery that was not attached to Panzer divisions. Nor 
was the German Army solely German. For apart from a few Germanic foreigners such 
as Swiss and others, the German Army had a large component of Sudeten Germans and 
soldiers from Austria now part of Germany since 'Anschluss' in 1938. 
The difference in character between a Bavarian and East Prussian, a Saxon and above 
all an Austrian division would be remarked upon immediately. 50 
Among those who had to walk were the mountain troops. The Gebirgasdivision was a 
two regiment, six-battalion division. Most of the men were recruited from the 
mountains of southern Germany and the Tyrol of Austria and were skilled in 
48 Wehrmacht is Gennan for Armed Forces. The Airforce is the Luftwaffe, the Army das Heer and the Navy die Kriegsmarine. 
49 Von Luttichau,C.(1974). Pume/l's The History of the Second World War. (I /0) Fighffng Men-The German So/die. BPC 
Publishers. London, p.3073. 
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mountaineering and living in high altitudes. They would depend upon mules and other 
pack animals to carry their heavier weapons. What made the German soldier so 
formidable was his ability to provide the necessary firepower at the point of 'contact' . 
The German army depended upon their panzers for the aggression and rapidity of their 
attack, but even the infantrymen were better armed then other comparable infantry with 
their own artillery pieces and each company had a machine gun and mortar platoon. 
The German soldier was also aware of his part within the division. No matter how 
much 'esprit de corps' that a battalion or regiment could derive the British system in 
World War II with its inter-unit rivalry never obtained the cohesiveness of a German 
division. No matter how good and well skilled the World War II German soldier was; 
throughout these commendable qualities ran the skein of National Socialism. The 
German soldier had given a personal oath to Adolf Hitler and coupled with the 
ruthlessness that was inherent in the German Army was a racial consciousness that 
would lead to atrocities and cruel treatment of civilians and prisoners. 
The first unit that the New Zealanders confronted was not from das Heer at all, but 
men of the Wajfen SS51 Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division. Orig inally formed as 
Hitler' s bodyguard, these men had to meet rigorous physical and racial examination. 
Himrnler the head of the SS intended to have the SS as the cadre for the German Police 
Force after the war, and to gain respect with the public these police would be expected 
to have served time as a fighting force. Not withstanding atrocities that this Division 
committed against British forces in France, they appear to have fought and behaved 
'correctly' to the New Zealanders and Australians they captured in Greece. 
Events and personalities had conspired that some of the least indoctrinated soldiers in 
the world were about to confront some of the most indoctrinated. The British were 
about to return to Europe, in the form of a Commonwealth unit composed of seventeen 
thousand Australians, almost seventeen thousand New Zealanders and twenty-two 
51 SS is an abbreviation of Schutzestaffel - Security Squadron. 
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thousand British soldiers. It would not to be long before they confronted the might of 
the Wehrmacht. 
In 1941 the strategic interests of Britain, and by implication the Commonwealth, 
collided with the strategic interests of Germany. For Britain the Balkans were the 
northern flank of a major supply route from the Empire. For Germany it was the 
southern flank for an advance into the Soviet Union and a bulwark for its principal oil 
supplies from Rumania. Responding to the Commonwealth strategic and military 
imperative, the New Zealand Division was to be based in Egypt, but the Division was 
not to remain there for very long. The personalities of the principal actors on the 
European stage: Churchill, Hitler and Mussolini and their response to the military and 
political circumstances in Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Mediterranean were 
conspiring to bring New Zealand's Division to the Balkans. 
British Cruiser Tank A- 9. 
Vickers Light Tank. 
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British Cruiser Tank A-HI. 
ArtiUery piece used by tbe 64th and 17th Medium 
Artillery Regiment. Royal Artillery 
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Some Senior Officers of the 2nd New Zealand Division. 
Lt Colonel Andrew and Brigadier Hargest. General Bernard Freyberg. 
Brigadier Puttick. Lieutenant Colonel Kippenberger. 
40 
4! 
42 
43 
Some of the Troopships used to convey the New Zealanders to Egypt and Britain. 
The Strathmore 
The Empress of Canada 
TheNevasa 
The troopship Dunera 
The Aquitania 
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Britains Principle Bomber: Bristol Blenheim. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Balkan house of cards collapses. 
no a 
Cruickshank, C. Greece 1940-41. 
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After sixty years, it is still difficult to discern Hitler's feelings when, upon meeting 
Mussolini on the 28th October 1940 in Florence, he was greeted with the words: 
'Fuhrer, we are on the march.' Did Hitler feel his world shift as his carefully 
contrived house of cards came crashing down? Hitler professed to admire Mussolini, 
but even he must have wondered why his capricious ally had chosen to invade a 
country whose politicians were ardent admirers of fascism. However, the historian 
Martin van Creveld believes that Hitler was aware of Mussolini's intention and that 
this had been discussed at their previous meeting earlier in the month: 
The Brenner meeting of 4 October 1940 is one of the most ' fishy' in the history of 
World War IL in that it was hard to get a good account of it, and because it gave rise to 
a heap of ambiguities in the [foreign] ministries of both sides. 52 
Hitler by professing ignorance was trying to distance himself from what he believed 
would be a military blunder by his ally. It is now known that, by this time, Hitler's 
mind was fixed upon implementing Operation Barbarossa. This was to fulfil his 
desire to colonise the Osten/and of Russia and the Ukraine. After 21 September it is 
doubtful whether Hitler was ever really enthusiastic about an invasion of Britain. si 
When the Luftwaffe failed to gain command of the air over southern England 1940, 
Hitler' s eyes turned eastward. Yet for any incursion into the Soviet Union, the British 
still threatened his southern flank. Although the Mediterranean theatre of operations 
was only peripheral to Hitler, the Mediterranean was one area where the axis powers 
were vulnerable to British attack and it was also an area where he could strike at the 
British Empire. To occupy the attention of the British, to protect his Eastern flank for 
his incursion into the Soviet Union, intimidate Turkey and protect the vital oil fields of 
Rumania Hitler mooted Operation Felix to Franco. This involved German troops co-
operating with the Spanish army in an invasion of Gibraltar. Once Gibraltar had been 
taken the German Army could move along the African coast to invade Egypt and take 
the Suez Canal. This action would also have the additional benefit of threatening 
British colonies in Africa However, Hitler found dealing with Franco extremely 
52 Van Creveld, M.L. (1973). Hitler's Strategy 1940- / 941 The Balkan Clue. Cambridge University Press: London, p.34. 
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difficult. 'Like drawing teeth' was his attributed description. The Americans had also 
threatened Franco that if he participated in any attack on the British; his oil supplies 
would be cut. Consequently any co-operation with Hitler came to nothing. 
Since August 1939 when Hitler had signed the 'non-aggression' treaty with Stalin he 
had been in a race with the Soviet Union to control the nations of Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union invaded Finland in late 1939 and had occupied the Karelian peninsula. 
While the world watched the conflict of the Allies and Germany; Stalin had also taken 
the opportunity to annex the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and imposed 
the cession of Bessarabia on Rumania whilst Hitler was occupied in France. The Soviet 
Union was too much an unpredictable element in Hitler's strategic plans; Hitler also 
had a suspicion that the Soviet Union was planning to invade Germany's possessions 
in eastern Europe." In late June 1940 Hitler ordered the Wehrnwcht to start making 
plans to attack the Soviet Union. 
In the 1930' s fascism did not carry the opprobrium that it does today. Not only was it 
seen as an instant answer to the economic chaos of the 1920's and l 930's, fascism was 
also regarded as a bulwark against communism_ Each Balkan state, more afraid of the 
motives of the Soviet Union's 'Comintern' then of Nazi Germany established closer 
political and economic ties with Germany. The nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Rumania, and Greece demonstrated their admiration of Germany by copying its 
political customs and attitudes. German intervention in the Balkans then stripped the 
independence of action from most of the Balkan states. Bulgaria, a nation culturally 
and physically close to the Soviet Union was the most pro-'axis', and an avowed pro-
German was appointed Prime Minister. The Hungarian President acceded to a request 
for transit rights for German troops travelling through his country to protect the 
Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti. In l 940, of all the Balkan nations, Rumania was the 
most ostensibly 'fascist' and anti-Semitic. Rumania had done particularly well from 
n !t is now known that Hitler had a meeting on 31 July 1940 at the Berghofto direct his senior military leaders to prepare a plan 
for the invasion oftbe U.S.S.R. 
;,4 The Historian, Heinz Magenheimer believes that the early successes of operation Barbarossa was due to the Soviet Union Army 
being forw,1rd in an attack posture. 
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the settlements of Versailles at the expense of territories of its neighbours and was 
particular anxious over the ceded province of Bessarabia. When the Soviet Union 
demanded that the Rumanians cede this province to her, the Rurnanians promptly 
sought guarantees of her frontiers from Berlin. Far from guaranteeing Rumania's 
frontiers, Germany advised them to cede the provmce. German involvement 
redounded upon Rurnania as both Hungary and Bulgaria then sought to reclaim 
territories that they had lost in the 1919 peace settlement. 
By late 1940 most the British residents in Rumania had fled. It became increasingly 
untenable for them to reside in Rumania, especially as British engineers were 
attempting to sabotage the oil supplies to Germany.ss Only the Yugoslavs were out of 
step in the Balkans; Yugoslavia was still a right wing monarchy, with a weak regent, 
Prince Paul. It was a country formed from the uneasy coalition of four states and two 
religions: Islam and Christianity, with the Christians divided between the Catholic and 
the Orthodox denominations. Politicians from Croatia, with its proximity to Italy 
tended to be pro-Italian and pro-Mussolini. The Croatians despised the seemingly 
unsophisticated Serbs. Yugoslavia was the Balkans writ in miniature. 
[T]here was only a single period of five months in the 23 years of the Yugoslav 
kingdom when the Prime Minister was not a serb.(sic) ... belatedly they established 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and closed the White Russian 'embassy' 
in Belgrade .. .. S6 
Yugoslavia continued to hedge its bets. It was still sending all of its copper to 
Germany and in return the Germans helped Yugoslavia to re-arm. Prince Paul, the 
regent of Yugoslavia was a 'pro-West' aesthete. He realised that while his heart was 
in Paris his body was in Belgrade and he was at all times a pragmatist.s1 He was 
married to a German princess, and through her, had connections with the British Royal 
family. He knew that should Germany threaten Yugoslavia the British could give very 
ss The British were the first to develop the oil fields and in early I 941 , most of the engineers were still British. 
S6 Quoted in: Palmer, A. Pumell 's History of the Second World War.Operation Punishment, p.374. 
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little military assistance. After Anschluss, Greater Germany was now on Yugoslavia's 
borders. There is a photograph (p.52) that catches the German Yugoslav relationship 
perfectly. It is taken at an evening function. Hitler is in evening dress; he is staring 
fixedly at Prince Paul whilst standing very close to the Regent. Paul has his left arm 
protectively across his body whilst his other hand rests on his sword. His eyes, 
avoiding Hitler's, flee like timid animals over Hitler's shoulders. ss Churchill somewhat 
unfairly nicknamed him 'Prince Palsy'. Prince Paul was convinced, quite rightly, that 
more British involvement in the Balkans would not deter the Germans but would bring 
them in: 
The evidence in our possession of German movements seems overwhelming. In the 
face ofit Prince Paul's attitude looks like an unfortunate man with a tiger, hoping not to 
provoke him while steadily dinner-time approaches59 
Now that Mussolini had ensured that the Greeks were in the allied camp, Hitler's 
southern flank was no longer secure. For Hitler's planned thrust into the Soviet Union 
in the spring of 1941, Hitler required that his southern flank to be covered by 
sympathetic or cowed allies. Prior to the Italian invasion, the Greek dictator, Ioannis 
Metaxas had chosen the path of appeasement. Now this all this stood for nought. 
Greece had been invaded and its pride affronted. This pride quickly superseded any 
admiration Metaxas and his followers had for Mussolini. Mussolini had swaggered 
about the Mediterranean throughout the latter part of the 1930's. Even the British 
Navy was cautious about coming into conflict with the modem Italian Navy. Now, 
suddenly, the weaknesses in the Italian command structure were exposed. Mussolini, 
like Hitler, knew of the value of martial display, but, unlike the Germans, competency 
for aspiring Italian military leaders was not as valued as much as sycophancy, and this 
was the predominant characteristic for promotion in the Italian Army. The 
braggadocio with which the Italians went to war was no counter to the "toughness 
training and knowledge of the country"w that the Greek soldiers displayed in their 
57 See Palmer, p.376. 
58 Palmer, p.376. 
59 Quoted by: D Dilkes ed.(1971) The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945. Cassel. London, p.349. 
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counterattack. The Greeks, angered by the many provocations that they had to put up 
with, attacked the Italians with an unexpected aggression. Caught in a series of 
passes, the elite Ill Alpine Division was all but destroyed and the Italians were quickly 
bundled back into Albania. 
Greece may have once been the cradle of democracy, but by 1940 a military junta ruled 
Greece. In 1936, Ioannis Metaxas, a retired general, encouraged by the Greek King 
George II, overthrew the constitutional government; for in Greece, tyranny is a 
tradition older than democracy. The Greek dictator Metaxas, a lifetime admirer of 
Germany, copied the Nazi political machine, institutions and youth movement. By 
1940, his internal security systems were close imitations ofNazi Germany.61 The Greek 
State of the late 1930's bore a marked resemblance to a South American 'banana 
republic' rather than the country that had given representative government to the 
world. Had it not been for Mussolini's hubris in his desire to be the emperor of 
another Roman empire, Greece would have fallen easily into the Axis sphere. It was 
Mussolini, wanting to impress Hitler and his countrymen that caused the carefully 
contrived Balkan 'house of cards' to collapse. He did this first by invading Albania, 
the most backward country in Europe in 1940 and then in 1941 invading northern 
Greece. 
By his impetuous vainglorious act, Mussolini had converted a potential ally and 
admirer of Hitler's into an implacable enemy. Metaxas was a very careful man. He 
had been trained in a German military school. He was also a Greek patriot. He had a 
great deal of admiration for Hitler and the Germans, but like a lot of Greeks he also 
remembered that it was the British, in particular the British Navy that had helped win 
his country's freedom from the Turks. He assured the British that he and the: 
Greek people were capable of understanding the strategic and other factors involved 
including the British inability to come to her aid. General Metaxas ended by saying 
that the quicker the war was won the quicker Greece would be liberated. 62 
61See: Packer, E. (1972). Pumell's History of the Second World War. The Attack on Greece, p.263. 
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In the period between the two World Wars, when most British politicians tended to be 
unconcerned with this region, there was one who had a particular interest in the 
Balkans. Winston Churchill had had a long fascination with the Southern approaches 
to Europe and as a proponent of the indirect approach method of warfare; areas as 
diverse as the Balkans and Norway fascinated his eclectic mind. Churchill had been 
the prime instigator of the fiasco of the Gallipoli landings in 1915. Forever staring at 
maps of Southern Europe and Asia, Churchill was ever trying to form alliances with 
disparate nations such as Greece Yugoslavia, and Turkey. As with every other field of 
British endeavour during World War II, Churchill's personality dominated. 
Throughout his life Churchill was beset with a form of mild ' manic depression' . This 
led to "Churchill's moments of irrationality, quirkiness, senility, his absurd operational 
proposals and flights of fantasy and depression"63• Once his mind was set on a course of 
action he allowed no one, but himself to deviate him from that course. Although 
Churchill was a Prime Minister from the House of Conunons he was an aristocrat, with 
an aristocrat's disregard of convention. Petulant, arbitrary and bellicose, he dominated 
the British military leaders. Contemptuous of most of his senior generals, whom he 
regarded as technicians, they were expected to implement his decisions, not to make 
them. A man of great energy he wore down his military subordinates with harangues if 
they were present and with cables if they were not. ''He ... deferred to professional 
views when they were expressed as coherently as his own - a hard condition to fulfil. "64 
Very few military leaders could resist his formidable persuasive powers. Rear Admiral 
Reginald Hall relates how he resorted to repeating his own name to prevent Churchill 
from overwhelming his convictions.65 It was A.J.P. Taylor's opinion that: "He always 
persuaded himself easily into believing anything that he wanted to believe ... "66 
Churchill was a man who was swayed by his emotions and he acted upon his 
intuitions. In a remark attributed to Lord Esher: 
63 Hastings, M. (1984). Overlord D-Dayand the Baille for Normandy 1944. Book Club Associates. London. P.23 
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He [Churchill] handles great subjects in rhythmical language and becomes quickly 
enslaved by these phrases. He deceives himself into the belief that he takes broad 
views, when his mind is fixed upon one comparatively small aspect of his question 67 
For Churchill in London the Italian invasion of Greece was an answer to a prayer, an 
opportunity to have British forces operating again on the mainland of Europe. Now 
Churchill was given an opportunity to demonstrate British resolve in front of the 
putative allies: Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and most importantly the United States of 
America. Surely he could bring both Greece and Turkey into the allied camp and win 
the admiration of the Americans. Turkey professed to be pro-British, but was not 
prepared to commit herself to become an active ally. Churchill offered President Inonu 
of Turkey ten squadrons of planes as an incentive, but still he would not be drawn. 68 
Suddenly Churchill saw the strategic position shifting towards the allied camp and, like 
the gambler he was, he quickly utilised the cards that had fallen into his hands. Prior to 
March 1941, the British Government was convinced that the Germans were going to 
drive through the Balkans into Egypt, possibly in conjunction with an attack upon 
Gibraltar.69 When the Italians invaded Greece, it was impossible for the British to 
believe that it could have been contemplated without Hitler knowing anything of 
Mussolini's plans. Because of the Italian attack the Greek Government invoked the 
April 1939 Agreement of Assistance with Britain and the British now looked upon the 
Balkans with less than an altruistic gaze. The British Minister in Athens, Sir Michael 
Palairet also brought a disproportionate amount of influence to bear on the British 
Government to encourage a favourable outcome. This agreement brought about the 
sending of Barbarity Force to Crete and Greece. Its primary objectives were: 
l . To help train the Greek Anny; 
2.To collect information that would be useful in the event operating in Greece. 
3.To co-ordinate the question of supply of not only war materials, but food and other 
commodities for the Greek Army and Civil population. 
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[And in General Freyberg's opinion, ([It] established itself in the Grand Bretagne 
Hotel. Developed an air of diplomacy and super politeness.70 
Although accepting British troops, they were to be used to fortify Crete. The major 
British contribution to Greece were three squadrons of Blenheim fighter-bombers and 
one squadron of Gloster Gladiator fighters, a biplane that would have been obsolete in 
any other theatre of war. The British attributed the reluctance of Metaxas to take 
anymore assistance as due to the influence of Prince Paul. Even a career diplomat such 
as Alexander Cadogan, frustrated by what he perceived as Greek timidity, expressed 
his fears in his diary: "I think that these Balkan States are probably wrong but they are 
all terrified. And it may be that the Germans are hoping to lure a small British force 
into the Balkans, to destroy it. "11 
The Italian attack on Greece was viewed as an opportunity for the British to retrieve 
the influence that they had lost after the invasion of France. The wily Metaxas agreed 
to take British planes and pilots in mainland Greece, and to allow Crete to be used as a 
Naval base by the Royal Navy and permitted British to take over the defence of the 
island. However Metaxas was not about to allow the British to become directly 
involved in the fighting on the Albanian front. No matter how cautious Metaxas was 
any British involvement in Greece would place the Rumanian oilfields within the range 
of British bombers. The oil supplies were so important to his invasion of the Soviet 
Union; Hitler was not going to allow any British threat to them 
During this period after the Italian invasion the British Navy and Army were not 
inactive. Under the command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham the British Navy in the 
Mediterranean had cast off its policy of appeasement of the late 1930's and had chased 
the Italians from the 'Mare nostrum'. British Fairey Swordfish torpedo planes had 
swept into Taranto harbour and sunk several Italian battleships at their moorings. The 
Italian warships then fled back to their ports leaving their supply ships without any 
escorts. This slowed down the sea supply to the Italian ports on the Albanian coast. 
70 WA II 8 Freyberg Papers. N.A. 
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Then the lack of railways in Albania ensured that supplies to the front were even 
slower. 
In November 1940, Anthony Eden was in Cairo for discussions with Wavell and his 
military advisers. He received telegrams from Churchill urging that all effort must 
now be concentrated upon aid to Greece. It is Charles Cruikshank's opinion that: 
Eden and his advisers in North Africa were equally certain that the defence of Egypt 
must have the first priority, and that no help could be spared for Greece. 72 
On the 1 st November Eden said that there was no hope of sending sufficient forces to 
Greece that would have a significant effect. Churchill, being particularly obtuse 
insisted that the Greek situation dominated everything else. After dropping veiled 
hints, Eden was forced to make Churchill aware that General Wavell was about to 
launch an attack on the Italians in the Western desert. In his memoirs Churchill gives 
the opinion that was not aware of the offensive until Eden arrived back in London: 
The Secretary of State for War got back home on November 8, ... He brought with him 
the carefully-guarded secret which I wished I had known earlier ... No longer were we to 
await in our fortified lines at Mersa Matruh an Italian assault, ... On the contrary, within 
a month or so we were ourselves to attack.73 
On the 18 December 1941, in the Western Desert, the British cut around the lines of 
Italian fortification and outflanked the Italians. What had started off as a raid then 
developed into a full-blown attack. General Richard O'Connor, by a series of flanking 
movements, captured Tobruk and then moved onto Benghazi. As the Italians retreated 
from this position their way was blocked by elements of the 7th Armoured Division. 
After a gallant fight, the Italians surrendered. The next day the Australians entered 
Benghazi. For a casualty list of less than 2,000 soldiers, O'Connor's forces "had 
advanced 800 km, destroyed ten Italian divisions, and taken two fortresses, 130,000 
71 D Dilkes (ed), p.350. 
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prisoners, some 400 tanks and over 800 guns.,,,. This was to be the last major military 
success for the British for almost two years. 
Once the British had entered Benghazi, Churchill was of the opinion that the western 
flank was secure and Wavell was ordered to make plans for the British to enter Europe 
once more, this time through Greece. This strategy was flawed as the port of Tripoli 
was left in Italian hands. A force moving from this direction could easily invest 
Benghazi. As Francis de Guingand points out: 
Benghazi is tucked up in the North-West corner of Cyrenaica and therefore could be 
outflanked and cut off by mobile forces from the Agheila area towards Tobruk.75 
Early in January 1941 the Italians commenced a second offensive. Like the first one it 
did not get very far, but it did prevent further Greek penetration of Albania. At the 
end of January General Metaxas died. With his death, any chance that Hitler was not 
going to invade vanished. Hitler told Mussolini that he would avenge him in Greece, 
but reading Hitler' s intention sixty years later, whilst Metaxas was alive Greece was 
safe from all but a symbolic attack across its Northern borders.16 The original German 
attack on Greece, prior to the British involvement, was to be extremely limited. The 
German army was to invade Greece but only as far as the northern approaches of the 
Aegean. Admiral Raeder's Directive No.18 of the 14 November pressed for a more 
active Mediterranean policy. In the Fillrrer Directive No.20 of the 13 December made 
it clear that Hitler had only limited aims for the Balkans: 
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March 1941 - and when the operation was successfully completed most of the troops 
would be withdrawn elsewhere.n 
Wright, M (Ed) , p.76. 
75 De Guingand, F. (I 947) Operation Victory. Hodder and Stoughton: London, p.48. 
76 Metaxas was very careful to limit British involvement. The original Gennan plan involved an attack through Bulgaria to 
Salonika. 
77 Cruikshank, p.77. 
58 
Although Metaxas was a soldier, he did understand the necessities of strategy and 
realised that the British Army could not operate everywhere. Metaxas emphasised 
that, to defend Greece, any force that the British could send would have to be ten 
divisions. 78 Metaxas would allow no provocation that would bring Germany into the 
conflict. Metaxas perhaps had a better understanding of strategy than Churchill did. It 
is Mott-Radclyffe' s opinion that: 
He was quite capable of understanding, and the Greek people were quite capable of 
understanding the strategic and other factors involved including the British inability to 
come to her (Greece) aid. General Metaxas ended by saying that the quicker the war 
was won the quicker Greece would be liberated. 79 
With his death Greece lost a skilled politician and soldier. His successor as Prime 
Minister was Alexandros Koryzis, a banker. Alexandros Kozyris was no strategist he 
was not even a politician. He was a banker "of great integrity and with little 
experience of public life, and whose pallid complexion did not suggest a constitution 
equal to the onerous task which he had assumed. "80 
12 February 1941 was to be a seminal day both the Germans and the British. For as 
Freyberg was arriving back from England and O'Connor was planning his last 
offensive, the strategic situation was swinging back to the Germans. General Erwin 
Rommel arrived in Tripoli. On the same day Anthony Eden and General John Dill the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff were leaving Britain on a Sunderland Flying boat 
for Cairo, Athens and Ankara, in an endeavour to form a Balkan alliance of neutral 
nations against Hitler. Air travel sixty years ago was far more hazardous and 
dependent upon the vagaries of the weather. Eden and Dill were held up by bad 
weather in Gibraltar.81 Eden initially had doubts about the wisdom of giving extensive 
aid to Greece. On November 1, 1940 he sent a telegram to Churchill where he stated: 
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The best way we can help Greece is by striking at Italy, and we can do that most 
effectively from areas where our strength has been developed, and where our plans 
made.82 
It is obvious that when Eden returned to the Middle East in February 1941 his opinion 
had changed, either by conviction or by Churchill's persuasive powers. 
Eden and Dill wanted to show that they could be as daring as Churchill. When 
Churchill and the war cabinet for once hesitated, the men in Egypt regarded this as a 
challenge, which it was no doubt intended to be, and declared their readiness to go 
forward. No systematic military appreciation was ever made. The decision to intervene 
in Greece was taken on political and sentimental grounds. Norway all over again.83 
During this period, the Germans were not idle. The Germans were the mid-wife to a 
Pact of 'Eternal Friendship' between Turkey and Bulgaria that meant that the Turks 
would not object if the Germans were to move though Bulgaria. At the same time the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia had visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden 
where Hitler expounded the advantages of joining the Tripartite Pact. This decision 
was sealed when Prince Paul the Regent of Yugoslavia put aside his pro-ally stance 
and also went to Germany to ensure that Yugoslavia was not to be on the losing side. 
By the time Eden and Dill finally arrived in the region, circumstances had changed. 
Prince Paul of Yugoslavia refused to see Eden, and the pragmatic President of Turkey, 
Inonu: 
stressed that Turkey was unprepared for war; she would remain neutral tmtil her 
military deficiencies were made good - when she might become an effective ally and 
not a liability. 84 
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On 22 February Eden Dill and Wavell flew to Athens for further talks: with the King 
George II of the Hellenes, General Alexander Papagos and Alexandros Koryzis at the 
Royal Palace on the 23 April. At the moment when Churchill was beginning to have 
doubts about the success of the campaign it was suggested by Wards that Eden who 
took up Churchill's ' challenge' with enthusiasm and carried along the implementation, 
disregarding his caution of November 1940. At Tatoi, King George II assured the 
British that the Greeks would fight anyone who invaded them. However he warned 
that inadequate assistance would probably precipitate a German attack.85 At this 
meeting was a junior staff officer, Francis de Guingand. His observations of Anthony 
Eden are interesting, with the caveat that he was not privy to all that was discussed at 
the meeting. 
I think it was Eden who stressed and enumerated the "formidable" resources which we 
were prepared to send over. It sounded pretty good, but if a real expert had carried out 
a more detailed investigation, I doubt whether those present would have been so 
satisfied. Totals of men and guns are generally impressive. In the aircraft flying over I 
had been asked to produce a list showing totals of items we were proposing to send. 
My first manpower figures excluded such categories as pioneers, and in the gun totals I 
only produced artillery pieces. This was nothing like good enough for one of Mr. 
Eden's party who was preparing the brief He asked that the figures should be swelled 
with what to my mind were doubtful values.116 
It was at these meetings that the seeds of the failure of Operation Lustre, the allied 
expedition to Greece - were sown. According to Charles Cruikshank: 
Eden' s first task was to get the Greeks to accept that the principal defensive position 
would be the line of the Aliakmon river, a strong natural defensive position in the heart 
of Greece, where there was thought to be a good chance of stopping the enemy with the 
available forces. 87 
85 McClymont, p.101. 
116 De Guingand, p.57. 
87 Cruikshank, p. IOI. 
61 
The Greeks were loath to withdraw to the Aliakmon River. This would mean 
abandoning the Metaxas line, a series of forts on the Bulgarian border, yet any invader 
entering from Yugoslavia could turn the Aliakmon line and the other proposed line 
running from the river Nestos. Therefore Eden's suggestion that the Greeks should 
start withdrawing troops to the Aliakmon line was received sullenly, especially as this 
withdrawal should be taken unilaterally of any action or attitude of Yugoslavia and 
Turkey. 88 Eden then, inadvertently gave the Greeks a means of opting out. He 
suggested that he send a British staff officer to Belgrade to discuss co-operation with 
the Yugoslavs. This was accepted readily by the Greeks because: "it would put off 
the evil day when they had to reveal to the world that they had invited the British to 
send an expedition .... " '9 This opportunity to temporise meant that no effort was made 
to withdraw to the Aliakmon line. It was at the Tatoi Palace meeting that the ebullient 
Eden allowed political considerations to take precedence over military ones when he 
finally convinced the Greeks to accept British military aid, de Guingand describes 
when: 
Eden came in [to the ante-room] looking buoyant. He strode over to the fire and 
warmed his hands, and then stood with his back to it dictating signals to his staff. They 
in turn looked nearly as triumphant as he did, and were positively oozing 
congratulations. Presumably he had done his job, and accomplished what he had set 
out to achieve. He was, therefore, no doubt entitled to be pleased with himself. But 
whether it was a job worth doing and in our best interests seemed to me very doubtful.90 
As Eden moved between Cairo, Athens and Ankara the cabinet met m London, 
Churchill said that both Eden and Wavell wanted to send troops to Greece: 
He thought they had made out an impressive case, particularly since Wavell was a man 
who always wanted to be better than his word. His opinion carried particularly great 
weight since his first wish must be to finish off the North African campaign.91 
88 The Greeks were hoping that the Yugoslavs and Turks would form an alliance once the Germans entered the Balkans. 
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Churchill never slow in dropping other names to reinforce his argument also stated that 
General Dill had been cautious about any incursion in Greece because he doubted 
whether the Germans could be resisted, but now Dill was in favour of this action. 
Churchill also met with Colonel Donovan, President Roosevelt's personal messenger. 
Donovan passed on Roosevelt's opinion that if Britain abandoned Greece to its own 
devices it would be viewed adversely in the United States.9' Britain was expected to 
unite the countries in a common cause and form a Balkan front. Churchill expressed 
the opinion that all of his War Cabinet had: 
[DJedared themselves in favour of sending armed help to Greece, subject only to 
clearance with the governments of Australia and New Zealand, since most of the troops 
earmarked for the operation came :from those countries.93 
Then when Eden again returned to Athens for further talks: 
He was astonished to learn 'that the Greek government had failed to carry out the 
agreement reached on the 22nd February at Tatoi and that the order for the withdrawal 
of troops from Macedonia had not yet been given' .9' 
The Greeks were procrastinating and any movement they were about to make 
depended upon the Yugoslav Foreign Minister's reply to the Foreign Secretary. The 
backbone seems to have gone out of Papagos since the death of Metaxas: "[H]e 
suggested that the British troops should be sent piecemeal to Macedonia, although he 
thought it unlikely that they would arrive in time to be of any use. "95 Churchill then 
sought advice from a man he admired, General Jan Smuts once an enemy but now a 
close confidant "arriving in Cairo, contnbuted the loud sounding nothings of which he 
was master".% He convinced Churchill that the Greek expedition had a good chance of 
success. In Smuts opinion: 
92 Churchill was awaiting the outcome of the United States decision whether to pass the 'Lend-Lease' bill in the Houses of 
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A firm British front in the Balkans would transform the situation in Southern Europe 
and the Mediterranean basin ... ! would thus urge most strongly that this new front be 
supported with all our strength. 97 
To ensure that the British High Command could use the New Zealand Division m 
Operation Lustre, Ian Wards believed that the British Government used a degree of 
duplicity in their dealing with the New Zealand Government.98 For Wards99, and also 
Kippenberger, the duplicity was Churchill and Eden giving the impression that the British 
Government could achieve a successful coalition of Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavs, when 
asking for military assistance from the Dominions. Wards wrote in pencil in the margin of 
Page two of Butler's letter: 
Duplicity is between HMG and HMNZG. There is no doubt of this what ever it is 
called. As between Churchill - Eden and HMG, it was not duplicity. Churchill ruled 
here and Cabinet followed. Menzies and Andersen have both stated that Cabinet played 
small part in decision. 100 
In a letter from Professor Butler, head of the British Government's Historical Section of 
the Cabinet Office date 4 October 1955 to Sir Howard Kippenberger, Butler queries Ian 
Wards use of the word duplicity in the draft narrative when referring to Churchill's 
transactions with the New Zealand Government. Butler wrote: "Does it mean that Mr 
Wards thinks that relevant evidence is missing, and suggests that before Eden started 
Churchill gave him instructions somewhat different from his written ones?" 101 
The New Zealand Division was saved from any more British attempts to break it up, by 
the decision to send it, the Australian 6th Division with elements of the British Army to 
Greece. On 10 January 1941, in a telegram from Churchill to General Wavell he says 
in the third paragraph: 
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Nothing must hamper the capture of Tobruk, thereafter all operations in Libya are 
subordinated to aiding Greece, and all preparations must be made from the receipt of 
this telegram for the immediate succour of Greece up to the limits prescribed. w, 
Eden found a ready ally in General Wavell. It is General Wavell who plays one of the 
most enigmatic moiety in the implementation of the campaign: 
The Greeks were going to defend themselves against the Germans then we should bring 
them what help we could and Dill and J were sent out after Wavell's victory at Cairo to 
look into this. When we got there Wavell said" 'and l hope you wont' mind what I 
have got to say. J didn't think I ought to waste time and I have begun the movement of 
troops and the concentration to enab}e us to go to Greece.' 101 
However it is General Playfair' s opinion that General Wavell " ... hoped ... that there was 
always a possibility that the Germans would not decide to occupy Greece. ",w 
Wavell further compounded The British Government's duplicity by giving the 
impression in his communications with the Australian and New Zealand Government's 
that Blarney and Freyberg were better informed than they were about the risks in the 
campaign. He informed the New Zealand and Australian Governments that he had seen 
both General Blarney and Freyberg on the afternoon of the 17 February 1941: "Both had 
been apprised of the situation and the greater risk. Both appeared to face this risk and 
shown no signs of backing down.""" Whereas Freyberg' recollection was: "My opinion 
was never asked .... [IJ Never expected to be asked my opinion by C.I.C. [Commander in 
Chief]. He was far from co-operative: he had a secrecy mania"'"' Both Generals 
Blarney and Freyberg were assured that their Governments had been apprised, and 
approved of the move of a significant portion of their forces into Greece, but as Paul 
Freyberg comments: 
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In fuct the situation was far more complicated, with both Freyberg and the New Zealand 
government believing the other to be better informed about the situation than was the 
107 
case. 
As a General with Pro-Consul responsibilities in the middle-east, Wavell was 
accustomed to dealing with 'quasi' independent Governments and it would have been 
little different for Wavell to perceive the New Zealand and Australian Governments in 
this manner. 
The New Zealand Government was doubtful about the size of the Force being sent, 
given the smaller Greek commitment to the Aliakmon line defensive line, the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments had yet to agree to the commitment of their 
forces this far north in Greece. "[B]ut agreed without hesitation that their Division 
should be employed."108 The New Zealand Government was proud of its Division and 
was keen to play its part in the survival of the British Empire. The New Zealand 
government's motives were: "[a] mixture of duty to~ determination to win the war, 
a sense of obligation as a free nation and concern over the division"109• The Australian 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies, who had spent a lot of time with Churchill during this 
period, believed the decision to send troops was based on the judgement of Eden, Dill 
and their advisers in the Middle East. Churchill emphasised to Eden: 
[TJhat he had made no case for the operation other than noblesse oblige. A precise 
military appreciation was indispensable if the Australians and the New Zealanders were 
to be convinced that Lustre should go ahead 110 
Ian Wards the Chief Historian of the Historical Publications Branch of the Internal 
Affairs, and narrator of the Official New Zealand History of the Second World War 
1939-45 The Greek Campaign was of the opinion that Freyberg also had deliberately 
misled the New Zealand Government. Writing to McClymont on 22 February 1955: 
107 
Freyberg, P., p.238. 
108 Cruickshank, p.107. 
109 I. McL. Wards to W.G. McClymont, undated note. WA II 3/16.N.A. 
11° Cruikshank, p .. 107. 
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He had given his views freely to the NZ Government before - why not this time? His 
Charter was no accident.... Freyberg wanted to get his division into action as a 
complete division as soon as possible. In Africa at this time this would have meant 
dispersion of units which Freyberg disliked. Greece gave the opportunity as a complete 
division. 111 
As a serving officer in the British Army now placed in command of another nation's 
army Freyberg was in an invidious position. His dilemma was on one hand, his loyalty 
to the New Zealand Government. Its' Charter required that he inform the New Zealand 
Government about any doubts that he had about a campaign, on the other hand, he was 
a serving British officer with a requisite loyalty to the British High Command. 
Notwithstanding his position on the British Army List; as a major general in the 
hierarchical British Army, his was a junior rank compared to a full general. He was 
aware that his superior officer, General Wavell was already going over his and 
Blarney's heads and communicating directly with the New Zealand and Australian 
governments. "Wavell had established the right to deal directly with the New Zealand 
Government, without letting me know what was happening .... "' Or so Freyberg 
thought, the actual channel was Eden, Churchill, the Dominion Office and the New 
Zealand Government.'" Freyberg also wanted to lead his Division into battle and 
whilst in Egypt his Division was under constant threat of being broken up and 
dispersed. Freyberg as shown later in his concern about the Aliakmon line preferred 
working through the 'military system' before invoking New Zealand's eharter. Yet 
after the Campaign Freyberg maintained that he had his doubts about going to Greece. 
Fraser wrote from Egypt in June 194 J: 
[I] am surprised to learn from Freyberg that he never considered the operatioo a feasible 
one, though, as I pointed out to him, his telegram to us conveyed a contrary 
impression. 1 u 
ni Ward to McClymont Jetter, 22 February 1955. WA 1 l 3/16. N.A 
w McClymont, p.99. 
u; McClymont, p.99. 
114 Fraserto New Zealand Government ,Cable 7 June 194I. WAH 3/16. N.A 
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Freyberg certainly did not show any doubts in his cable No. 271 on 13 January 1941. 
"Still think as I did in 250 [Cable] of7 November 1940, that Greece must be added to 
list of countries we might be called upon to defend" 11s and this is reinforced by his letter 
of6 March 1941: 
I wonder who gave us the order to come. If we did not send help to Greece all the 
Balkans would have gone into the Axis.. . . . .I feel the Germans don't want to fight in 
the direction so from that point of view it will be to the good. 116 
In another letter to McClymont dated 20 March 1953 Wards details the time scale of 
his notification: 
General Freyberg was told on 17/2 he was going to Greece he had not told his Gov't. 
Freyberg wanted to go into action with the Division - took it upon himself responsibility of 
agreeing that the division would go in without first informing the New Zealand 
Government.117 
Freyberg then took five days until before he notified Fraser on 23 February (Cable 
274). On 24 April, Freyberg told his Brigadiers that the Division was going to Greece. 
At 5.15 p.m. New Zealand time 26 February 1941, the New Zealand Government 
agreed to send the Division to Greece. Whatever his emotion on the 17 February 1941 
when he was instructed to prepare to go to Greece Freyberg believed that his first 
loyalty was to the British Army and he went along with Wavell's decision and did not 
communicate his doubts to the New Zealand Government. 11' 
Although the majority of combatant troops were Australians and New Zealanders a 
British general Lieutenant General Maitland Wilson was appointed the commander of 
the force for Operation Lustre. General O'Connor, the victor in the western desert was 
the first choice but Eden thought Wilson' s imposing build would impress the Greeks. 
115 Freyberg to NZ Government,Cable271 13 January 1941. The Freyberg Papers WA II 8/10. N.A 
116 Frey berg to Wife, Letter 6 March 1941,. The Freyberg Papers. 
117 I.McL Wards to McClymont , letter dated 20 March 1953. The Freyberg Papers. 
m I.McL Wards to McClymont, letter dated 15 November 1949. W.A II 3/16. N.A. 
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Freyberg states that Eden commented "As Freyberg and Blarney are such strong 
characters, I think we should pick Wilson."'". Freyberg opinion on this comment was: 
Notwithstanding our being strong characters, we were never consulted in either the 
general detailed planning of the Greek campaign. Although when we got there we were 
given an impossible task and told to make it work, and when it went to bits we had to 
shoulder the whole burden of bad policy decisions and the lack of proper staff work."" 
No matter the effect that: Wavell, Eden, Freyberg and Blarney had in ensuring that W 
Force went to Greece, they were subordinates in a larger drama. The three principle 
personalities that were responsible for the strategic decisions that brought about the 
Greek campaign: 
Hitler, who decided that an attack on the Soviet Union in mid 1941 was more 
strategically advantageous, than pursuing the Mediterranean policy advocated by 
Admiral Raeder. The British attack on the Italians in Libya was a minor distraction to 
Hitler. which he dealt with by sending General Rommel and two German divisions to 
distract the British. 
Mussolini, whose vain unilateral action almost brought chaos to Hitler's plan for the 
invasion of the Soviet Union, had it not been for Mussolini, the Balkans would have 
remained quiescent. His action confirmed to the British that Mussolini could not be 
acting on his own initiative and that Hitler intended to make a strike through the 
Mediterranean towards British possession and interests in the Middle East. 
Churchill, whose emotional response to Mussolini's invasion overrode his strategic 
and military common sense. The Italian attack on Greece enabled him to initiate his 
policy of striking at the primary antagonist through the weaker secondary antagonist. 
His power of his personality and oratory enabled him to overrule his senior generals 
and advisers. 
119 Freyberg's comments in letter to McClymont 15/11/49. 
120
.Freyberg's comments in. letter to McClymont.15/1 I/49. 
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These men and the decisions of others had contrived that a British force comprising of 
a New Zealand division an Australian division, and a British armoured brigade, was 
returning to Europe a year since a significantly larger force with greater air elements 
was bundled out. They were destined not to remain there for long. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FLIGHTING TO GREECE. 
The isles of Greece, the isles of Greece! 
Where burning Sappho loved and sung, 
Where grew the arts of war and peace 
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On 29 March I 941, the majority of the New Zealand Division of the 2nd NZEF, for the 
first time in its existence had unified in Greece. The Division had travelled to the Port of 
Piraeus by sea in a series of flights. 121 This somewhat ramshackle lift of troops was brought 
about by the mining of the Suez Canal that had left several military transports on the Red 
Sea side of the Canal. The first flights on 6 and 7 March travelled on British cruisers. 
"Some units enjoyed the comparative luxury of travel on the fast cruisers, but others had to 
endure a slow crossing on small cargo vessels."122 Charles Upham who was then a Second 
Lieutenant in C Company 20 Battalion was fortunate to cross the Mediterranean in a fast 
destroyer was glad to leave Egypt. For the New Zealanders, Greece, was a balm to the eyes 
and the soul after the heat, dust and flies of Egypt. Unlike the Egyptians, the people were 
extremely friendly, the young women were pretty and chaste, and the alcohol was cheap 
and potent. As many Greeks had lived in the United States a surprising number of them 
spoke English. Charles Upham spent an evening at the nightclub 'Maxines', which was 
also frequented by the staff of the German Embassy. Sometime during the evening a New 
Zealander stole some pyjamas as souvenirs from the German Embassy. m 
The commander of the force, Maitland Wilson had a difficult, disparate command. The 
Generals in command of both Australian and New Zealand contingents had doubts about 
his ability and were sensitive to the welfare of their soldiers. He also had to co-operate 
with his nominal superior General A Papagos; a man whose heart, as it later transpired, 
was no longer in the conflict. Even had Papagos been more enthusiastic, the condition of 
the Greek Army, made it difficult for his forces to conform to the Commonwealth 
mechanised forces. Wilson was also disadvantaged by the political considerations of the 
campaign in that he was forced to await the German attack before he could act, whereas his 
opponent General Wilhelm List had the choice of where, when and what forces to use and 
the choice of the axes of advance. The German army also had the advantage of internal 
lines of supply whereas the Commonwealth force was dependent upon a ramshackle supply 
line. 
121 Flight: although somewhat confusing is lhe correct technical term for this type of movement. 
122 McClymont, p.120. 
123 Charles Upham to Tony Simpson, Interview (1979). Oht 0200 collection. Alexander Turnbull Library archives. 
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Dispositions on the Aliakmon Line as at 6 April 1941. 
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As the New Zealand battalions made their way up to the Aliakmon line many New 
Zealanders commented on how much Greek countryside resembled that of New Zealand, it 
was spring and spring flowers were beginning to bloom. 12• What the New Zealanders also 
noticed and commented on were the troop trains full of Greek soldiers going in the opposite 
direction. This was prior to the ten days leave over Easter, but several of the interviewees 
commented upon this fact. The New Zealand Division's problems were compounded when 
the 19th Greek Division on the right flank of the New Zealanders was moved forward and 
instead of a front of ten miles (16 kilometres) the New Zealanders would be expected to 
hold a line of fifteen miles (24 kilometres). The Division, less 5th Brigade as Corps Reserve 
behind the Veroia Pass, would be responsible for the quadrilateral areabetween Miliki, 
Neon Elevtheronkhorion, Katerini and Mega Elevtherokhorion. 1" 
When Germany declared War simultaneously on Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941 , 
the majority of the New Zealand Division was sitting on the Aliakmon line. The 4th and 6th 
Brigades were sitting slightly north of Neon Elevtheronkhorion with the Divisional Cavalry 
forming a screen north of this position. The 5th Brigade was in the Olympus pass area 
preparing defences in this region. West of this position was the Greek 12th Division and 
the Greek 20th Division. The former held the line south ofVeliki to north of Ptolemais and 
the latter continued the line to the Yugoslav border on the slopes of Mount Kairnakchalan. 
Twelve Greek infantry divisions, three independent infantry brigades and one cavalry 
division were on the Albanian front; their right flank on Lake Ochrida and the left flank 
anchored on the Albanian coastal town of Hirnare. On the Metaxas line, a series of 
'Maginot' style camouflaged forts commanding the main passes south of the Bulgarian 
border. At the border were the Greek 19th, 14th and 7th Divisions with elements of the 
18th Division. Most of the 6th Australian Division had also arrived directly from Libya. 
The "16 Brigade was taking over the pass at Veroia from Greeks, 19 Brigade was moving 
up from Piraeus and 17 Brigade was about to leave Alexandria." 126 The British 1st 
Armoured Brigade was in the Edhessa-Vevi area north of Lake Vegorritis. 
124 Several of the interviewees commented on the similarity to New Zealand. For more descriptions see: McClymont, p.124 and in 
the draft narrative: WA II 3/16.N.A. 
125 McClymont, p.123. 
126 McClymont, p.150. 
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An army has to be supplied and every third day a convoy from Egypt arrived at the port of 
Piraeus. Piraeus is the closest port to Athens and from the day that war was declared, was 
vulnerable to air attacks from the Luftwaffe. On Sunday 9 April every berth in Piraeus 
harbour was taken up with ships from the convoy AFN 24. Because of the lack of co-
operation between the Royal Naval liaison officers and the Greek harbour authorities, the 
Greek stevedores stopped loading the ships with the coming of nightfall. At 9.00 p.m. the 
Luftwaffe attacked the Port of Piraeus dropping bombs and aerial mines. One of the ships 
to be hit and damaged was the partially unloaded Clan Fraser, still carrying two hundred 
and fifty tons of ammunition on board. At this moment Brigadier G.S. (Bruno) Brunskill 
the senior British Officer in charge of the Logistics of Operation Lustre was having dinner 
with his Greek opposite number at the Hotel Bretagne. Driving down to Piraeus he was told 
by the Royal Naval port contingent that although the bombing had missed two warships, 
the Calcutta and the Ajax, the ammunition ship, SS Clan Fraser had been hit and severely 
damaged. 
Brunskill was surprised that, apart from a company of New Zealand soldiers and a small 
contingent of British sailors, no other group was doing any thing about minimising the risk 
from the burning Clan Fraser. With the help of the New Zealanders the sailors pulled 
other merchantmen along the wharf, away from the doomed ship. After summoning and 
handing over command to the Port Admiral. Brigadier Brunskill went back to the Hotel. 
At four o'clock in the morning he heard the explosion of the Clan Fraser blowing up. The 
irrepressible Brunskill then returned to Piraeus where he was confronted with a scene of 
absolute devastation. 
127 
The damage was terrific. Sheds and offices, equipment and rolling stock were wrecked; six 
merchant ships, twenty lighters and one tug were burnt out and another ship sunk by an 
aerial mine. The port was closed for two days for clearing and reorganisation, but the 
damage to the facilities for llllloading was a problem for the rest of the campaign. 127 
McClymont, p.161. 
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An attack that should have caused only mmor damage was transformed by the 
incompetence of the Greek Port Authorities and the Royal Navy liaison personnel into a 
disaster that affected the problems of supply for the rest of the campaign. 
Part of the agreement at the conference at King George's Palace at Tatoi was that the rest of 
the Anz.ac force would move up to the Aliakmon line and the Greeks would move back 
from Epirus to conform to the Anz.ac positions. 123 This defensive position of over sixteen 
miles (twenty-six kilometres) was so long that companies held positions that normally 
should have been allocated to a battalion. The 24 Battalion had arrived on 29 March 
replacing the Greek troops who then moved west. Captain D. G. Morrison's Waikato 
Company held a front of 1200 yards (1100 metres). His was the most easterly position, 
right on the beach. 
My own company in fact holding the eastern [position] and including the beach, the north-
south railway and main road. . .. [W]e knew nothing of what happened on the Australian 
and British 1st Armoured Brigade sector further west, nor of the effort of the Greeks. 129 
The railway, the road and the tank ditch had bridges over them. When Morrison asked for 
mines ''to cover the beach where there was no Anti-tank defence, [I] was told there were 
none available." At one point there was a five-kilometre gap (5,500 yards) between 4th 
Brigade and the sector held by the Greek 12th Division. To make matters worse, there was 
only enough wire and sandbags for the 4th brigade the 6th having to make do with what 
came to hand. 
Lieutenant General Wilson indulging in imperturbability to the point of complacency 
insisted that any attack on the Metaxas line would devolve around the town of Edhessa, 
between Salonika and Florina. Although it is in a pass, the pass runs east to west and not 
north to south. What he based this opinion on is not disclosed, nor was it substantiated by 
subsequent occurrences. These beliefs in his own strategic ability gave him the assurance 
128 For more detail on the conference and the misunderstanding about the withdrawal of Greek troops to the Aliakmon line. See 
McClymont,pp 100-105. 
129 D.G. Morrison to Author, letter dated 15 April 2003, p.2 . 
. 
129D.G. Morrison, p.3 
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to release the Greek 19th Motorised Division from the central sector of the front and 
replace it with the Greek 6th Brigade. Telling Freyberg: 
You may not like this but it can't be helped. It is imperative that they be released for 
service NE [Neon Elevtherokhorion].130 
Freyberg never had much faith in Wilson's ability as a general. He had known Maitland 
Wilson since their Camberley days at Staff College and "he regarded Jumbo [Wilson] as an 
amiable 'yes man', one that would always bend in the wind and side with those in 
authority". 13 1 Up to this moment, Generals Blarney and Freyberg had not been involved in 
or consulted about the strategic discussions between Maitland Wilson and the senior Greek 
commander General Papagos. From the very beginning of Operation Lustre, Freyberg, the 
most optimistic of men had his doubts about the Aliakmon line position and made his 
opinion known to Maitland Wilson. Freyberg was doubtful about the New Zealanders' 
ability to hold a defensive line that was sixteen miles long. 
[B]linded by woods of stunted oak, and couJd be turned by the empty high ground on our 
left. It was vulnerable to infiltration tactics and I was very thankful that we never had to 
fight on it. 132 
Even had the Aliakmon line been a good defensive position, once the Germans turned the 
flank at the Monastir Gap, the position became untenable. However the quiet period gave 
the division time to dig fortifications and train and practise tactics during the fine days of 
early spring. The problems of the line were compounded by the difficulty of getting the 
Greek Army to retreat to the Aliakmon position. The New Zealand Division was expected 
to remain behind the 'anti-tank' ditch that ran intermittently in front of their positions. It 
was Freyberg's opinion that this line was only defensible for two days and it would be 
preferable to prepare defences in the Mount Olympus area. 133 Freyberg was not idle in the 
time leading up to the invasion. On the 18 March two companies of 18 Battalion had been 
130 McClymont, p.136. 
13 1 Freyberg P. p.247. 
132 Kippenberger, H. Sir. (1961 ). Infantry Brigadier . Oxford University Press: London, p.18 
133 Kippenberger to McClymont, letter: The expression 'derided the dispositions on the Aliakmon line' is used . . WAH 3/16 
[181/42/3] N.A 
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sent back to prepare positions in the Olympus pass. On the 19 March when Blarney 
arrived in Athens and sent up a staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. Wells, to tour the line, 
Wells was "impressed by the unwisdom of trying to hold broken country north of Katerine 
instead of the passes to south."134 On 23 March when General Blarney visited the Aliakmon 
line for the first time Freyberg told him that: 
[H]olding a front of25,000 yards with 2 infantry brigades and one Field Artillery Regiment 
with no a-t guns .. . we would not be able to defend ourselves against tanks. 135 
After v1ewmg the position with Freyberg, General Blarney agreed so strongly with 
Freyberg about the defence lines and so lacked confidence in the defences of the Aliakmon 
position, that he was determined to order a withdrawal to the Mount Olympus pass area 
once he became Corps Commander. 
When the Germans did invade on the 6 April, the Greeks still had not moved their forces 
back to the Aliakmon line. General Papagos recollection was that the inertia of the Greek 
Army was not due to any political pressure but the Greek Army was awaiting the Yugoslav 
Government to clarify their intentions: 
I insisted however that before commencing such a final decision as would be the evacuation 
of the whole region east of the Axios (Vardar) and the abandonment of the defences, this 
portion of national territory, the attitudes of Yugoslavia should be completely clarified, and 
I proposed that the Yugoslav Government be informed of the decisions ... we were perforce 
to be dependent on the policy they would adopt. 136 
In the preface to the English edition of Papagos' s book Cyril Falls comments: 
The Greek General Staff in February were obviously on the horns of a dilemma whether to 
withdraw to the Aliakmon line, thereby destroying all hope of a Yugoslav intervention once 
134 Ibid 181/42/3. 
135 Ibid. 181 /42/3 . 
136 Papagos,A (1946) .. The German Attack on Greece. Synopsis. Greek Office oflnformation: London, WA II 3/16 Vol 2 . N.A, 
p.265. 
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Salonika was abandoned; or to risk waiting until the last moment in the hope of Yugoslavia 
coming in. 137 
This meeting was held prior to Dill's and Eden's visit to Ankara. Papagos was at pains to 
point out to them: that first, any decision to move would depend upon the attitude of the 
Yugoslav Government and second, any withdrawal to the Aliakmon line would take at least 
twenty days for the predominantly non-mechanised Greek Army. Eden and Dill were 
apparently unaware, or did not hear, this codicil about the withdrawal to the Aliakmon line 
and when Eden and Dill returned to Athens in March, both were horrified to hear that the 
Greek Army had still not moved to the Aliakmon positions. However it appears that Major 
General T.G. Heywood, an Army member of the original Operation Barbarity, was aware 
of this, for from the 22 March until the 4 April he was constantly queried by General 
Papagos whether any answer had been received from Yugoslavia about its movements and 
disposition. 138 
Because of the political and military constraints, coupled with his own shortcomings as a 
commander, Maitland Wilson was never able to take a proper grip on the situation. As he 
was unsure what the Yugoslavs were going to do, he insisted that the forward Aliakmon 
line positions be held. Even after the Serbian officers ' coup, when the Yugoslavs were still 
wavering about joining the allies; Wilson was still waiting for the Yugoslav decision to 
defend the Monastir Gap, an important strategic egress. Ultimately Wilson expected the 
Yugoslav's to defend the 'Gap' , and consequently did not make any dispositions there. On 
the afternoon of 7 April, Maitland Wilson came to visit the Aliakmon position. He met 
with Freyberg, Blarney and the Australian General Mackay, who were already there and he 
acceded to Blarney's "original opinion that the brigades should be withdrawn to the passes 
about Mount Olympus"139 as they were the stronger positions.140 
137 Papagos. Introduction. synopsis .WA 113/216 
138 McClymont, p.162. 
139Freyberg, B. Report by the GOC NZEF Major General Feyberg on the Campaign in Greece. WA 11/1 DA 401 .21.3 . N.A 
Appendices, p.10 
140 The Olympus pass defences were a compromise position to the Aliakmon line. 
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It was Freyberg' s opinion that this decision to withdraw probably saved the Division from 
being outflanked and spending the rest of the War in a Prisoner of War camp.1• 1 The 
withdrawal was at the cost of a lot of wasted work and telecommunication wiring: 
The New Zealanders, after wasting a month preparing the line, would have to leave a large 
proportion of their wire and mines alongside the anti-tank ditch.142 
The 4th Brigade was sent to the Servia Pass area and 6th Brigade was withdrawn into 
reserve positions behind the Olympia and Servia Passes. This is a move that should have 
been done a month earlier and it reflects the 'haphazard' British approach to the whole 
campaign. There was no meeting of minds or synchronicity of action. The British 
141 McClymont, .p.163. 
142 McClymont,.p.163 . 
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Generals disagreed with the Greek disposition of forces. Generals' Blarney, Freyberg and 
Mackay disagreed with the British dispositions, but did not have the authority to act. 
General Maitland Wilson had been following a course of prevarication. It was the opinion 
of Major General K.L. Stewart that Wilson was compelled by political pressure, to hold the 
Alia.km.on line until the Germans attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, and the defence lines 
were predicated on the behaviour of the Yugoslavs. Major Stewart, Freyberg's chief of 
staff was of the opinion that: 
General Wilson ... knowing that rearward positions were in preparation, that Katerine 
railhead was available, expecting the main attack on the left of his line and that the Greeks 
in the Metaxas line would impose some delay, deliberately refrained from ordering NZ div 
(sic) to retire until last moment. The document makes it clear he did not expect NZ div to 
fight in its forward position. 143 
Although it now appears that the Commonwealth Force in Greece was there for reasons 
primarily political and as deterrence. It now became more imperative, as a conflict was 
approaching, to talce up defensible positions instead of deferring to Greek wishes. 
Notwithstanding Wilson's stated belief that there would be a 'blitzkrieg' in the Monastir 
Gap, which runs south from the town of Bitolji (known by the Turks as Monastir) in the 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia across the Greek border at Florina and onto the town of 
Kozani and ends only a short distance from Servia on the Aliakmon River. At the time of 
the German invasion on 6 April there were negligible forces defending the passes from 
Monastir (Bitolji) to Kozani in Greece. 
If the Germans could force this pass, they would outflank the Commonwealth forces on the 
Alia.km.on river and the Mount Olympus passes and the Greek Army confronting the 
Italians outside Vlone. Any opportunity for the Commonwealth and Greek forces to 
withdraw to another defensive position would be severely limited. Conversely, the 
Monastir gap is a natural defensive position. It is in mountainous country with narrow 
roads spanning rivers on equally narrow bridges. The pass is particularly narrow at Vevi: 
143 Major General Stewart to I. McL Wards, letter dated 4 July 1950 .WA II 3/16.N.A. 
81 
To the west steep hills rise to more than 3,000 feet; east of the pass, the lakes Vegorritis and 
Petron lie across the path of an advance over the foothills. The pass itself varied in width 
from I 00 to 500 yards and followed a winding course through a defile flanked by steep 
rock-strewn hills with few trees. 144 
The failure of the senior Greek and British generals to allocate more troops to the Monastir 
Gap can be directly attributable to two things. First, a fortress mentality; if a country 
prepares defences in a particular area then there is an expectation that the enemy will attack 
in that area. Secondly, a belief that the Yugoslav Army would hold this position if 
attacked, and if not attacked, would deter the Germans from coming by this route and 
defend their side of the border in which the 'Gap' was situated.1•s Unfortunately the 
Germans had shown a tendency to avoid the conventional method of attack. 
On 6 April invading from Bulgaria, the Germans met a different type of resistance from the 
Greeks to that of the Yugoslavs. Contrary to expectations, the Greek forts manned by 
regular troops, refused to surrender immediately; the 'Hellas' fort held out for 36 hours and 
only succumbed after the entire artillery of the German ..XXX- Corps had been in action 
against it. The 'Ekhinos' fort held out for several days in the German rear. 146 Although the 
German plans were inconvenienced for a short time by Greek gallantry, it did not hold the 
Germans for very long. On 6 April the Germans cut the Salonika-Serrai railway at 
Rhodopoles. On 7 April the 5th Mountain Division broke through the Metaxas line west of 
the Rupel pass. By 8 April the resistance in Yugoslavia had been broken. The 
Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler division wheeled south for the Monastir Gap and the 2nd 
Armoured Division was approaching Salonika. On the 9 April, the 2nd Armoured Division 
occupied Salonika. On the left General Hartmann's corps, with the 164th Division on the 
right flank and the 50th Division on the left advanced to the sea. The 50th then swung 
towards Salonika and the 164th using a small fleet of caiques, occupied the islands of 
Samothrace, Thasos, Lemnos, Mytiline and Chios. Greece now lay vulnerable to the 
Germans. 
144 Long, G .(1953) Australia in the War 1939-45. Greece, Crete and Syria .. Australian War Memorial: Canberra, p.47. 
145 There was every chance that Yugoslavia would resist such violation of her neutrality, so the military experts, remembering 
Serbian resistance in 1914-18 and the mountainous nature of the country though the flank was reasonably safe. McClymont, 
p.101. 
146 Long, p.52. 
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Fearing that a German advance through the 'Gap' would threaten the ' rear' of the Western 
Macedonian Army and the Commonwealth Forces on the Aliakmon line. General Papagos 
sent instructions to Lieutenant General Wilson to dispatch elements of the l st Armoured 
Brigade into the 'Gap' and make contact with the Germans. These were the tanks of the 
3rd Royal Tank Regiment, the armoured cars of the 4th Hussars, the 1st Rangers a 
territorial battalion of Royal Rifle Corps, a troop of 25-pounders of the Royal Horse 
Artillery and a few batteries from the 64th Medium Artillery Regiment. This was to be the 
Amindaion detachment. The rapid German conquest of Yugoslavia meant Wilson had to 
make new dispositions. The defence of the ' Gap' could only be for a finite time. Enough 
time to allow the Commonwealth forces to retreat to the defended Olympus passes. Wilson 
met with the Australian Major General Mackay on the morning of the 8 April and he 
instructed Mackay to take command of a force that included the detachment and "such 
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troops of the 6th Division as became available". 141 Initially his force would consist of the 
aforementioned elements of the 1 st Armoured Brigade, two battalions of the 19th Brigade, 
the 213rd Field regiment and two attached companies of the New Zealand Machine Gun 
battalion. This was to be Mackay Force. According the Gavin Long, the Australian 
official historian: "It was a minute and ill-balanced force with which to meet what might be 
the main German thrust into Greece."1•• 
On 9 April 1941 Mackay Force began to deploy. On their right, in the region of the Lakes 
Vegorritis and Petron was the Dodacanese Regiment. On the previous day General 
Mackay had attempted to liaise with his opposite number General Karassos in the village of 
Perdika, but in Mackay's opinion the meeting was of little importance: "[a] difficult three-
hour conference ... during which the commanders exchanged views through interpreters and 
liaison officers .... " 149 Three battalions, the Australian 2/8 and 2/4 and the 1st Rangers, had 
travelled up to this position the previous day along the treacherous mountain roads. 
Having left their transport they then had to march ten miles over the difficult mountainous 
terrain. On arrival the infantry battalions had to spend the night in the cold. "They had 
only their great-coats and one blanket each and the intense cold sapped their reserve." 150 In 
the morning the soldiers viewed the terrain where they were expected to fight. It was a 
natural defensive position but it did have its problems: 
[O]n each flank the front was so extended that it was necessary to separate platoons widely, 
and some could keep touch only by patrolling the considerable gaps between. On the right 
and left the steep hillsides and lack of tracks made it necessary to man-handle all weapons 
and supplies to the forward positions.151 
Sharing the Mackay' s Force's travails were the two New Zealand companies of the 27 
Machine-Gun Battalion. One platoon was positioned near Vevi supporting the 2/8 
Australian Battalion. The rest of the two companies were dispersed on the right giving 
support to the 2/4 Battalion and the Rangers. The three infantry battalions and their support 
147 Long, p. 43 . 
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troops were expected to defend a position on difficult terrain, of over ten miles. The 
Ranger's took the central position overlooking the road through the Vevi pass, but after 
their exhausting march the Rangers were limited in the time that they had to prepare their 
positions or make a reconnaissance. Forward of the Rangers was a minefield laid by the 
Australian Engineers of the 2/lst Field Regiment. It was a good defensive position, but the 
terrain would make it a difficult position to retreat from. 
On the night of 9 April the New Zealand Machine Gunners defending the Vevi pass were 
told to expect a German attack. The attack did not eventuate. However a patrol of the 
New Zealand Divisional Cavalry on attachment to the 4th Hussars of the 1st Armoured 
Brigade had been charged personally by Brigadier R. Charrington (The commander of the 
1 st Armoured Brigade) to find the Germans and report back as quickly as possible. 
Concurrent with this duty they were detailed to protect a detachment of Royal Engineers 
who were destroying bridges in the pass. Divisional Cavalry troop A under the command of 
the New Zealand Lieutenant D'arcy Cole had travelled almost as far the town of Bitolji to 
ascertain how far the Germans had advanced. Lieutenant D'arcy Cole's troop of three 
armoured cars was on the way back from Bitolji when they noticed a German 
reconnaissance patrol followed "by a column of 'limousines, motorcycles and side cars, 
light trucks and armoured cars". 15' The three Marmon Armoured cars of the New Zealanders 
moved forward aggressively to engage the Germans but the volume of mortar and machine 
gun fire from the German troop carriers caused the British Engineers and the Divisional 
Cavalry patrol to withdraw precipitately. Because of this, the stone bridge that the sappers 
were preparing for destruction could not be blown. The detachment was more fortunate 
with the next two bridges. They were able to soak the wooden bridges in petrol and leave 
them burning. Just outside Sotir a German reconnaissance column of 'thirty odd vehicles' 
managed to get behind them. The car commander J. W. (Lofty) King said 'charge 
them!'(Or words to that e:ffect).'53 The squadron raced towards the German column and 'got 
among them guns blazing'. This unexpected behaviour worked and the Germans retreated 
in disorder. It was only when they got back did they find the one of the Marmon armoured 
m McCJymont, pl9S. 
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cars had only one bolt left on one of the wheels. Brigadier Charrington suggested that they 
'ditch' the car, but he was told laconically by Lieutenant D'arcy Cole 'We don't ditch our 
cars in the divisional cavalry. 154 
The British and New Zealand Engineers activity had held the Germans up, but had not 
stopped them. The German combat engineers (Pioneeren) quickly rebuilt the bridges, or 
re-bridged the gorges. The efforts of the sappers did have some effect and the Germans 
were held up for one day. This day's grace enabled the Commonwealth troops to dig in 
around Vevi. The well 'dug-in' British, Australian and New Zealand Medium and Field 
Regiments shelled incautious German vehicles that were sighted. Then: 
Next day, the 10th of April, the New Zealand machine gwmers dug in above the small town 
of Vevi, had a grandstand view of the 64 Medium Regiment Royal Artillery (4.5" 
Howitzers) wreaking havoc on the German Motorised column coming down the road. The 
shelling went on all day for the Germans had a traffic jam. There was tmtold damage and 
we could see the enemy inflantry] Tlllliling through the shell bursts for the shelter of shell 
holes. 155 
When the German attack finally developed, the British for once had the advantage of air-
superiority, a luxury that was not going to last in the air over Greece. The New Zealanders 
witnessed a rare sight of Blenheim bombers of the Royal Airforce bombing the German 
column, adding to the congestion and the confusion. 
The Germans were not to be thwarted for very long. In the afternoon, movement to the 
southwest indicated that the Germans were preparing to probe the defences. There was 
supposed to be a Greek Infantry Brigade on the left flank covering the Flambouron - Xylon 
Neron road, but this force consisted of several untrained Greek battalions which had 
withdrawn to this position after making an exhausting march from one mountain ridge to 
another. At 9.30 p.m. on Thursday evening 10 April, German motor cyclists were seen 
154 Spencer,H.- interview. Harry was a trooper in this action and the quotations are his own words. The Divisional Cavalry 
Regiment was one of the few verifiable units that did maintain a degree of informality that supposedly existed between officers 
and men. Harry described Lt Cole 'as a good officer, once we had knocked all the nonsense out of him'. 
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oflnternal Affuirs. Wellington, p.38. 
86 
entering the village of Vevi and the two Machine Gun sections covering this area opened 
fire upon them. Also ominously the Rangers could hear the movement of tanks. The 
German panzers were edging forward behind the infantry, probing the Vevi positions. 
Several incautious tanks were left burning in the minefield. These incursions became 
increasingly persistent and to counter them number 6 platoon of27 Battalion opened fire on 
fixed lines. This activity brought about a mortar attack from the village at around 
midnight. An hour later the machine guns of this platoon held off an infantry probe.'" 
The Germans were too skilled in night fighting to be held off by static defences for very 
long. Moving around the positions the Germans were constantly probing the defences for a 
weak spot. A weak spot was found at the juncture of Rangers and the 218th Australian 
battalion by a German combat patrol(Gefech/sspahtruppen or Stosslruppen).'" 
They had been in position a few hours when they heard voices in the darkness calling in 
English "Stand up, Steve". "Friendly patrol here". and the like. It was discovered that these 
calls came from Gennan patrols probing among their widely-spaced positions."' 
The Germans from the Waffen SS had got behind the positions of 6 platoon and captured 
some of the Ranger defence screen and some Australians. The New Zealanders were 
convinced that the Germans were wearing Australian uniforms.'" The Germans corning 
fonvard and behind the New Zealand position, "brought the 'Aussies' down in front of 
them as though nothing was wrong".'"' As they had mingled with theit British and 
Australian prisoners they were among the New Zealanders before the Machine-Gunners 
could react. Sergeant Green had been suspicious of the approaching group and was able to 
make his escape but eleven New Zealanders were captured. 
11 April 1941, was Good Friday, a fine cold day, but this must have been little consolation 
for the cold and rain sodden machine-gunners. During the night 27 Battalion's Lieutenant 
l% Kay, p.39 
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Colonel F.J. Gwilliam bad gone around his men's positions with a bottle of whisky. He 
noticed that his men's boots had become waterlogged in the trenches. Left unattended this 
could cause 'trench foot'. At this stage Gwilliam could do little, but encourage his men 
verbally and with tots of whisky and rum but he realised that they could not be left in this 
position for too long. Lieutenant Liley the commander of2 Company's 6 platoon describes 
their condition: 
The machine-gunners were scarcely in a fit state to handle their guns. Probably none of 
them had slept for three nights. Corporal Cook was evacuated with frostbite. ' After the cold 
night in wet boots I was very concerned, didn't want to see them crippled,' says Liley. 161 
With the morning came a spotter plane that quickly discovered their location. Soon salvoes 
from the German heavy mortars necessitated the Machine Gunners moving every ten 
minutes. The Germans continued to probe forward under an umbrella of heavy mortar fire. 
To compound their misery it began to snow. 
It was during these three days that the British had the first experience of the German' s 
ability at night fighting. Patrols were comprised of the aforementioned 'shock-troops' 
infiltrating between the lines and causing the maximum disruption. When captured they 
appeared as if they were ordinary soldiers. The Germans also had troops that were 
experienced in mountain warfare. Recruited from the alpine regions of Austria and 
Germany, they were specially trained to fight in mountainous conditions. It soon became 
apparent to them, that although the Commonwealth troops were doughty fighters, the cold 
had sapped their aggression and they were not engaging in aggressive patrolling to counter 
the German infiltration. For although it was spring, they were high in the Greek 
Mountains. During the evening of the 11/12 April the New Zealand machine gunners were 
firing their machine guns on fixed positions all night. When morning came some had to be 
relieved and others were suffering from frostbite. Most were in no condition to repel an 
attack from a well-trained and well-provisioned German force. The Australians were in a 
similar condition. The cold of the Greek Mountains had come as an unpleasant surprise to 
161 Kay, p.42. 
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men fresh from the Western Desert. During the early morning the Rangers without notice 
pulled back their right company.'" Thls left number one section of the Machine Gunners 
facing the Germans alone. Only quick action by Lieutenant W. Liley in ordering this 
section back prevented this section joining their unlucky compatriots on a trip as prisoners 
of war back to Yugoslavia. This precipitate move by the Rangers not only inconvenienced 
the New Zealanders but also the Australians who were forced to conform to the new 
positions of the British riflemen. This was no small task for men who had trudged up the 
pass the night before, and many had had a sleepless night and for rain sodden and sleep 
deprived machine gunners evading capture must have seemed the least of their problems. 
Further down the pass at Kleidi Lieutenant G. Kirk's 3 Platoon under was also receiving 
attention from the Germans. His machine gunners had knocked out three or four 
combination motorcycles. Towards evening they were firing at mule trains bringing up the 
Germans heavy automatic equipment. The Germans continued to infiltrate through the 
lines. Two Vickers machine gunners firing down a fixed line into a gully caused 
significant casualties among the enemy probing the Cotmnonwealth positions but having 
had three nights without sleep, in atrocious conditions, the machine-gunners of the 27 
Battalion was no longer a wholly effective fighting force. "Colonel Gwilliam and Major 
Wright brought up dry greatcoats and a rum ration, and some hot food arrived from the 
Australians ... "'" It was apparent that the machine gunners would either had to be withdrawn 
or they would be overrun and captured. 
It was decided to withdraw Mackay Force on Saturday 12 April. The timetable had been 
prepared on the afternoon of the 10 April between General Mackay and General Karassos. 
As the Greek forces were not motorised the withdrawal was to take more than three days. 
The 19th Australian Brigade was required to march thirty miles over hilly terrain to come 
up on the right flank of the 4th New Zealand Brigade at Servia. Should the Germans break 
through Mackay Force, it was thought that the 19th Brigade had better not be caught on the 
move, but it was a stiff march for troops not long out of the desert and untrained for 
161 The Rangers thought the Australians were withdrawing from one of their positions. So they decided lo pull back two miles 
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mountain warfare. The two Australian battalions were to withdraw, covered by the 1st 
Armoured Brigade, the two companies of machine gunners and the tanks who were to be 
the last to leave. This withdrawal was not unimpeded. The Germans who had infiltrated 
during the evening of the 1 l/12th April attacked Point 997 where Lieutenant Liley's 3 
platoon was dug in. The Germans had some initial success, overrunning an Australian 
position and again putting the Ranger battalion to flight. The Australians put in a counter-
attack, but were not able to dislodge the Germans from all the captured positions. Liley 
was forced to withdraw 120 metres due to the difficulty in supporting the Australians in 
their close quarter fighting after it became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. 
On the other side of the Kleidi Pass, the two platoons of I Company 27 Machine Gun 
Battalion were surprised to see Germans occupying the high ground on the right of their 
positions. They were even more disconcerted when they saw the Rangers, without 
informing them, pulling out, and leaving their heavy equipment behind. At around 11.00 
a.m. the Rangers retreated through number I Company' s position leaving the machine 
gunners who they were supposed to protect, facing the advancing Germans. A New 
Zealand machine-gunner describes the situation: 
From my position, the first intimation I had of the enemy break through was seeing them 
scramble over the high ground on our right at approximately 7765(a map reference). 
Shortly before midday the KRR (Rangers) withdrew without orders through the M.G. 
positions.164 
Their rapid withdrawal of the Rangers left the anti-tank guns unprotected. Lieutenant R. 
Hains' s section gave protective fire for an Australian 2-pounder gun in order to allow them 
to get away their gun. At 2.00 p.m. the machine gunners were able to withdraw under the 
cover of the Australian 2/8 battalion. So precipitate was the withdrawal of the Rangers 
that the commanding officer of the Australian field artillery battery "immediately 
communicated with the Australian Brigade Headquarters, which refused to believe that the 
Rangers were not still in position. " 165 They also initially refused to believe Lieutenant 
164 Hains, R to Wards I. McL Letter. 26 April 1952. Correspondence of the 27th Machine Gun Battalion. W All/3/11 .N.A.. 
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Hain's explanation that the retreating British Infantry were now in the rear of the medium 
artillery battery and it would soon be at risk from small arms fire. The two platoons of 
number 1 Company split into squads and finally, after a fatiguing tramp, the waiting trucks 
picked them up. 
On the left of the pass, a stiff rear-guard fight was still going on. 5 and 6 platoons were 
firing in support of the Australian 2/8 Battalion. This was not as helpful as it first sounds. 
It appears that the machine gun fire over the heads of the forward Australian platoons 
disconcerted them into withdrawing as they thought it was fire from the Germans 
infiltrating to their rear. 
I [Liley]was told by an infantry officer that the shoot was at least partly successful; he said 
the enemy withdrew a little but so did some of his [theAustralian] forward sections. They 
could probably hear it going over and thought they were being fired on from the rear. 166 
The two machine gun platoons thought that it was time for them to withdraw as well, when 
the 25 pounders began dropping shells onto targets in their rear. The two platoons 
withdrew five or six miles carrying their guns. 
At 5.00 p.m. in the afternoon some machine gunners on the heights above the village of 
Flambouron were still engaging the enemy when Captain J. Robbie overheard instructions 
on the wireless for 27 Battalion to withdraw. Once the machine gunners withdrew the 
Germans were then able to overrun the anti-tank gun battery leaving the Australian 2/8 
Battalion surrounded on three sides. It was a case of 'every man for himself' as the 
Australian battalion disintegrated and "that their only chance of escape was to move fast 
and use what cover the hills offered. " 161 
The defences of the Kleidi Pass had collapsed, placing 2/4 Battalion and the supporting 
elements in great danger. The machine-gunners were able to manhandle their guns to the 
road and finally onto some Australian trucks after setting fire to their own transport that had 
166 Cody, p.45. 
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become bogged down. While all this was going on, a battery of the Royal Horse Artillery 
was engaging elements of the enemy over 'open sights' at a range of less then quarter of a 
mile (450 metres). Although the machine gunners were able to extract themselves 
relatively intact (less the killed, wounded and the eleven captured) their supporting 
Australian company was almost destroyed when it ran into a German ambush astride the 
road. Seventy were captured and the company commander killed. 
The column moved on but only to walk, section by section, into a strong enemy position 
astride the road There, covered by Germans in weapon pits, they were disarmed and 
shepherded into a near-by field. 168 
Extracting a force from a defensive position that is under attack is a difficult military 
operation. The pass had been held for three days. The Rangers and the two Australian 
battalions had been badly cut up. The Australian 218th Battalion bad to throw away its 
heavy weapons in order to march faster. In the company commander's words: 
[T]he men were simply too tired to withdraw carrying weapons, and perhaps 20 per 
cent(sic) threw away Brens and even rifles. 169 
Whilst this was occurring, the First Armoured Brigade's A9 and AlO cruiser tanks of the 
Amindaion detachment bad been steadily breaking down. They had been ordered up to 
cover the junction between Dodacanese Regiment and 2/8 Battalion at the exit of the 
Monastir Gap. This position was attacked and the Germans repulsed but seven Cruiser 
tanks were lost to engine failure and broken tracks and according to Robert Crisp, at least 
one tank was lost due to deliberate action of its driver. 110 After the defence of the pass only 
ten tanks were left serviceable. 
By nightfall of 12 April the Commonwealth troops and the Greeks were away from the 
Klidhi Pass. Covered by the rearguard they then assembled on the Sotir ridge, only six 
miles from the southern exit of the pass. Casualties occurred, not so much in the fighting, 
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but in the withdrawal to the awaiting transport. When 2/8 Battalion reached the Rodhonas 
area it had only 250 men and many were without weapons. 2/4 Battalion was down to 
less than two thirds of its effective fighting force. No 1 Australian Anti-tank Regiment had 
lost fifteen guns; ten when a demolition isolated them and their crews"' and "five when the 
Rangers had withdrawn from the Klidhi Pass .. .. m 
Nineteenth Australian Brigade had lost heavily and 1 Armoured Brigade, the only Allied 
unit of its type in Greece, had been shattered. Fourth Hussars still had the majority of its 
light tanks, but 3 Royal Tank Regiment because of mechanical defects was reduced to one 
composite squadron. The 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment and 2 Royal Horse Artillery had both 
lost guns and 1 Rangers had lost at least 15 percent of its establishment.'" 
In forcing the Klidhi pass, the German losses are thought have been low: "The assault unit, 
1 Battalion SS 'Adolf Hitler; Division, had 37 killed, 98 wounded, and two missing, ... "'" It 
was a small sacrifice for opening the Monastir Gap to the German advance. 
Up to now the Greek forces in the area had fought well. The 21 st Brigade on the right of 
Mackay force had made a fighting retreat to rejoin the Greek 20th and 112th Divisions 
covering the Klisouura-Vlasti-Siatista passes. The non-motorised 20th and 112th 
Divisions were limited to the pace of mules and oxen and were still in position. The 
Dodecanese Regiment on the right side of the Klidhi pass had been assisted in its 
withdrawal by Australian transport. General Papagos complained that the British did not 
offer sufficient protection to the retreating Greek forces, but, however, time was not on the 
allies side. The modes of transport were incompatible, and language and liaison difficulties 
resulted in minimal co-operation. 
With the Germans through the Klidhi pass, their way was clear for two separate thrusts into 
northern Greece. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Division was to send a force southwest to 
destroy the 3rd Greek Corps Headquarter at Koritza. This eventually would compel the 
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surrender of the Greek Army in Albania. The 9th Panzer Division would continue on the 
road towards Larissa. 
Although the Commonwealth troops had been driven out of the pass, and despite the 
atrocious conditions they were still capable of a skilled retreat: 
Retreating before vastly superior forces is a grim experience: weary men have to keep 
moving longer than their pursuers, they have to turn and fight when the terrain favours them 
and then start moving back again without rest in order not to be outflanked. Nothing saps 
courage like cold, hunger, and exhaustion - the will falters when the body is incapable of 
obeying its command. m 
Although this speaks volumes about the morale of the Commonwealth Force it was 
fortunate that it was a fully mechanised force able to keep ahead of the German tanks. 
The first rearguard was at Sotir, anchored on the marshes surrounding Lake Rudnik. The 
second was to be just north of the small town of Proastion. Over-night the Commonwealth 
troops had organised a temporary defensive position. It consisted of: the two surviving 
companies of2/4, the Rangers on their left, augmented by two machine guns from the 2nd 
platoon of 27 Battalion; and supported by a battery of Australian anti-tank guns and the 
Royal Horse Artillery. In reserve were two squadrons of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment. 
The enemy had approached the Sotir ridge the evening of 12 April but were content with 
sending out 'jitter parties' to harass and probe the defenders. By dawn of the 13 April 
elements of the 9th Panzer Division claimed they were over the Sotir Ridge and were in 
pursuit of "large motorised columns and an English armoured division". 116 The 
Commonwealth rearguard was mostly away by 9 a.m, protected by the tanks of the Royal 
Tank Regiment. Four more tanks were lost to mechanical defects and one received a shell 
hit from a German Mark III tank. The burning tank left a pall of smoke in the morning air. 
A reserve of several tanks and two-pounder anti-tank guns were sent to establish a screen 
for the retreating rearguard south of the small town of Ptolemais. According to Peter 
m Elstob. p.498 
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Elstob: "Here the main road to the south crosses a dyke and then runs alongside a river and 
between two ridges - a natural ambuscade. "m 
The Germans found that countryside outside of Proastion was easier to flank the allied 
positions. The German armoured column was made to suffer as the artillery and bombers 
caught them in the open, but they determinedly pressed on driving the allied forces back. 
The German panzers had got through the difficult countryside of swamps and ditches and 
were threatening British positions in the rear. In this position the machine gunners were 
again in action, helping to slow the German advance. It was almost dark when the 
machine gunners withdrew, their stand had allowed the tanks of the 1 st Armoured Brigade 
to come up, and supported by the 25-pounders of the Royal Horse Artillery. The action: 
was a most pretty sight, blazing tanks and trucks, 2-pr. and 50 mm. tracer, rn.g. and Bren 
tracer, flashes from guns and rifles, and bursting shells, with the last afterglow of the setting 
sun and the dark mass of the mountains as the background. 178 
At 7 .30 p.m Brigadier Charrington decided to withdraw the rearguard to the third position 
at Mawrodhendendhri., but the Germans were now a spent force and "made no effort to go 
beyond Proastion. 11• Early on the morning of 14 April the Rangers, 102 Anti-tank Regiment 
and the two companies of 27 Machine Gun Battalion were falling back to the Grevena area 
covered by the surviving light- Vickers tanks of the 4th Hussars. As soon as the last 
infantry passed through the artillery and the light and cruiser tanks fell back to a defensive 
position at Grevena. n the New Zealand Official War History of the Second World War To 
Greece, McClymont claims that the German approach was 'checked' and "that W Force 
and the Greek armies were in their respective sectors of the Aliakmon line. "180 The attack 
had not been 'checked' by any action of the allies. The tempo of the German vanguard had 
been slowed due to a traffic jam between two competing divisions (9 Panzer and 
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). 
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Apparently 9 Panzer and SS 'Adolf Hitler ' divisions in their haste to get forward had 
entered the Klidhi Pass at the same time, thereby creating a congestion of traffic that had 
stopped the movement of both troops and supplies. 181 
The Germans bad also been confounded by the problem that was to be-devil them 
throughout the War. Only the forefront of their force was fully mechanised. Most artillery 
was horse drawn; some infantry still walked; supplies were still brought up by horse drawn 
transport. Blitzkrieg was only fully effective against advancing or static forces. As in 
France with the British Expeditionary Force, it bad difficulty attacking a fully mechanised 
force that is in retreat. 
This was the beginning of the campaign, yet the allies had already offended against several 
of the principles of military strategy that was to militate against the campaign' s successful 
conclusion. The initial disruption caused to the transportation of the force by half-hearted 
attacks by the Italian Airforce and the Navy exposed the ill-conceived and ramshackle 
element of the Greek campaign. Then by sending a force away from an area of known 
threat to one of potential threat was contrary to the principle of war,182 economy of force. 
As Commodore Gordon Craig once stated: "It is axiomatic in risk-taking that you should 
always concentrate upon dealing with the threat that you know to exist, rather than those 
you imagine. "m Once the force was in Greece, the activities of the German ambassador 
and his staff, and the pro-axis sympathisers that permeated the senior ranks of the Greek 
army would ensure that the dispositions of W Force were well known to the enemy, 
offending against the principle of security. Then the destruction of the Clan Fraser fatally 
compromised the logistic chain of W Force already weakened by the lack of co-operation 
and the incompetence. A principal route of attack the Monastir Gap was compromised by 
the collapse of the Yugoslav army, subsequent after the German invasion attests to the 
paucity of military intelligence on the Yugoslav army. Then the Germans were able to 
manoeuvre the superficial allied force out of the Gap, outflanking the forward Aliakmon 
line positions. This exposed the two New Zealand brigades north of Katerini and 
181 McClyrnont, p2 14. 
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necessitated the abandonment of the forward positions and a retreat to the Mount Olympia 
passes. The position's abandonment meant that not only that it was a waste of time 
installing defensive positions, but communication cable and barbed wire was left behind. 
With no apparent answer to the technique Blitzkrieg, the allies had to conform: first to the 
German attack, and second to the imperatives of the withdrawal to the evacuation beaches. 
Some things had been done we!~ the Divisional Cavalry had accomplished their 
reconnaissance successfully against a better equipped enemy; the Divisional Artillery had 
achieved everything that they were required to do, and notwithstanding the cold, the 
soldiers had fought well and then withdrav.n in good order. By forcing the Monastir Gap 
the German forces had separated the Greek army from the Commonwealth forces. The 
Germans now had a choice of approach: the littoral plain defended by W Force or the 
interior held by the Greek Army. Threatened by being outflanked, the allies had to 
conform to the German attack, the Commonwealth forces could only withdraw to the 
evacuation beaches and the Greek Army could only surrender. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
on the passes. 
German tanks advancing through Greece. 
18 Battalion was the first battalion to reach Katerini in northern Greece. When ordered to 
move up to the front, 18 Battalion had left Katerini in high spirits. Two companies, B and 
D travelled up to the forward positions of the Aliakmon line whereas A and C companies 
travelled back to work on positions around the Olympus passes. A and C Companies spent 
their time fortifying the area around a position under a rocky cliff called 'Gibraltar'. 
Further north B and D companies witnessed to the rest of 4th brigade moving north up to 
join them on the Aliakmon line. 
The battle position of 18 Battalion ran along a ridge through the villages of Mikri Milia and 
Paliostani: 
The Mikri Milia-Paliostani ridge dropped away abruptly on the north to the Toponitsa 
River. From it there was a wide view over the lower hills falling away to the Aliakmon 
plain, and beyond that the peaks of Eastern Macedonia, with Salonika gleaming across the 
gulf on a clear day. The ridge was a hotchpotch of small ploughed fields, patches of young 
green wheat, and oak thickets, from which rose the thin smoke of charcoal-burners' fires. 184 
The battalion did not have any time to rest and admire the view. They spent their time 
helping the engineers widen the track that ran through the village of Palionellini, which was 
four miles south of 18 Battalions position and was to be the main access route for 4th 
Brigade. 
The Battalion was billeted on the local villagers and in the nearby monastery which was 
unstinting in its hospitality. While they waited for the war to start, they dug weapon pits 
and covered bunkers. The incessant cold was a problem "and many men spent sleepless 
nights, numb with cold, before extra clothes and blankets were organised."185 Finally by 6 
April the 18 Battalion: 
had its positions wired, had cleared fields of fire through the scrub, and was as ready as it 
could ever have been under the unfavourable conditions. It hadn't been easy. All the wire 
184 Dawson, W.D. (1961). Official History of New ZeallandI in the Second World War 1939-1945 18 Battalion Official History 
War History Branch Department oflntemal Affilirs: Wellington, p.80. 
185Dawson, p.81. 
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and sandbags, food, ammunition and other necessaries had been manhandled up. The 
battalion would have been in a bad position if it had been attacked during that fortnight, 
especially as until early April it was away up there on its own. 186 
There were gaps of up to two miles between defended positions and this was partially 
rectified by having the areas patrolled by Bren-gun carriers. On 7 April the rumble of 
artillery in the distance gave an impetus to the 4th and 6th Brigades to finish off the wiring, 
entrenching and digging in the weapon pits in the bitterly cold wind. 
On 6 April 1941, the Germans simultaneously declared war on Greece and Yugoslavia. It 
was also a special day for the 4th Brigade, not because of any activity by the enemy, but 
because the Brigade received its first mail :from New Zealand since leaving Egypt. The 
next day the 7 April when the defeat of Yugoslavia seemed certain, it was decided to 
withdraw the division to the Olympus area. Wilson decided W force would be withdrawn 
to the Olympus Aliakmon River line position. The 5th and 6th Brigades were to move 
together and the 4th Brigade was to be sent to Servia to act as a pivot. 
It came to a surprise to Colonel Kippenberger when on the evening of 7 April he was given 
orders to move the 20 Battalion (Part of 4th Brigade) through the Olympus pass to Servia. 
Instead of the expected move forward, they were about to move back. Travelling to their 
new positions was not a particularly easy journey. 
The journey up to the Sarantoporon pass was slow and unpleasant, in heavy rain at :first and 
later snow, on winding slippery roads. At one point an Australian truck had gone over the 
bank and half a dozen bodies were lying beside it. 187 
On arrival, 4th Brigade occupied positions to the south of the village of Servia In 
Kippenberger' s words: 'The whole position appeared very strong and had good 
observation, but it was over-extended and artillery support must have been very difficult."188 
The 6th Brigade was ordered to remain in position until contact was made and then it would 
186 Dawson, p.83. 
187 
Kippenberger, p.21. 
188 
Kippenberger, p.21. 
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withdraw through the 4th Brigade. The 5th Brigade, in reserve, had been allocated the 26 
Battalion that had been tasked with setting the demolitions in the Platamon tunnel. The 26 
Battalion would combine with the 22 and 23 Battalions to the east of the Olympus pass 
with the 28 (Maori) Battalion on the west. 
By the evening of 8 April, the front was crumbling; the Germans were expected in Salonika 
at any moment. As with the Greeks in 480 BC: "The proposal which found most favour 
was to guard the pass of Thermopylae, on the grounds that it was narrower than the pass 
into Thessaly". 1119 Therefore it was finally decided to withdraw W Force further south to 
Thermopylae. To enable this to be accomplished successfully, the defence of the Olympus 
passes was to be the responsibility of the 5th Brigade (22, 23, and 28 Battalions) and 6th 
Brigade's 26 Battalion. In conformance to this, the 22 Battalion was to move to positions 
astride the entrance to the Olympus pass. The 26 Battalion was withdrawn from the 
Platamon area to be replaced by the 21 Battalion, which was coming up from Athens. 
On April 9, situated high up on the slopes of Mount Olympus, the soldiers of 23 Battalion 
saw the smoke of Salonika burning 40 miles across the Gulf This day also brought the 
detritus of retreat: refugees, Greek and Yugoslav soldiers, smartly dressed Greek 
policemen, artillery pieces of various types and a constant stream of motorised traffic. One 
of these soldiers watching the retreat, was the writer and scholar Dan Davin. Davin's had 
been a rough crossing to Greece and they had been bombed ineffectively by the Italians. 
When they arrived in Piraeus (bombed to hell), he was amused by the decision to pay his 23 
Battalion. Then the soldiers went out and became "all schickered as gnats". 190 Some 
became difficult about entraining for the front. One soldier had to be knocked out and 
thrown onto the train. Davin, who was slightly older and worldlier, was cynical about the 
reasons of his compatriots for being in Greece. One comment he heard was: "the Germans 
had been making a nuisance of themselves and the poor old pongos can't do anything about 
it so we will solve it for them". 191 More immediately, Davin was somewhat concerned that 
189Herodotus. (trans A de Selincourt).(1972). The Histories. Penguin Books.England, p.503 
1
~.Davin to Tony Simpson, Interview, I 979. OHColl. Oral History Section. Alexander Turnbull Library. 
19 1Davin interview. 
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his Commanding Officer had positioned his platoon forward of the others to absorb the 
attack when it came. 
Further down towards the Petras Sanatorium, 22 Battalion held positions astride the 
confluence of the Elikon and Harnos rivers. It was a strong position but the demolition of 
the 'back road' a subsidiary route, and the road through the pass would mean that 23 
Battalion would be dependent upon retreating along a newly constructed road from Petras 
Sanatorium to the village of Kokkinoplos. By April 14, five miles of this road had been 
completed and the remaining two miles would take another three weeks to complete, but 
time was not to be on 23 Battalion's side: 
At 8 am. next day [14 April 1941] Colonel Falconer attended a conference at 5 Brigade 
Headquarters, where he was told that the Yugoslav-Greek line to the west had broken and 
that 5 Brigade was to withdraw at nine o'clock that night. 192 
The three battalions of the 5th Brigade were covering a front of approximately six miles 
(9.5 Kilometres). Where the road ran along the Movroneri River, the Maori Battalion faced 
north, refused ( at right angles to) along the road to Skotina. In support of 5th Brigade were 
the 5th Field Regiment, 32nd Battery 7th Anti-Tank and 4th Company 27 (machine gun) 
Battalion. The 4th Field Regiment should have been there as well. Guns, ammunition 
and supplies had been winched into precipitous positions but on the evening of 14 April, 
the 4th and its indomitable commander Lieutenant Colonel Ike Parkinson, was sent to 
Kalabaka to be placed under the command of the l 7th Australian Brigade. By a fortuitous 
misunderstanding, the copious supply of ammunition left by the 4th Field Regiment was 
transported south of Elasson by parties of the 5th Field Regiment. Instead of the one trip 
that they should have made, they made three and through this tiring mistake the 213rd 
Australian Field Regiment had enough ammunition to keep the Germans out of Elasson for 
a day, and enable the 6th Brigade to withdraw in good order. 
192Ross, A. (1961).0fficia/ History of New ?.ealland in the Second World War 1939-1945 23 Battalion Official History Department 
oflnternal Affairs. Wellington,p.36. 
104 
On 14 April the carriers of the 23 and 28 Battalions came back to their battalion areas 
followed by the vehicles of the Divisional Cavalry. Then, with a bang, the demolitions 
went off at 6.00 p.m, and 11 platoon 22 Battalion saw to their delight the bridge over the 
Elikon river explode and fall into the stream. At 11.00 p.m German reconnaissance 
motorcyclists from the anti-tank unit of 2 Panzer Division drove up to examine the damage. 
The 11 platoon, under the command of Lt Armstrong, shot them up most efficiently; "the 
startled vanguard shrank back leaving, as was discovered next morning, five wrecked 
motor-cycles, some with sidecars and all with weapons, lying about the road. "193 Then quiet 
descended upon the area However, in the distance could be heard the rumble of vehicles, 
and a diffuse glow of headlamps. Kampfengruppe Zwei was moving towards their 
rendezvous with the 21 Battalion. (See chapter five). 
That evening Brigadier Hargest of 5th Brigade was summoned to a meeting with Freyberg 
and was told to prepare to move to the head of the pass to enable the 4th and 6th Brigades 
in the Servia area to withdraw. The predominant emotion among the New Zealand soldiers 
seems to have been one of disappointment at the withdrawal. The official historian of the 
23 Battalion, Angus Ross describes this feeling: 
For the officers and men who had put days and nights of hard work into perfecting their 
positions and who were confident that they could beat off any ordinary infantry attacks, 
these orders to withdraw were most depressing. 194 
No soldier enjoys retreating from an enemy that he feels is not as good as he is. Then 
came the news that the Brigade was to hold on another day, and their morale rose. Davin 
was objective about the ability of New Zealanders to fight. "They had the natural courage 
of people who had been fed on good meat. The New Zealanders were not afraid ... but it 
was the courage of ignorance". 195 Notwithstanding this, Davin admits that ''they had the 
confidence of men who had a sense of their own integrity and strength and their morale 
stood up very well". 196 
193 Henderson, J . (1958). Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45 22 Battalion. Department oflntemal 
Aflilirs. Wellington 
194 Ross. p.35 . 
195 Davin - Interview. 
196 Davin - Interview. 
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On 15 April the Germans started sending in strong probing patrols in the 5th Brigade' s 
area, but the artillery of the 5th Field Regiment appeared to have discouraged them from 
making too close an investigation. In the afternoon the German artillery attempted counter 
battery fire, but was unable to find the effectively camouflaged guns, "none of the rounds 
fell anywhere near the guns. Perhaps the crest-clearance troubles were compensated for by 
a parallel difficulty on the enemy side of locating and engaging the New Zealand guns."197 
During the evening, forward posts of the 22 Battalion heard the Germans calling out in 
English. Sensibly the soldiers held their fire in the belief that the Germans were trying to 
pinpoint their camouflaged positions. To their chagrin they found out in the morning that 
the Germans had cut their barbed wire and lifted some mines.'93 Davin' s platoon had also 
laid anti-personnel mines forward of the 23 Battalion' s position, but it appears that the 
fuses were faulty and no German was blown up by them. 199 
At 8.30 a.m. Kampfengruppe Ein 200 made its move. Two companies of the 1/2 lnfanterie 
Regi.ment moved down the flank of the 22 Battalion with the intention to 'clean-out' any 
machine gun posts and to act as a screen for the main force moving down the highway from 
Katerini. Artillery fire from the 5th Field Regiment and then medium machine gun from 
the 27 Battalion's attached machine gunners broke up the first company' s advance. The 
other company moving down the highway came under a barrage of artillery and machine 
gun fire. They retreated leaving nine vehicles burning and strewn across their wake. 20 1 
Another attack by tanks attempting to by-pass the bridge also came to naught as the intense 
fire from 5th Field Regiment caused them to withdraw, leaving one tank stuck in the mud 
of the riverbank. Lieutenant Colonel K. W. Fraser of the 5th Field Regiment came forward 
among the 22 Battalion and by directing the artillery with wireless managed to silence at 
least one concealed German mortar. The gunners of E troop of the 7th Anti-Tank 
Regiment were well aware of the limitations of their two-pounder anti-tank weapons, did 
not commence firing until the panzers again advanced down the road at 8.40 am. they then 
19
' Murphy, W.E. (I 966). ). Official History of New l.ea/and in the Second World War 1939-45. r' Divison Artillery. Historiical 
Publication Branch. Wellington, p.42. 
193 Henderson, p.18. 
199 Davin - interview. 
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laid down concentrated fire on individual tanks. The Germans retreated leaving another 
tank burning on the riverbank. Finally the Germans realised that the road could not be 
forced directly and decided to encircle the 5th Brigade's position. As 5th Brigade was 
holding a very wide front, the German movement was not only hard to stop, but also 
difficult to see, as they moved through the misty, pine forests on the Brigades flanks. For 
the rest of the day, the Germans were content to fire into the 22 Battalion's positions with 
75mm fire from the cannons of their Mark IV tanks. 
Davin," [H]ad a sense of something happening on the right.. .I could not find out what was 
happening". 202 Contradictory messages came through from the company headquarters, first 
withdraw and then "to hold for another hour or so". 203 In the gloom of late afternoon the 
Germans put in a determined attack on the forward positions of C Company of 23 
Battalion. They came in from the right flank and overran the right section of Davin's 
platoon. "Firing sub-machine guns and tossing over grenades, they pressed through the 
wire" .™ Despite the confusion of battle Davin was still able to observe that the New 
Zealand artillery and machine gun fire "was beautifully co-ordinated, giving the Germans a 
good thrashing."205 As it is with most actions the fog of war was paramount. The Germans 
overran a section of 13 platoon and some New Zealanders were captured, but a counter-
attack was put in and the Germans were ousted and driven back. Davin experienced the 
disconcerting experience of one of his Bren-gunners Private R. Inglis, one of Corporal A. 
Quinn's No. 3 Section, jumping into Davin's trench, crying 'they're all killed, they're all 
killed'. According to Inglis he was the only survivor of Quinn' section, the rest had all 
been wiped out.206 Inglis experience and reaction was not an unusual experience. Soldiers 
confronted with close quarter combat for the first time, often become disorientated and 
believe that they are the only ones left alive. Davin first got the survivors of his platoon 
into shelter behind the rest of the Company before going back to find what had happened to 
the missing section. Davin admitted to feeling very conspicuous in his pale coloured 
202 Davin - interview. 
203 Davin - interview. 
204 McClymont, p.265. 
205 Davin - interview. 
206 Davin - interview. 
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'trench coat' as bullets hit the birch trees around him. As he went about his lonely task he 
was grateful to find that one of his platoon's 'hard cases' an ex-sailor 'Congo' Smith had 
decided to come with him, against orders, to find out what had happened to his mates. 
We hadn't gone far when we heard cries. Eventually we found Todd [one of the missing 
section] - almost exhausted, but still with his Bren.201 
He also found three to four members of the missing section trapped by the barbed wire in 
front of the Company positions, but otherwise all right. Missing and presumed captured 
were Quinn and four others. 
B Company of 23 Battalion had its lines probed to little avail. Lieutenant R.L. Bond was 
able to check some infiltration on the extreme right of the position as the Germans 
attempted to get between the D Company of 23 Battalion and the village ofKokkinoplos in 
the swirling evening mist. A scratch team of signallers, quartermaster staff and members 
of the transport platoon were lead by Major D. Leckie high up onto the slopes of Mount 
Olympus, but apart from an initial sighting, no Germans were found on the slopes and the 
withdrawal route of23 Battalion was still protected.208 
On the left flank of the Brigade the 28 (Maori) Battalion was situated on both sides of the 
higher slopes of Olympus Pass road with the forward positions among the steep rugged 
wooded slopes of Mount Brusi (Part of the Olympus Massif). They could see the German 
vehicles crowding the road twenty-three kilometres back to Katerini. From 11.00 a.m. to 
3.00 p.m. the mist made it impossible to see what the enemy was up to, but when it lifted 
the Germans were seen be making a long encirclement in a ravine of the Mavroneri River. 
Francis Rangi Logan, then a young lieutenant in the Maori Battalion describes the 
positions: 
16 platoon was RIGHT FORWARD (sic) and 17 platoon was LEFT FORWARD and 18 Platoon was 
in RESERVE between 16 & 17, but much higher up the mountain road which 
207 Davin - interview. 
208 McClymont, p.264 . 
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ran alongside the MA VRONERI stream in the MA VRONERI GORGE. This road was the 
access (sic) to a sawmill at the village of SKOTEINA, three miles higher up the BRUSI & 
close to OLYMPUS. While 16 Platoon was near the bottom of the gorge, the road & 
stream made a sweeping turn & started a steepish climb to SKOTEINA. 17 Platoon was on 
this bend & higher up the road.209 
At twilight the Germans were seen to be gathering in the ravine through which ran the road 
to Skotina on the front refused flank of the 28 Battalion, D Company the 'Ngati 
Walkabouts' commanded by Major H. Dyer held this position. Then two elite companies of 
mountain troops put in a charge. Throwing grenades and firing their 'schmeisser' sub-
machine guns they were thrown back once, but on the second attack carried the forward 
Maori positions, killing three of the defenders. Harry Taituha the section leader, covering 
the others, was wounded and left for dead. The Germans had lost heavily in the attack and 
were in turn chased back into the ravine. As evening crept on the weather "turned foul, 
wind and cold sleety rain."210 The flank was reinforced and the position stabilised, but the 
attack had delayed the retreat for over an hour and a half. Again the fog of war ensured 
that John Palmer, also in 17 platoon, a Bren gunner in one of the forward trenches among 
the pine trees was only vaguely aware of the firing. 211 Then everything went quiet. In the 
middle of the night having not heard anything from the rest of the Company, he and his 
companion, decided to make it back to the D Company bivouac. It was deserted, the 
German 'potato masher' grenades scattered over the area, were the only indication that 
some sort of struggle had taken place. There were other members of D Company in the 
area, and once they had established that John and his companions were friendly they came 
out of the surrounding bushes. It transpired that when Jim Koti came down to tell 17 
Platoon to withdraw he met 'Darkie' Wehi a section leader, but they could not find Les 
Wipiti's section (with John Palmer) and consequently overlooked the three forward 
trenches concealed among the pine trees. Wehi had done his duty and passed on the 
message, but as the order to withdraw could only be passed on verbally, and as there were 
still Germans in the area it was inevitable that some members were going to be left behind. 
w9Francis Rangi Logan, to Massie Palmer, Letter 3 September l 998, p_ J _ 
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What had happened was that when the German 72 Regiment started to make a wide 
encirclement of the position it was decided to withdraw D Company. The 28 Battalion 
was to pull out at 8.00 p.m, the forward platoon, number 17 was to remain in position until 
7.00 p.m then rapidly withdraw until it reached battalion lines at 7.30 p.m.. When Les 
Wipiti' s section did not turn up, Lieutenant Rangi Logan in command of 17 platoon wanted 
to go back but was prevented from doing so by the N.C.O.'s of the platoon. 
I [Logan)became more concerned &(sic) said I would go down to find WIPITI'S section 
myself To this Jim & the other objected strongly saying ''you are the only one who could 
find D Company HQ in the dark. If you get lost now we well all be lost."2 12 
The Battalion was on a tight schedule, and if Logan had gone back, he could have been lost 
to the unit. It says much for the man, that the loss of his section remained on his mind for 
the rest of his life. 
Neither the Maori Battalion (28) nor the 23 Battalion had an easy time withdrawing through 
heavily forested mountain tracks. 23 Battalion's positions was astride the main road, and 
they found it somewhat easier going, but it still took C Company - the closest company to 
the road - three hours to reach the main road, clambering through "the precipitous ridges 
and dense undergrowth."213 During this withdrawal it was found that 32nd Battery of the 7th 
Anti-Tank Regiment could not get its guns across the Poras stream. The anti-tank gunners 
had to do what every gunner dreads - wreck, or roll the guns down into the stream The 
gunners of 32nd Battery then served as infantry with the 23 Battalion. The 23 Battalion 
withdrew up towards Kokkinoplos, but it had to leave their heavy equipment behind. 
Although the Greek muleteers had taken away the sick and wounded the previous day, they 
had been disconcerted by the shellfire and had not returned. With a vanguard of one 
platoon from B Company to discourage any German mountain troops that might have 
infiltrated their way around the mountain, the battalion picked its way through the mud and 
over precipices, discarding packs and personal equipment as they went. Finally they 
staggered into the Kokkinoplos village at 6.30 am for a well-earned sleep. 
212 Logan, p.2. 
188 Mclymont, p.267 
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The 28 Battalion's heavy equipment had been moved back during the day. Mules and 
muleteers had been arranged to carry the packs of the soldiers, but when it was found that 
they had deserted, the Maori Battalion was faced with an exhausting tramp after the last 
German attack had faded away at 10.30 p.m. "A withdrawal over mountainous terrain is 
even more difficult and with the heavy packs the operation becomes extremely 
dangerous."21• Major Dyer waited an extra hour for a missing section to turn up. 
Regrettably Corporal Wipiti and his section had disappeared, never to appear again. 
Although they evaded the Germans for a week they were finally captured and immured in a 
Prisoner of War Camp. The Battalion was forced to withdraw in single file through the 
heavily timbered forest. They only had cigarette papers to follow in the dark. Captain A. 
Scott, commander of C Company, a short plump man periodically slipped off the track. 
Three times he did this and three times Logan and another man hauled him and his kit back 
onto the track. Lieutenant Ruihi Pene described the hell of the withdrawal: "We climbed 
this precipice, packs and all by grabbing and clutching at trees and branches and hauling 
ourselves up foot by foot."215 So exhausted were the Maori soldiers that Colonel G. 
Dittmer gave the order that their packs were to be abandoned when he realised that they 
were not going to get out of the pass before the New Zealand Engineers blew the road.216 
His decision came just in time, when the first of the battalion reached the head of the pass 
at 3.30a.m., they were "a sad sight soaked to the skin"m they found the engineers about to 
demolish the road. Brigadier Hargest had regretfully decided at 3.00 a.m. that if the 28 did 
not tum up in half an hour, the pass was to be blown and the transport sent back. The 
battalion was withdrawn to defensive positions in Ay Dhimitrios. They had lost three men 
killed and nineteen missing, they had blooded some of the best of the German Army, and 
then withdrawn in good order. 
At 12.15 p.m. on 17 April a series of explosions reverberated through the pass. The 
explosion cratered the road, but the 'sappers' were disappointed when the adjacent cliff did 
214 Gardiner, W. (1992).Te Mura o Te Ahi-The Story of the Maori Battalion. Reed. Auckland P.53 
215 Gardiner. P.54. 
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not fall in as well. It was: "A most disappointing fact when it is remembered that the 
Division had five weeks in the area to prepare for such an event."218 
The 4th Brigade even had less time to prepare for the withdrawal then did the 5th Brigade. 
4th Brigade, the hinge in the Servia pass was tasked with holding the pass to enable the 
other brigades to withdraw. Through the evening and early morning of the 8 and 9 April 
1941, the brigade had moved over from Mount Olympus to Servia through the gelatinous 
mud, finally moving into position in the early hours of the morning. The 19 Battalion had 
an early start at 3.00 a.m. on the 9 April. This early start was made worse when it was 
found that their transport could not carry all the battalion.219 But at around 5.00 am. they 
were picked up by the drivers of Divisional Petrol Company (Later on in Crete this unit 
was to inflict, more casualties on the Germans then any other comparable unit). In the 
Petrol Company' s ' three-tonners' they continued the 90 mile (154 kilometre) journey over 
the precipitous route to Servia. The weather in the Servia pass was as bad as the soldiers in 
the Monastir Gap had to face. Heavy rain, sleet and the unaccustomed heavy traffic were 
tearing up the roads 
The village of Servia occupies a strategic position. South of the Aliakmon River, the 
skyline above it is dominated by a 12th Century Byzantine castle. Once through the town 
there is a road junction. One road leading to Elasson, and one to Karperon. It was regarded 
as being a poor position as once through the town and pass, the Germans could turn the 
allies flank. This was the least of the 4th Brigade's problems as the infantry laid their 
groundsheets and huddled into their great coats and blankets. Luckier by far was the 
Hawkes Bay Company of 19 Battalion; they all managed to crowd into a barn. 
Next morning, the 4th Brigade faced a morning bright and cold, but the shivering soldiers 
were revived by their breakfast that the cooks had prepared against all odds. Once this was 
done they had to reconnoitre their new positions. "Eighteenth (sic) and 19 Battalions went 
to the steep escarpment which extends westward from Servia to the Aliakmon River and 20 
218 Mclymont p.269. 
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Battalion to reserve positions"'"'' 
On the 12 ApriL a company of the 2/l Australian Machine Gun Battalion was taken under 
command. 4th Brigade had the opportunity to view what the Mackay force had seen in the 
Monastir Gap. a constant stream of refugees; Greek and Yugoslav soldiers and. more 
usefully. a Yugoslav 88mm batter, and its crew. This was the German manufactured dua.l-
purposc weapon. which must have come as a fillip to the brigade, and it was quickly put 
into an anti-tank role. However everyone did not appreciate this gift. Kippenbcrger 
thought that the guns were '"settled in unpleasantly dose to my headquarters."'" 
On the evening of the 12 April the warning went around the brigade that the Germans were 
expected in the pass the next morning. but the Germans also had logistic problems and their 
progress had stopped outside K(mmi about seven kilometres away. This enforced hail 
allowed the 19th Australian Brigade to a.ssemb.le on the left flank of 4th Brigade. This also 
enabled demolitions to be laid and defences improved. 
During this enforced break the LufiwafJe had also been busy. straffing and bombing: '·but 
the casualty list was relatively light"""'. There were three killed and four wounded. On the 
14 April the enemy made its move. Patrols were seen entering Kozanis and this drew fire 
from the medium and field artillery regiments. The Germans tried to engage in counter 
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battery fire, and although its airbursts were spectacular its efforts were futile due to the 
efficiency of the Commonwealth gunners camouflage. 
Notwithstanding extensive aerial and ground reconnaissance the Germans were of the 
opinion that the allies had withdrawn south ofServia. 223 Oberst (Colonel) Grafvon Sponeck 
had been sent forward to take the Aliakmon river bridge only to see it fall into the river. 
The normally efficient German Pioneeren were unable to repair the demolitions to the 
bridge.22• So two augmented companies of Germans crossed the river by rubber boat and 
were advancing on Servia in the happy belief that the British did not only hold the pass in 
any great numbers but were also in full flight. 
The fact that they had captured two Greeks who were escaping on horseback had 
strengthened their belief that the Allies were making a hurried withdrawal...221 
At 5.30 am. these two companies casually walked226 (this is the description used) through 
the two anti-tank ditches into the lines of 19 Battalion. This lack of order and discipline 
fooled a New Zealand sentry into believing that they were refugees.221 This happy time for 
the Germans was not to last. A Company of 19 Battalion, the company that had inflicted 
the last sharp lesson was ready. Their listening posts had already reported abnormal 
movement. Grenade explosions and small arms fire echoed around the cutting. The 
Germans tried to regroup but were cut down by the Australian machine gunners. Some 
retreating Germans actually took a New Zealand position from the rear, killing several men 
before Private R McKay killed several of the enemy with a grenade, and Private P. (Jim) 
Frain disconcerted several others with his 'tommy-gun' and took them prisoner.228 
Another aggressive withdrawal was discouraged by a Private R. Wellman wielding another 
'tommy-gun' "so effectively that the attack faded away."229 It must have been a very 
demoralised group of Germans who sheltered from the Anzacs in the gorge. Some seventy 
surrendered at 7 .15 a.m. and the rest, who had come under sniper fire surrendered at 
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8.00am. In this sharp battle the Germans gave its losses as twenty-one killed, thirty-seven 
wounded and 168 missing for two New Zealanders killed and five wounded.230 It would 
appear that the Germans had some difficulty in learning from experience, for two platoons 
were seen in mid-morning approaching the cutting with slung rifles. Unfortunately, for the 
New Zealanders, a 19 Battalion rifle platoon opened fire too soon, and the Germans were 
able to withdraw under a hail of allied mortar fire. 23 ' Blissfully unaware of the reversals 
that had happened to his regiment, von Sponeck sent two more companies forward. By 
now the Commonwealth artillery had got into the act and these two companies were 
severely dealt with as they tried to cross the Aliakmon River. Colonel von Sponeck led the 
rest of his Regiment over the river by swimming, but they then spent a very uncomfortable 
day under shellfire and when the night came withdrew to the bridgehead where a defensive 
position had been made. The day had resulted in a significant victory for 19 Battalion. It 
had defeated in detail a force twice its size and driven it back to the river. m In that moment 
of triumph its commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel F.S. Varnham was seriously injured 
and the command taken over by Major C. Blackburn. 
The Luftwaffe ensured that the 19 and the other two battalions in the Brigade did not have 
an easy day. According to McClymont's Official History: "Those who stayed still were 
reasonably safe but anyone moving across country was likely to be strafed."m During the 
day 6th Field Regiment was operating in a target rich environment. The 9 Panzer War 
Diary reports that "the bridge building operation made no progress because the enemy's 
accurate shellfire made it impossible at times to work on the bridge and destroyed what 
work had been done."234 Lieutenant General Hubicki in command of the 9 Panzer Division 
convinced General Stumme, his corps commander that another attack would be costly and 
it would be far better to outflank the British whilst '"tying them down in the Servia 
position."235 
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General Hubicki had hoped to outflank the British by moving down the flank and moving 
through the town of Grevena to take Elasson, through which the British had to withdraw. 
At the same time the British were preparing to disengage and withdraw to Thermopylae. 
The withdrawal began with the 213rd Field Regiment, the 26 Battalion and some of the 19th 
Australian Brigade moving back through Karperon and Dheskati, thus avoiding the heavy 
shelling of the crossroads, and joining the left flank at Zarkos. While the German's were 
trying to outflank the Allies, the Anzacs were preparing to withdraw from the Servia pass 
area. 
On 16 April Kippenberger was somewhat disquieted to find both battalions in his vicinity, 
an Australian battalion and the New Zealand 26 Battalion of the 6th Brigade retreating 
without notifying the 4th Brigade. 236 The disturbing movements of the Germans across their 
front and the steady disappearance of the battalions on the left flank did much to excite 
comment in 20 Battalion, the only battalion with the luxury of a view on that rainy misty 
day. Explanatory orders finally arrived. Around 8.00 p.m. the Battalion slipped away 
through the heavily shelled cross roads near Prosilion; " ... where there was already 'a smell 
of death', but two trucks, one bren carrier and two motor-cycles were lost over the 
crumbling banks. "237 
By 5.00 a.m. the next day, mud spattered and grey with fatigue, they were in their new 
positions astride the road at Lava. It was a tribute to Kippenberger's training that not one 
man fell out.238 Around them on the road came the rumble of the withdrawing field and 
medium artillery regiments. The only artillery left in the pass area was the 6th Field and 
the British 7th Medium Regiments. The responsibility for the rearguard of the 4th Brigade 
fell on Colonel Kippenberger. A serious conscientious man the welfare of his men were 
his primary concern. This concern made him hold on longer than he should have for 
several stragglers. This lapse almost caused Kippenberger to be incarcerated in a German 
Ojjl.ager. Taking advantage of the mist the 7th Medium and the 6th Field Regiment 
moved off at once. Two gunners gallantly rescued their guns when a break in the mist 
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exposed them to German fire. 18 Battalion had the most difficult withdrawal. Their 
position overlooking Servia was high on an escarpment. They had to move quickly with 
full equipment. As with the Maori at the Olympus pass the order was given to abandon 
packs. 
Everything else, including food, blankets, and the nice new two-man bivouac tents only 
received within the last couple of days, was to be left behind, and if possible destroyed. 239 
This is something no soldier likes to do, as his contact with the outside world falls away 
with his personal effects in the pack. Unit cohesion and the timetable broke down as the 
demoralised men staggered like automatons over ridges. By this time the companies had 
separated. When the first company reached the road at 2.00 a.m. they had no idea of the 
whereabouts of the others who had withdrawn by the 'back route'. After a gruelling five-
hour tramp, only C Company came out onto the main road and into the welcoming arms of 
Brigadier Puttick who shepherded the exhausted men into the awaiting trucks. Captain W. 
Lyon a serving Member of Parliament, and soon to be killed on Crete, realising that the 
men could not manage to march much longer pointed this out to Kippenberger. Lyon was 
sent ahead to bring the trucks closer. This had the consequence that the engineers had to 
lift their demolitions. It speaks much for Kippenberger's moral courage that he was 
prepared to wait so long for 18 Battalion's stragglers. With the morning light touching the 
sky, Kippenberger knew that he could wait no longer. At 5.40 am. the first demolition 
was blown. This caused a gaggle of 18 Battalion stragglers to call that out they were still 
across the gorge. Kippenberger then waited for another young private still carrying his 
Bren gun and great coat. At 6.20 a.m. when he could wait no longer, the demolitions 
finally went up. The failure of the 5th Brigade to cause the collapse of the cliff in the pass 
was to have its consequence, when several German tanks and motorised infantry cut off 
Kippenberger's rearguard outside Servia village. Lieutenant H. Robinson was surprised 
when preparatory to blowing the culvert, he heard frring ahead of him. Then a New 
Zealand truck appeared quickly followed by a tank, a German panzer. The truck was 
beckoned frantically around the bend as the machine guns and 'Boyes' anti-tank guns 
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opened fire. 
The first intimation that Kippenberger had that the Germans were there was when a truck 
blew up in front of him, and started to burn. Through his binoculars K.ippenberger could 
see two German tanks "firing fast down the road at me."2"° The tanks were being subjected 
to a torrent of fire from the Divisional Cavalry and a gallant two-pounder on a 'portee', but 
with little effect. "A carrier from somewhere ahead in the column swung out from behind 
the truck and raced straight at the tanks. "m Alas this gallantry was ineffective as the carrier 
capsized into a ditch. Then Kippenberger saw the lorry borne troops approaching and 
sadly realised that any chance of forcing the crossroads had gone. It was time to take to 
the hills on foot. Looking back Kippenberger saw a dismal scene. All the trucks had 
stopped and some were on fire. Two anti-tank gunners lay dead on their 'portee' and the 
carriers were stuck in the field and their crews were running for the bank behind them 2• 2 
"Very soon the firing slackened, until there was only one Bren gun firing lonely- sounding 
bursts, then it stopped. I realised that our rearguard had gone ... "24 ' Battles appear 
differently to where a person is stationed and Kippenberger may have decided it was time 
to leave, but the rear-guard battle went on. The battle was not as one-sided as 
K.ippenberger believed. P troop of 7th Anti-Tank and C Squadron of the Divisional 
Cavalry continued to fight the Germans after Robinson blew the bridge. Bombardier 
Bellringer's crew claimed two German tanks. This was probably the "portee' that 
K.ippenberger saw the anti-tank gunners and the Divisional Cavalry claimed four tanks, two 
armoured cars and one truck before they were driven off, killed or captured.24• It was a 
reduced but not demoralised P Troop that withdrew to Elasson with A Squadron of the 
Divisional Cavalry. 
After an exciting and extremely tense trudge where they were fired on by both sides; 
Kippenberger and his companions eventually evaded capture to escape to the new lines at 
Thermopylae. "Suddenly we were halted by a sharp challenge. The party stood frozen 
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while I obeyed a very keen-looking New Zealand infantryman standing in a slit trench and 
pointing a sub-machine gun at us.''245 They had rejoined the Division. 
The morning of 18 April brought disturbing news for 6th Brigade' s commander., Brigadier 
Barraclough. At 6.00 p.m. a liaison officer reported that the Germans had occupied village 
ofGonnos opposite Tempe and were probing towards the Pinios River. At 8 p.m. Brigadier 
Puttick brought even more disturbing news; a German column had cut the road between 
Servia and Elevtherolhorion; attacked the 4th Brigade withdrawing from the Servia Pass. 
They had cut off some of the rear-guard and were engaging some of 4th Brigades' anti-tank 
guns. 246 There was now a fear that the Germans could isolate 6th Brigade., Allen force, 
including 21 Battalion., and other elements of the Anz.ac Corps by dropping paratroopers in 
their rear and then thrusting across the foothills of Mount Olympus from Gonnos to 
Tirnavos. Barrowclough and Miles acted decisively. The HQ squadron of the 5th Field 
Regiment and the 28 Battery was sent forward. F troop was to join 26 Battalion carrier 
platoon to protect the outskirts ofTirnavos and the airfield at Larissa. 
The 6th Brigade was deployed south of Elasson., where two roads lead to Larissa. One of 
the roads, the south-east was covered by the 24 Battalion. Because of the steepness of the 
pass no anti-tank guns were placed around the 24 Battalion., but the demolitions and the 
mines were thought to provide adequate protection against tank attack. Also the area in 
front of the 24 Battalion was covered at a distance by the twenty 25-pounders of the 
Australian 213rd Field Regiment and some of the 4.5 inch guns of the British 64th Medium 
Regiment. The other road running south-west, over the steep Menexes Pass was an easier 
but longer route covered by the 25 Battalion with eight 25-pounders in an anti-tank role, in 
support. Around each position was a screen of 2-pounder anti-tank guns. The 26 Battalion 
was placed in reserve. 
The 26 Battalion was impatiently awaiting action. It was dug in on high ground running 
along the Aliakmon River. Because of the constant adjusting of positions the troops were 
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not able to get much rest and were forced to sleep out in the open. On the evening of 16 
April, Jack Turvey, a runner for Lt. Colonel J. Page, was sent for, to deliver a message to 
the Colonel. Before he left, Page, an aggressive regular soldier popular with the men, said 
to Jack "We and the Aussies on our left are going to have a 'go' tonight."247 Page's 
optimistic assessment came to naught, and as the Germans entered the north of Servia the 
26 Battalion was pulling out heading to Diskata on a very rough secondary rough. There 
was not enough transport for the battalion and so began what the 26 Battalion History 
describes and the "longest forced march in the campaign"m. What Jack remembers is the 
rain and when the rain stopped, the stukas came down. Once being 'straffed' Jack and a 
group jumped off the road into a gully to avoid one attack and hid the scrub. As the bombs 
exploded, a piece of shrapnel killed his friend, Private G. Webster who was only two 
metres away from Jack. Private Webster was the :first dead body Jack had seen. It was on 
this retreat that the men were told to eat their 'iron rations', 'bully beef and biscuits. Jack 
had acquired a tin of MVP (Meat and Vegetable Pie). He was not allowed to enjoy it, 
several of the larger men in the battalion took it away from him. Jack bears no bitterness 
from this episode, as he says, "we were all awfully hungry."249 
Once the Divisional Cavalry screen withdrew it was not long before the German panzers 
began to probe forward to Elasson. The attack commenced at 11 p.m. but the terrain 
caused the panzers to bunch-up north of Elasson. This congestion made them easy targets 
for, :first the medium guns of the 64th and then the 25-pounders of the 213rd Field 
Regiment. Several tanks were destroyed at ranges of 10,000 yards (9,145 metres). During 
this engagement the 213rd regiment fired 6,500 rounds and discovered that the German 
tanks would not advance through the heavy artillery fire. 250 This concentrated fire prevented 
any German attack developing until evening. The Germans were not idle and were 
infiltrating by a secondary road between Tsaritsani and Elasson. As dusk fell on the 
smoking battlefield and the dark made accurate observation difficult; a German attack 
began against the 24 Battalion. At 6.00 p.m. shells began to fall on the positions of this 
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battalion. Lorries carrying panzer-grenadiers led by tanks advanced towards the Menexes 
pass. The leading tanks ran over the mines in the pass and their tracks were blown off 
delaying the advance towards 24 Battalion's positions. Unfortunately, although initially 
spectacular the demolitions, as with the others prepared by the 5th Brigade, had been half 
hearted and were cleared within half an hour.251 The German infantry were soon fanning 
out and passing through the disabled tanks. The shells and the defence of the 24 Battalion 
did have the effect of slowing down the advance which 'petered out ' by 9.00 p.m. 
" ... [T]he 24th ... was withdrawing in accordance with the plan, but the attackers succeeded 
only in delaying the withdrawal for a time."252 As the New Zealanders withdrew, the 
defence positions were thinned out until 11.30 p.m only " ... a troop of New Zealand field 
guns, four anti-tank guns and small parties of infantry were left."253 Then suddenly they 
were gone. 
The town of Larissa was a bottle-neck; an earthquake had all but destroyed it in early 
March of 1941. Now it was devastated by German bombing, the town was still burning as 
the last of the rear-guard passed through at around 3.00 p.m. when they were able to join up 
with part of Allen force withdrawing from the battle at Tempe. At this time the writer and 
farmer, Peter Winter of Petrol Company was also on the road from Larissa. "The roads 
were crammed with trucks travelling nose to tail and from dawn to dusk the planes from the 
Luftwaffe strafed and bombed them Driving my water truck I was spared the anxiety of 
carrying troops.2S4" Winter was one of the last to leave Larissa: 
Of our own volition we began taking food supplies from a deserted dump near at hand and 
handing them on to the tired and hungry infantry as their trucks went by. Their obvious 
gratitude rewarded us for our endeavours. Then a young lieutenant turned up from 
somewhere and accused us of looting. We protested and pointed out as we were 
distributing as much as possible of the stores [it] prevented the approaching German (sic) 
from getting them and kept on with our self-imposed task. The officer drew his revolver 
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and cocked it. Perhaps he wanted to get a signed 'chitty' from the Germans. To my delight 
we ignored him and he went away. 255 
(The nationality of the lieutenant was not disclosed.) 
Freyberg appeared shortly afterwards; waving to the troops and sometimes directing traffic. 
It was at one of these times that Max Ritter of the 19 Battalion relates that Freyberg's son, 
Paul Freyberg, then an infantryman in 19 Battalion, stuck his head out of a truck to shout 
friendly abuse at his father. 256 Freyberg sensibly told the drivers to turn on their headlights 
and sent them on their way. This order permeated it way through the retreating ranks and 
from then on all the transport travelled by night. Freyberg and his Australian colleague 
General Mackay did much to allay their soldiers' fear by appearing to be impervious to 
German straffing. According to Peter Winter the sight of Freyberg sitting in his 'spic and 
span' car relaxed and apparently at ease, did much to bolster the morale of the retreating 
New Zealanders. 251 Driver Winter did not retain his water truck for very long. 
At one stage we were directed into open fields to reduce congestion on the roads and the 
German air force was presented with even better targets. We lost ten trucks including my 
water truck. I also lost my co-driver who was not there when we were ordered to move off. 
[They were separated in the confusion.] I next met him in a prisoner-of-war camp.258 
What none of the veterans whom, I was privileged to interview, ever disclosed was 
the tension of watching the bombers come down and destroy their trucks and kill and 
wound their comrades. One of them, Gunner Walter Murphy, also an author of two 
official war histories shot at a bomber that had destroyed a truck further up the 
convoy. He was gratified to see the plane crash but suspects that it was damaged 
already. 259 
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There are two roads and two railway lines going south from Larissa. 6th Brigade retreating 
from the town was split into two components: the 24 and 25 Battalions took the road to 
Volos, which was strewn with cars and trucks broken down through over use. The 
Battalion went by train. Two sappers (Gibson and Smith) from the 19 Army Troops 
Company (Engineers) convinced Lt-Colonel William Gentry the Quarter Master General 
that they could assemble a train. As the signals on the line had been destroyed, the troops 
flashed warnings by torch. "Moreover, neither of the drivers had been over the track before 
and much had to be left to providence and their intuition. " 260 Travelling by train was as 
hazardous as by road. Just Outside Larissa the troops had to to evacuate the train and go to 
ground when Junkers 87's tried to destroy the bridge over the Pinios River. The soldiers 
evacuated the train and sheltered in the adjoining fields. The bombers were unsuccessful 
but a shell splinter killed one of the sheltering soldiers. The train also ran into the obstacle 
of abandoned wagons that were pushed in front until they could be shunted into sidings. 
Outside Lamia the gradient rose sharply on the slope of Mount Ossa. To get up this steep 
grade the New Zealanders had to behave ruthlessly with their Greek allies, five trucks full 
of Greek soldiers were surreptitiously disconnected and the New Zealanders crammed into 
the remaining nine trucks. 26 ' It was doubtful whether these Greeks were able to be formed 
into a coherent force again, whereas the New Zealanders were retreating to another 
defensive position. On the reverse slope the situation turned to farce, although the troops 
would not have seen it that way. Because the break van was one of the rolling stock that 
was disconnected there was no way to break the train. The train hurtled down the slope 
into Lamia 'knocking all obstacles out of the way'. 
At Lamia the train and the battalion ran into Greek bureaucracy. The train required a Greek 
crew to interpret the Greek signals and as the New Zealanders appeared not to want to use 
coercion the remaining trucks were attached to a train already made up for some retreating 
Australians. As this was being done, another attack crune in. The line was cut, carriages 
damaged and several Australians were killed. The two redoubtable sappers Gibson and 
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Smith with an equally determined Australian driver came to the rescue. Another train was 
made up and handed to the Greek crew. This time the Anzacs were more ruthless, 
dislodging the Greek soldiers and ignoring the protesting stationmaster the train was taken 
onto the main line. " ... [W]here the men of 26 Battalion were collected from the fields of 
corn and poppies in which they had been sheltering." 262 The train finally stopped at the 
town of Kifissokhori where the troops detrained to spend a night in the open. The British 
railway transport officer (RTO) arranged rations and some transport for C and D 
Companies, but the other companies prepared to march the forty miles to Molos but after 
three hours the vehicles of the NZASC picked them up. Finally the New Zealanders were 
on the Thermopylae line. 
Wars are not won by withdrawals, but this retreat was conducted with tenacity and skill 
whilst inflicting losses on the enemy, enabled the Anzacs to keep out of the German army's 
grasp and fall back to another defensible position. 
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German Military Equipment as used in the Greek Campaign 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE 'LONELY STAND' OF 21 BATTALION 
I do freely agree that the 21 st Battalion were placed in an impossible position, and attacked 
by a superior force, but so were the rest of the Division in the same plight, in fact, so was the 
whole of the British force. That we got out at all was a surprise to me. 
Lt General Freyheri( 
\31 
Northern Greece, showing planned withdrawal to the Thermopylae line. 
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On the evening of8 April 1941 the 21 Battalion, the last New Zealand battalion to leave the 
Athens area, was :finally moving up to the front. The Battalion had been in Athens on the 
evening of 6 April when the Germans bombed Piraeus harbour then full of ships from the 
AFN 24 convoy. The 21 Battalion would have been aware of the catastrophic explosion of 
the ammunition ship, the 12,000 tonne Clan Fraser. The blast was so powerfuL that it 
blew in the tent flaps of Colonel Macky's tent 12 miles away. 
The Battalion commander, Colonel Noel Macky, had frequently enjoyed the hospitality of 
the officers of the Base Area in Athens and was somewhat sorry to move northward when, 
eventually, the battalion sloughed off the control of the 80 Base Area.263 Macky's instruction 
was that their destination was to be Katerini, but before they arrived a decision had been 
made to withdraw the Division from Katerini to the Olympus Pass area. On the way to the 
front, the train transporting 21 Battalion had to pull off the main track several times to 
allow Greek troop trains to go in the opposite direction. Colonel Macky commented that: 
The true story of the defection of the Greek troops is to be told. One story we had was 
that a divisional commander gave general leave just at a critical moment. As we proceeded 
up country our train was often side tracked to allow Greek troop trains to pass through in 
the opposite direction. We could only goggle at the phenomenon.264 
\Vhen the train drawing the cattle trucks carrying the 21 Battalion reached Larissa, the 
German columns had already occupied Salonika. Larissa, already ravaged by an 
earthquake, was now it in the path of an invading army. At Larissa, Colonel Macky 
professed to be astonished by the informality of a telephone instruction to detrain at the 
town of Platarnon fifteen miles further north. In a letter to J.F. Cody, (author of several 
Official Histories of New Zealand in the Second World War), L.N. Wallace who was a 
witness to the conversation between the two officers was of the opinion that the Railway 
Transport Officer (RTO) who called Macky to the phone was drunk.265 Macky's instructions 
was that 21 Battalion was not to join 5th Brigade, as he had originally been instructed, but 
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it was to take over the defences above the Platamon tunnel presently defended by D 
Company of the 26 Battalion. 
The German XXXX Corps under the command of General Georg Stumme had been ordered 
by Field Marshal Wilhelm List to attack in the Edhessa-Florina region with three divisions. 
XVIII Corps with one panzer division, two mountain divisions and two infantry divisions 
was ordered to proceed down the coast through Larissa and force the British defences in 
Platamon and the Pinios Gorge. The combined movements of XXXX Corps and XVI/I 
Corps would have the effect of cutting off the allies before they were able to withdraw to 
the Thermopylae line. General Maitland Wilson unaware of XVIII movements, was 
convinced that the Edhessa-Florina region was where the main German attack was going to 
fall. "General Wilson at this stage anticipated a greater threat from XXXX Corps, and his 
rearguards were so disposed."266 
The town of Platamon lies on the coast, surrounded by mountains, north of the Vale of 
Tempe, which is in the gorge of the Pinios River. When the train reached Platamon a 
solitary soldier at the station greeted the 21 Battalion. He was the batman of Captain F. 
Huggins, the commander ofD Company, 26 Battalion and his presence at the station was a 
coincidence as he was there to collect his officer' s laundry.261 Huggins' s company was 
further up the line mining a tunnel. 
Macky had been given specific orders From Brigadier Hargest, for the defence of the 
position on 10 April. 
It had to deny the approaches to the gap [at Platamon], watch for landings along the coast to 
the south and defend Castle Hill and Hill 266. If either of them were captured there had to 
be an immediate counter-attack; there would be ' NO retirement' .268 
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Macky immediately ordered the 21 Battalion to prepare defensive positions on the ridge 
overlooking the railway twmel: 
The ridge, comparatively flat on top and about 200 feet high, fell away steeply on each 
side. At first glance it appeared impassable to any form of wheeled traffic, but along half a 
mile inland there was saddle across which a track alongside the railway deviated to rejoin 
the line at the tunnel's southern exit.'" 
21 Battalion positions were disposed in order to command the track. (Macky refers to it 
as "a rough and unmetalled" road) and to deny access to the twmel. '" A Company was 
positioned on 'Castle Hill', a hill that dominated the tunnel, and B Company on Point 
266, a hill to the left of 'Castle Hill'. The two other companies were held in reserve. 
Eventually, C Company was to cover the small tov.11 of Pandeleimon just north of the 
Platamon ridge looking south. 
269 Cody, J.F. (I 953) 2 J Battalwn Offrciaf History of New Zealand in the Secorui W"orld War 1939-194 l. War History Branch 
[)epartmem oflntemal Affairs: Wellington, p.43. 
270 Macky. 
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tunnel and D Company would dig into the reverse slope of 'Castle Hill'. The hill itself 
was "covered by dense and impassable shrubs and large flinty rocks through which mule 
tracks meandered. 211 
At 5.00 p.m. welcome reinforcements arrived. They were the sappers of the 19th Army 
Troop Company, New Zealand Engineers, under the command of Lieutenant F.W.O. Jones 
and a troop of four 25-pounders under the command of Lieutenant L.G. Williams. 
Williams decided to site his observation post on the 'castle'. It was not easy getting the 
guns into position, and on one occasion, a carrier had to tow a gun up the slope. The 
battalion and its support troops then had to endure a drizzly cold evening. Early next 
morning Colonel Macky and Captain W.M. Tongue, the commander of C Company, made 
a reconnaissance and decided that the adjacent village of Pandeleimon would have to be 
defended or the Platamon position could be turned. Tongue and his C Company were 
allocated to defend Pandeleimon village. Tongue did not have enough men to defend the 
actual village so C Company was not placed in the village, but on the hill above it. 15 
Platoon was placed in a gully astride of the track leading from the village. 14 Platoon was 
to the left of 15 Platoon, and in the front of 13 Platoon. Captain R.B. McClymont's A 
Company was to hold the ' castle' area; Major C. Le Lievre's B Company was to hold the 
most difficult position to the left of the 'castle' scattered among the scrub and the rocks. 
Captain Trousdale's Company was in reserve and Captain Wilson' s mortar platoon was 
placed in front of McClymont's company. 
Some time during the morning a train arrived to ' dump' ten days supply of rations as well 
as 1200 rounds for the 25-pounders. With the supplies came a letter from General Freyberg 
stating that "I [Macky] should expect infantry only [ attacking his position] as the country 
was impassable to tanks."212 It appears that General Wilson was still holding to his original 
belief that the attack would come in one of the passes to the north.273 It was at this point that 
Macky, in his report, made the claim that his battalion had been allocated to the Anzac 
Corps. Macky claims that his original orders to occupy the Platamon position came 
211 Macky. 
272 Macky. 
273 McClymont, p.174. 
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from Blarney's headquarters. Beside this in the margin Ian Wards has written: 'contrary to 
the facts - nonsense.' 274 
Later on the same day (Saturday) a despatch rider came through with more instructions 
from Freyberg. If Macky had been allocated to Corps as he maintained then it appears that 
Freyberg was not aware of this fact. These instructions were specific about demolitions in 
the tunnel and in the Pinios Gorge. That day those of the battalion around the 'castle' were 
also heartened to see a British fighter shoot down 'Hawkeye', the persistent German 
reconnaissance plane, 215 into the sea. Macky makes the comment that this was the only 
time that they saw the R.A.F. This was one of several planes that were reported shot down 
that day. 21 Battalion claimed some, but Lieutenant M.C. O'Neill confirms that a British 
fighter brought down this one. 
Easter morning was a day of activity. All the Allied Forces were bedevilled by the 
inability to communicate directly in the mountainous terrain of Northern Greece. To rectify 
this a better wireless arrived from headquarters. According to Macky: ''we could not get 
over Olympus, but could dogs-hind-leg through Larissa".216 Using other units as relay 
stations. 
Around mid-afternoon, the last train from Katerini passed through the 21 Battalion 
position. It contained a short stout Greek general who gave a certificate to Macky stating 
that this was the last train from the north. At 3.00 p.m., Macky, was 'wandering down to 
the station' (his words) to meet his second in command, Major Harding who was expected 
by train, was astonished to see General Freyberg and Freyberg' s G.S.0.3.211 Major J. Peart 
who had also arrived from Larissa. 218 Freyberg brought the news no battalion commander 
wants to hear. The division was withdrawing to the Thermopylae line, but the Battalion 
was to deny the Platamon ridge and coast road to the Germans for as long as possible. "I 
214 Macky .. 
215 Macky . 
276 Macky. 
277 G.S .O. Stands for General Staff Officer, 3 indicates the grade. I is generally a Colonel, 2 a Lieutenant Colonel. 
278 Macky. 
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was assured again I should only expect an Infantry advance. Got authority to blow the 
tunnel."279 
For the rest of the afternoon,, Macky was subjected to the continual explosions from the 
tunnel area as Lieutenant Jones' Company got into their work. Macky writes, somewhat 
petulantly, in his report: "In the defile below a fiendish corporal put in blow after blow. It 
was all below my headquarters and most unpleasant."280 For all this activity, the demolitions 
were thought not to be satisfactory, and the sappers were of the opinion that the damage to 
the tunnel would only offer a four to six hour stoppage.2'' 
The last units of26 Battalion had withdrawn south on 13 April but not before they had left 
the positions wired in. The 21 Battalion and their supporting arms were going to be on 
their own. The closest New Zealand unit was on the other side of Mount Olympus. Not 
withstanding Hargest's orders, Colonel Macky was also aware that sooner or later his flank 
would be turned at Pandeleimon,, as he had only a company covering it. Contrary to the 
assurances of Freyberg, the New Zealanders were about to meet the full force of a German 
panzer attack. 
The German XVIII Corps commanded by General Franz Boehme believed that the allied 
forces were in headlong retreat. In this belief he ordered the divisions under his command 
to pursue, destroy or capture the Greek and Commonwealth forces in his path. 
219 Macky. 
28'>Macky. 
2s1 Macky. 
2 Panzer Division was instructed to capture Katerini and carry on the advance on both sides 
of Mount Olympus. The 6th Mountain Division was to close up on the high ground 
between Verioa and the Olympus Pass and was to be in a position to push forward towards 
Katerini, or to the area south of Servia. 282 
282 Wards. p.3. 
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It was the lonely task of 21 Battalion to slow up this pursuit as much as possible, for the . I 
German's instructions were: "If they advanced 'as quickly as possible' they could cut off 
the retreat of the British units withdrawing towards Larissa. " m 
It was the 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion of the German 2nd Panzer that made contact with the 
21 Battalion on the late afternoon, (6.20 p.m. according to Macky), on 14 April.214 The 
scout cars saw soldiers lounging in trenches on the forward slopes of the 'castle' dominated 
ridge. These were the soldiers of the 21 Battalion. The soldiers had just been paid and 
were preparing to 'stand-to' for dusk when setting sun caught a moving windscreen and the 
flash of light indicated that the Germans had arrived. The New Zealanders supporting 
artillery opened fire at a range of 5000 yards (4572 metres) at the German reconnaissance 
patrol. The Gennan motorcyclists were under the impression that they were unobserved 
until the moment when artillery fire burst around them. The Germans, having discovered, 
and in tum been discovered by the New Zealanders rapidly withdrew to join the stream of 
traffic some four miles behind them. The vehicles had stopped in tidy lines just out of range 
of the 25-pounder guns. The commander of the 2nd Panzer gained the impression from the 
reconnaissance that although the British held the Castle Hill they did not hold the 
surrounding countryside. The German divisional commander divided his forces into two, 
one was sent towards the Olympus Pass and the other to force the Platamon tunnel. The 
battle group detailed to attack Platamon was the aforementioned motor cycle battalion and 
the 113rd Panzer Regiment, the II/304th Infantry Regiment with one battalion in reserve and 
two batteries of artillery Colonel Hermann Balck of the 3rd Panzer Regiment commanded 
this battle group: " ... [A] hard strong-willed man who later commanded an army group."285 
Balck's second battle group drove down the coastal road towards the tunnel. His 
reconnaissance parties reported that the New Zealanders held the tunnel in force and the 
flank was anchored high on Mount Olympus above the village of Pandeleimon. 
The New Zealand soldiers were soon unsettled to see a long stream of traffic moving 
towards them. This traffic was quickly seen to include German tanks deploying onto the 
283 McClymont. p.245. 
234 Macky. 
285Wards, p.3. 
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plain. Captain Tongue reported that he counted a hundred tanks, to which Macky retorted: 
"Nobody will believe us, so officially there are 50 tanks in front of us."286 The German 
deployment soon drew 25-JX)under fire ... " ... without much hope of damaging them, but 
with the intention of discouraging their closer approach."287 Then a loud crash indicated 
that the engineers had blown the tunnel with a naval depth charge and gelignite. This 
explosion had not only its desired affect but also sent the children who had been interested 
onlookers scurrying back to their village. 288 At some time Macky must have received some 
of instructions about pulling back to the Pinios Gorge otherwise he would not have had 
instructions to carry out demolitions in that area. Whether it was on 13 April when the 
despatch rider came through or directly from Freyberg cannot be ascertained. Lieutenant 
Jones was then instructed to go to the Pinios in conformance with the orders to carry out 
demolitions there. Macky doubted that Jones would have much sleep that night. 
As it was a dry day, clouds of dust soon rose over the JX)sitions of the Germans and 21 
Battalion revealing to both sides their mutual locations. Colonel Macky observed that: "the 
Germans parked their vehicles neatly off the road. Like the old-time horse lines." 289 As 
night fell on Easter Sunday, Macky's rather fatuous comment was: "[D]ark fell on a 
surprised, but resolute battalion"2"° Macky does not say what sort of surprise this was, but 
probably referred to the German use of tanks, as the Battalion had several days to prepare 
for an attack. Macky also stated that he wanted to see the Battalion 'properly blooded'. 
Neither side had much chance for sleep. The Germans used the night to probe the New 
Zealanders lines and to bring up equipment. Enemy vehicles that came into range of the 
four-gun battery or the two mortars drew fire. A satisfactory moment occurred when a 
mortar bomb hit an enemy truck; it exploded and then burned throughout the night. The 
leading element of the German attack - the 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion spent an 
uncomfortable night being shelled. Moving forward after an artillery bombardment they 
had met heavy fire from the ridge and they incurred substantial casualties. A patrol on the 
286 Macky. 
287 Macky. 
288 A. Ferguson to J.F.Cody enclosed in a letter from W.J. Gorrie dated 3 July !950. WA ll 3/8 N.A. 
2&9 Mackv. 
290 H.W. ·smith to l.McL.Wards letter dated 19 March 1950 WA ll 3/8 N.A 
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right flank confirmed that the New Zealanders defences stretched as far as the village of 
Pandeleimon. Lieutenant M.C. O'Neill set out with a patrol to 'straighten the line' when he 
was fired on by a strong German patrol comprised of one or two companies. Macky was 
also under the impression that the Germans had got into the village and later on in the 
evening Lieutenant C.T. Mason was told to re-take the village of Pandeleimon. The New 
Zealanders had made the same mistake as the Germans, and thought that the enemy had 
occupied the village. Although the Germans had infiltrated patrols into the village during 
the night, their main positions were outside the village. There is some confusion whether 
Mason's attack actually reached the village. The evidence is that both sides seem to have 
been content to fire at each other from either side of Pandeleimon. In a letter to Ian Wards 
from Harold Smith, a private in C Company, Smith states that the 15 Platoon did counter-
attack the village of Pandeleimon and there was a lot of firing coming from around the 
village. 291 C.J. Bosworth, a private in the C Company, says he was told to lay low by a 
NCO who thought that to attack a securely held village with just a platoon would be 
futile. 292 Next morning at daylight, Bosworth's platoon was itself attacked. The German 
attack was initially broken up and the German soldiers scattered by light machine gun fire, 
but soon brought their mortars into play and drove the New Zealanders off. 
With the dawn came the persistent reconnaissance Fieseler Storch, or 'Hawkeye ' as the 
soldiers knew it. The plane must have seen something, for at 6.00 am. a shell burst just 
above the mortar positions. 293 This signalled the beginning of the enemy bombardment. 
This attack was concentrated on McClymont's A Company, defending the centre of the 
ridge. The German motor cycle battalion, moving forward after an artillery bombardment 
on the 21 Battalion positions met heavy fire from 'Castle' ridge and incurred heavy 
casualties. A patrol on the right flank found that the New Zealanders not only held 
'Castle' ridge but also, that their defences stretched as far as the village of Pandeleimon. 
Colonel Hermann Balck arrived at 2.00 p.m. on 15 April. He found that the motor cycle 
battalion had been driven to ground in front of the ridge and were sheltering among the 
boulders and the scrub. Balck ordered them back to be re-formed. It was now time for the 
290 H.W. Smith to I.Mel.Wards letter dated 19 March 1950 WA Il 3/8 N.A 
291 CJ. Bosworth to I.Mel. Wards, letter dated 6 December 1959. WA II 3/8 N.A 
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panzers. Balck's personality being what it was, he was not going to accept any delay. The 
whole regiment was deployed to support the light tanks (Panzer Mk II's). In the attack 
the Panzer Mk II's all shed their tracks, but no casualties were suffered by the regiment. 
The Panzer Regiment 113rd attacked frontally while the 2nd Motor Cycle Regiment worked 
around the flank. Their targets were A Company on the ridge above the railway. The 
castle also came under a disproportionate amount of enemy fire, but, apart from the artillery 
observation post, the unromantic New Zealanders had not manned such an obvious target. 
As W.J. Gorrie recalls: The Huns blasted hell out of the old castle, much to our satisfaction 
as none of our men were near the place. 29• A probing German patrol received a home-made 
grenade, killing the officer and driving the others into the bushes. The enemy continued 
their fire throughout the day but with little effect. In the afternoon the tanks were again 
heard trying to force their way up the ridge. To the left of the tunnei three companies of 
the motorcycle regiment probed C Company above the village of Pandeleimon. One 
company of the motorcycle regiment was ordered to flank Pandeleimon, was slowed in its 
advance towards the village of Skotina whilst the other two attacked Pandeleimon frontally. 
Some of the positions held by Lieutenant Mason's platoon were taken temporarily, but the 
Germans were driven off by a determined counter attack by the platoons of Lieutenants C. 
Mason and H. Smith. Balck was not to be thwarted, and decided to attack Pandeleimon 
again. This time the 11304th Infantry Regiment supported the 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion, 
and the 113rd Panzer Regiment, with one company of infantry in the attack during the night. 
Much to Balck's annoyance contact was lost between the various arms of the attacking 
forces and the attack was not synchronised. 295 It was to the grim satisfaction to the 21 
Battalion the attack was ineffective. At 8.00 p.m there was another determined infantry and 
tank attack, but the tanks were unable to get up the ridge to A Company, which was just as 
well, because the Boyes anti-tank rifle was found to be useless at anything but removing the 
paint off the German panzers. One tank at least must have been hit by indirect fire from 
Lieutenant William's 25-pounder battery because it was left derelict and burning. An 
observation on the day's fighting in the diary of the 3rd Panzer Regiment (2nd Panzer 
Division) was that the tanks and the infantry were unable to establish themselves on the 
293 Cody, p.53. 
294 Feguson enclosure. W .J. Gorre to CJ. Cody, letter dated 3 July 1950. WA ll 3n. 
295 Wards, p.5. 
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ridge, but again commented on the New Zealander's failure to counter-attack.296 During the 
night German aggressive patrolling and probing parties ensured that there was very little 
sleep for anyone in the 21 Battalion. Major C. Le Lievre was so concerned by the level of 
infiltration that he decided to pull B Company's 11 platoon into reserve behind 12 Platoon. 
C Company, on the flank on the ridge overlooking the village of Pandeleimon, suffered the 
most from infiltration and aggressive patrolling by the Germans. Nevertheless Macky was 
satisfied with his Battalion' s performance; as he writes in his report: "[T]hey [The 
Germans] were severely dealt with ... [and suffered] ... many casualties. Never turned us 
out of one post. 207" Macky' s satisfaction aside, things were going to be difficult in the 
morning. Lieutenant William's artillery battery was now down to eighty rounds. It was at 
this time "that General Freyberg, very occupied with the imminent withdrawal of 4 and 5 
Brigades, had arranged for Anzac Corps Headquarters to take 21 Battalion under 
command. "293 
When the attack came at 7.30 am. on the morning of 16 April it fell upon C Company on 
the ridge above Pandeleirnon. The company was attacked from the front and the flanks. 
At 9.00 am. the bombardment of the 'castle' started again. At 9.15 am. Tongue reported 
that his company headquarters was surrounded. 299 C Company put up a stiff fight to hold 
their positions but after an initial discomfiture, the Germans regrouped and overran the now 
scattered sections of C Company. Late on 14 April the 1/304 Infantry Company climbed 
up a 700 metre ridge to the west of the New Zealand positions, outflanking them. 300 "[T]he 
appearance of this company coming up to give support turned the tide, and Pandeleimon 
was captured with all field positions in the area."301Those New Zealanders taken prisoner 
were initially surprised by their captors demands for food and then angered when in 
296 Cody, p.55. 
m Macky. 
293 McClymont, p.248. 
299 Cody, p.57. 
300 McCleod, J. (1986). Myth and Reality - The New Zealand Soldier In World War//. Heinmann Reed: Auckland, p.31 
301 Wards, p.6 . 
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Hawkeye or Percy the Pimp. 
contrdvention of the Geneva Convention they were made to clear the railway tunnel. CJ. 
Bosworth thought that his German captors were · quite decent· and 'sportsmen', but he was 
somewhat startled by them asking if the New Zealanders had any cigarettes or ·bully beef. 
He admits that his favourable impression was somewhat diminished when he was made to 
work clearing the tunnel by some of the rear echelon troops. One German N.C.O. spent 
i45 
most of the day trying to ride a donkey and then threatened Bosworth with a revolver 
whenever he tried to take a break. w 
At 9.40 a.m. Colonel Macky contacted Corps Headquarters to notify it of the seriousness of 
the situation, C Company had been dispersed and was out of the battle. 
I think C Coy 21 Bn had 'bad jt' by this stage - but it had fought a splendid little action 
against overwhelming odds. C Company 21 Bn actually fought a withdrawal action 
down the ridge - platoon leapfrogging platoon and got away with the rest of the Bn.JOi 
D Company was now pinned down by fire from Pandeleimon. But more ominously 
Williams' battery, firing in support, was almost out of ammunition. Now that the Germans 
had a clear path to his rear positions Colonel Macky ordered a general withdrawal and with 
a last message at 10.15 a.m.: ·~/t sta 21 Bn closing down. Getting out."- With that his 
signallers destroyed the wireless set. The Battalion cooks thoughtfully left containers of 
stew by the castle, just in case the retreating soldiers were able to have something to eat as 
they retreated. JO$ 18 platoon covered the withdrawal as the various companies retreated 
through their lines. Last to arrive were the survivors of C Company, among them Captain 
Tongue. They were somewhat despondent in that they felt that they had let the side do\Vll.. 
but there was little more they could have done. They had fought a battle for four hours 
JOl Bosworth. to I.Mel. Wards C.J., lcttcr 6 Dect.,nber 1959. WA 113/8 N.A. . 
J<>3 Long, G .Commentaries. WA ll 3/8 N.A. .,p.8. 
:1<>< O.A . 54/ 10/ 19. in WA 113/8 N.A. 
~ One is struck by the trouble that the Quartermaster department went to. to ensure the soldier.; had hot food, in contrast to the 
Germans. 
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while surrounded by a superior force and had succeeded in cxtricat ing themselves. This 
was a commcndabk manocuvTc as it is very difiicult to retreat while still maintaining 
contact with the enemy. Colonel Mack\ wit hdrcw 21 Batt<1iion just hefor<: I0.15 u.m. 
' . 
Given the confidence that \"lacky had displayed the previous day. the rapidity of the 
withdrawal "came as a shock IO Anzac Corps. Headquarters."·"· 
At I 0.05 a.m. Bakk signalled that the ·castle· had been captured and that his forward units 
had suffered thirty five percent ca,ualties .• ,. Later in the evening the Germans hoisted the 
swastika on the tu.rrel of the 'castle'. They had been hdd up for thirty-six hours and the 
New Zealanders had suf1crcd 36 casualties."" Behind the celebrating Germans. the saddk 
track leading to the ·castle' was littered with damaged tanks that had thrown tracks or split 
their assemblies. The Germans attempted to pursue the 21 Ba1talion hut as yet no tanks 
could move along the track by the sea. The ridge on v;hich the castle stood, had been so 
thorough\v demolished that no tanks could get off the southern end and the railwav tunnel's 
.... ,I ... " 
rno[ although not properly demoiished. kept falling in. The Germans finally had to resort 
to towing their tanks over the ridge."" By l LOO a.m. the next day only twenty-five tanks 
had bt,;;:,n mov,·d across. 
The 21 Battalion was not wanting in courage. but during the night of the 15/l 6 April they 
displayed a lack of aggressive patrolling that the Germans had used to manoeuvre some 
the platoons out of their dug in positions. A favourite tactic was to send in two man sniper 
teams behind tht' New Zealanders, "it was most difficult to face u frontal attack when your 
back was exposed to snipers."·,, Had the Nev,, Zealanders sent out 'fighting· putrols, and 
ambushed the infiltrating German patrols. infiltrated the German positions themselves. and 
attacking the tank ·1aagers· the enemy would not have been in such good condition on the 
morning of l6 Aprii. However the fighting withdrawal of C Company was very skilfully 
undertaken and the Battalion withdrew to the Pinios gorge in good order. 
'-0<, M.cC!yrnonL p.250 
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Two soldiers missing in the action, were Bill Davies and 'Tommy' Thompson. They were 
two New Zealand 'bushmen' (forestry workers) who had been sent by Lieutenant Allan 
Yeoman to estimate the number of Germans who were facing them. In clambering over 
the ridges forward of their positions they ran into a Gennan wiring party. Bill Davies 
laconically reported that it was a ''win on points for Gerry"311 • They took to the hills, only 
to reappear on the wrong side of the Pinios Gorge to witness the German attack on their 
Battalion. The two bushmen persuaded a friendly Greek to ferry them across the Pinios 
when the firing had died down. They eventually fell in with a group commanded by 
Captain W. Dickson and made it to Athens. Major Le Lievre refused to have the two 
posted as missing, as he knew that being bushmen they would find their way to safety, and 
he was right. 
The next position that the Battalion fell back to was the Pinios River and the gorge through 
which it flows through to the sea. 
The Gorge was a natural defensive barrier, being impossible to outflank on its seaward side, 
while 300m high cliffs extending 6 km inland, prevented any river crossing in force. It was 
hoped that road and rail demolitions on either side of the river together with the depth and 
speed of the water wuld prevent tanks from progressing up the Gorge.312 
North of the Gorge are the highlands running up to the slopes of Mount Olympus, 
impassable to motor transport. The gorge is five miles long, narrow and steep with cliffs 
running down to the river. The railway line crossed the gorge at the small town of Tempe 
on the southern bank and Itia on the northern bank. This is where the next defensive 
position of 21 Battalion was established. The day of 17 April was used to prepare the 
defences. The bridge was blown and the ferry destroyed. 
At 11.00 am that day, Brigadier C.A. Clowes arrived in the Gorge. General Blarney, the 
311 Davies, to J.F. Cody W, letter dated , 27 October 1950. WA ll 3n.N.A 
312 McCleod, p.3 I. 
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Corps commander had sent Clowes, his commander of artillery, to ascertain what the 
situation was with the 2 l Battalion. He had thought to find it in Platamon and was 
somewhat surprised to find Macky and his battalion by the ferry in the gorge. Clowes 
instructed Macky that: one, it was "essential to deny the gorge to the enemy till 19th April 
even if it meant extinction" ,3 ' 3 and two, if the enemy broke through the gorge, to fall back to 
a position astride the point where the road and railway crossed seven miles south of the 
western exit. 314 This position had to be held to enable the rest of the Anzac Corps (formed 
on 12 April) to withdraw through Larissa. Larissa was a choke point and an excellent 
defensive position, but it also was a hindrance to the retreating Anzac Corps as all roads ran 
through the devastated town. The Anzac Corps had expected the German schwerpunckt 
through the Olympus passes, but now it appeared that the main thrust was to be towards the 
Pinios river. Two thousand years earlier the generals of the Greek confederation had been 
presented with the same dilemma. The Pinios Gorge is an excellent defensive position but 
it can be turned on its western flank. The Greeks decided to continue to retreat to 
Thermopylae drawing the Persians on to its well-known conclusion. Now it was not the 
313 Long, p.97. 
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gallant Leonidas who faced extinction, but Colonel Macky and his Battalion and the 
supporting AIF battalions and support troops. They were expected to hold the Germans 
for three days, until 19 April. Once Blarney received the information on the 21 Battalion's 
location, he sent another one of his staff officers; Brigadier S. Rowell with instructions to 
stop the frrst battalion of the Australian 16th Brigade that he met on the road and detour 
them to the Pinios gorge. The first one he met was Colonel F. Chilton's 212nd at 10.00 am. 
They had been "marching since 2 a.m., many on blistered feet and most with worn-out 
boots and torn clothing".m 
After receiving his orders from Brigadier Rowell, Chilton set out in his car to find the 21 
Battalion. On the way to Platamon he met Brigadier Clowes on the way back from Tempe, 
and was told that Macky's battalion was in the Pinios Gorge. As the roads through Larissa 
were cratered, Chilton changed to a Bren Gun carrier after instructing his adjutant to make 
best speed with the battalion to Tempe. At dusk Chilton met up with Macky who 
explained his and the Battalion's situation. 
Macky agreed to deploy his Battalion to conform to the dispositions of Chilton's 212nd, but 
not without an argument over the siting of the anti-tank guns. 
I wanted them out of the gorge - deployed to catch the tanks debouching there from. He 
was anxious to site them behind the spurs, which here and there ran to the river making 
small flats between them.316 
While the 212nd AIF Battalion was making it's weary way to the Pinios Gorge, Blarney 
was looking around for other troops he could send to assist Chilton and Macky. The 
Australian Brigadier S.F. Allen was given command of the ''21 st, the 212nd, 213rd, 4th 
Field Regiment, a troop of New Zealand 2-pounders, seven carriers of the 215th Battalion 
and four of the 2/l lth". 1 11 Allen's task was to prevent the Germans outflanking 
Larissa from the east. 
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The narrow, steep-sided gorge was about five miles long. The river nmning through it was 
from 30 to 50 yards wide and fast flowing. The railway travelled along the north side of 
the river, the road along the south. At the western end of the gorge the railway crossed the 
river and turned south towards Larisa.313 
The 21 Battalion blew up or destroyed culverts and tunnels around their defence positions. 
"The tanks, when they got so far, would certainly have to swim the river before they could 
advance further."' 19 The Battalion have been somewhat disconcerted to know that although 
the German tanks did not actually swim across, several were able to ford the Pinios. 
Another Australian Battalion (213rd) coming up on the left of the 212nd Battalion also was a 
reassuring sight to the 21 Battalion. It was decided that the 21 Battalion was to be 
responsible for defending the gorge and the high ground on the south side of the Pinios 
River. The Australian positions were west of the village of Tempe stretching along the 
Pinios River almost as fur as the village of Parapotomos and also defending the railway line 
south of the village ofEvangelismos. Communications were going to be difficult for the 21 
Battalion. All the telephone cable had been left behind after the Battalion's precipitate 
departure from the Platamon area. The geography of the area also militated against 
wireless communication in certain areas. Consequently, communication would have to be 
by a runner, the feeling of isolation was heightened when Macky heard, to his anger that the 
Battalion transport had been withdrawn 60 miles to the rear.320 
The morning of 18 April was crisp and clear. Soon, the guns of the two armies were 
duelling in counter-battery fire. The German mortars and mountain guns then changed to 
firing on the anti-guns along the riverbank and in the re-entrants. Whilst the German guns 
were seeking to knock out the Anzac anti-tank guns, the twenty-five pounders of the 26th 
New Zealand Field Regiment was seeking to distract or destroy the German mortars and the 
mountain guns. In mid-morning, Macky held a conference with his company commanders. 
His orders to them were that should the Battalion be overwhelmed, each company 
commander would be responsible for the extraction of his company. The Germans' first 
313 Long, p.!06. 
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attempted a crossing at the juncture of the two Australian companies, and the carriers of the 
21 Battalion bren-gun carrier platoon were ordered to throw it back. This attack was a 
feint to enable the main attack to develop further along the gorge. The Germans had put a 
cable across the river and had two pontoon boats in the water. The fire from the New 
Zealand and Australian carriers and mortars whipped up the water. This later led to British 
newspapers, sensationally but accurately describing this minor action as having made the 
river run with blood. 32 1 
The real attack descended on a B Company platoon commanded by Lieutenant H. Rose, 
who was operating a 'block' in the gorge. Rose's platoon contained most of the 'hard 
cases' of the Battalion. Macky expressed some regret that he could not support this block 
with artillery. The rest of B Company was engaged by German tanks, lorried infantry and 
soldiers on foot, the company already under heavy mortar fire, was forced further along the 
ridge, away from Rose's block. 
The small village of Tempe at the western end of the gorge, came under intense shellfire as 
a prelude to another probe by the Germans. Macky wisely shifted his Headquarters from a 
house in the village to a deep ditch. The Germans, showing great initiative, found a ford, 
which allowed several of their tanks across the river. Several stalled in the Pinios,(see 
page 155) but enough tanks got across to surprise the defenders on the morning of the 18 
April. Supported by troops that had crossed the gorge during the night: 
The tanks were first seen by 12 Platoon, the forward element of B Company, which had 
throughout the morning been engaging the enemy across the river. About 12.15 p.m., when 
enemy fire acorss the river had been intensified, 'at least 6 enemy tanks came through the 
mouth of the gorge' and rolled on below the company.322 
The New Zealand two-pounder anti-tank guns were able to destroy two tanks before being 
destroyed in tum. The Germans had also got into the village of Evangelismos whose 
321 McLeod, p.32. 
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occupancy was being contested by the Australians. The German tanks overran the depleted 
A Company and controlled the road and the railway Jinks to Larissa. 
By late morning, the Mountain troops from the 6th Mountain Division after having crossed 
the southern slopes of Mount Olympus, began to filter through the village of Gonnos. At 
11.00 p.m. the Mountain troops were making for an 'S' bend in the Pinios Gorge. Macky 
makes the comment: "Our artillery did not seem to get onto the target as well as usual. I 
have the idea that they were being dive bombed at the time.""' The determination of the 
German Mountain troops was admirable. They soon established a crossing with pontoon 
boats. Once again the carriers had to go in and restore the situation with Bren-gun and 
Vickers machine-gun fire. According to Macky the Germans were able to get tanks across 
the gorge at Gonnos and into the village of Tempe and concentrated on C Company. 
Lieutenant O'Neill had pointed out to Captain Tongue, C Company's commander, when he 
assigned him the position that it would become vulnerable under certain conditions, and if 
they had to retreat, certain features would give O'Neill's platoon 'a line of withdrawal'. 
Tongue tersely replied 'There will be no withdrawal, Colonel Macky wants this to be 
another Gallipoli".'" 
That was to be ()'Neill's last contact with the widely dispersed Battalion, apart from a visit 
by a Captain Mc!llray with ammunition "I fought my own little war according to orders and 
without contact with company or battalion."m O'Neill dispersed his platoon as five units 
in five weapon pits and with the coming darkness the platoon could hear the voices of 
infiltrating Germans. However, O'Neill was not totally on his own, some Australians 
brought him some tea and a meal of hot chicken for his platoon. With dawn came the 
enemy. The platoon spotted half a dozen Germans standing outside a building across the 
nver. O'Neill was gratified to see his platoon break-up 'this party', and the Germans 
quickly scattered, realising that the allied troops were much closer than they thought."' 
O'Neill spent the morning firing at the Germans infiltrating across the gorge. "We were 
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very happy in our work."327 Then a voice from the observation position above their 
positions called out "Infanteers, the tanks are coming."m Two anti-tank guns were in their 
vicinity and as the German tanks came out of the gorge they were met with a hail of fire. 
At 12.30 p.m. three tanks stopped about ninety metres in front of their position, at the foot 
of a low rise.O'Neill was surprised to see one crew get out and make a reconnaissance. 
"We withstood most of their cannon and machine gun fire and at less than 100 yards 
range."329 O'Neill was upset330 to see a corporal and two privates run away(they were later 
captured by the Germans). At 1.00 p.m. the firing in their vicinity slackened and O'Neill 
concluded from this that A Company had been wiped out. An hour later, when firing was 
reverberating from the hills, O'Neill opined that this was the last stand of the Battalion331• 
There were still the sounds of heavy fire from the Australian positions, although by now the 
anti-tank guns in their vicinity had been knocked out. At 2.00 p.m. the German tanks 
were passing through their positions and their fire on them was 'tremendous'. "Tongue 
counted 17 tanks which simply battered O'Neill' s platoon in a welter of dust and 
explosions."332 At 3.30 p.m. O'Neill regretfully surrendered. He saw that he could not 
inflict any more casualties on the Germans whereas the Germans now had them 
surrounded. In this gallant little action, contrary to Tongue's observation, O'Neill had 
only three casualties. He ascribes this to the Germans siting their positions too close to 
have real affect. By this time Macky had vacated his headquarters in the ditch for a 
position on top of a ridge overlooking Tempe village. His Battalion was down to one 
defensive position. The battalion carriers were sent out once more to restore the situation 
and Lieutenant S.M Lockett gallantly engaged the German panzers with his carriers. 
During the morning Chilton had spoken several times to Macky. Macky' s last report was 
that the village of Tempe was under heavy fire and his soldiers were firing across the river 
at the Germans. At midday Macky went silent. Soon afterwards, New Zealand soldiers 
began to filter through the Australian position. Most of these survivors were not in good 
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German Tan.ks in the Pinios Gorge. 
order, but one platoon under Lieutenant Southworth reported to Chilton, and was placed in 
a defensive position near the village of Evangelismos. Chilton's impression was that 21 
Battalion had been forced south-east up the slope of Mount Ossa. Chilton "claimed that 
many New Zealand troops had no weapons and ignored all entreaties from senior officers to 
make them stand and fight. Most of them were "very distressed and inclined to urge my 
gunners that all was lost and the best thing to do was run. ""mGeneral Allen's headquarters 
had been notified that German tanks had taken Tempe village and Macky' s Battalion had 
withdrawn into the hills. 
In the Report on Operations 21 Battalion in Greece, in an echo of his subordinate O'Neill' s 
' plaint, Macky complained that all the time that he was in the Gorge he never received an 
order or direction. On the morning of 18 April Macky says: 
So that when I saw the company commanders on the morning of the 18th and the threat 
from Gonnos looked serious, we decided that if we were completely cut-off and 
overwhelmed, those left would make out in small companies to Volos. I myself could then 
see that no effort was going to be made to withdraw us and that we must stave off the 
enemy as best we could for as long as possible. This I think we achieved.m 
In an undated letter to J.F. Cody (author of the Official History of the 21 Battalion) E.G. 
Smith states that the German tanks broke through the 21 Battalion' s position at 2.00 p.m. 
"About 2 McClymont and I called to Battalion Headquarters. Colonel Macky gave the 
order to withdraw into the hills and attempt to reassemble at Volos.m" Macky, thinking the 
Australians had been outflanked, ordered his men to take to the hills. "336 Some thought that 
Macky was in a ' blue funk' and Kippenberger records his remarks as "Take to the hills. 
It' s every man for himsel£"m 
General Freyberg had gone up to 21 Battalion' s rear position shortly after lunch. "I went 
forward to Larissa to the 21 Battalion' s rear headquarters, who were many miles behind the 
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major position."'" Major Harding, Macky's second in command, gave a gloomy picture of 
the situation of the Battalion. Harding had said that the Battalion had disintegrated. 
Freyberg then went forward, through a dive-bomber attack, to Tempe. Passing through 
Colonel G. (Ike) Parkinson's 4th Artillery Regiment, he made contact with both the 
commanders of the 212nd and the 213rd but as he says: "No New Zealand infantry were to 
be found. I did not contact any of the 2lst".'" So concerned was Freyberg with the 
situation that he took Brigadier Allen under his command. "Had I not done so all would 
have been lo st."°"'' 
At 3.00 p.m. the German attack fell upon the Australians. The Germans were discomfited 
at Tempe by the accurate fire of the detached battery from the 26th Field Regiment. The 
German assault began with an aerial attack on General Allen's Headquarters. The German 
ground attack was lead by the heavy Germanpanzers, the Mark IV's and Mark III's. They 
quickly overran the anti-tank guns in the gorge and captured the crews. Slowly the 
Australian battalions were pushed back by the tanks. Macky reports that by evening the 
German tanks had got 'behind and through the Australian infantry'. He describes how the 
Germans marked their progress and communicated by firing very lights and tracers. The 
only check the panzers received were from the New Zealand field artillery that was steadily 
knocking out the German armour. Although the anti-tank gunfire had very little affect on 
the tanks it did slow down the supporting infantry and the two Australian battalions were 
able to make a fighting retreat. 
As the guns of 26th Battery held up the Germans from taking Larissa that evening, Colonel 
Macky, watching from on a ridge of Mount Ossa, where he had withdrawn, could see the 
remnants of his Battalion retreating from the area The 21 Battalion was now a spent force 
and it was now left for them to 'save themselves' they had fought most of the day and now 
it was time for the survivors to disperse. Eventually only just over three hundred men were 
to assemble in Crete. 
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By early evening the German panzers, discomfited by the 25-pounder fire had taken a 
' down-hull ' position awhile waiting the supporting infantry to arrive. Their firing drove 
out 212nd Battalion of the AIF and the last organised resistance of the 21 Battalion, 
Lieutenant Southwood and his platoon who had not taken to the hills. Eventually the 
212nd Battalion also retreated into the hills. Once the organised resistance from the 
Australian Battalions had ceased, General Allen had the task to cover the road to Larissa. 
The New Zealand guns that had retreated through the covering 213rd Battalion were placed 
to cover the Tempe-Sikourion road until 03.00 a.m. next morning. Allen also had in his 
possession the carriers of the three battalions, although he now only had the equivalent of a 
composite battalion of infantry under his command. 
At 7.30 p.m five German tanks approached up the road. Small arms fire was to no avail 
so that two 25-pounders firing over open sights were moved into action. Two German 
tanks were destroyed before the remaining gun and the wounded had to be pulled out. At 
one instance a German tank ran over two soldiers, but due to the softness of the ground they 
were, remarkably, only seriously injured. As dark came on, an admirable fighting 
withdrawal was made under the command of a middle-aged Australian sergeant; a veteran 
from the previous War, forcing the tanks to slow their advance. Then the armoured cars of 
the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry came up to enable the force to withdraw in good 
order. 
The escape of the Anz.ac forces was made even more difficult by a small party of 
determined Gennans who had swum the Pinios River and established a roadblock on the 
road to Larissa. The German's block on the road successfully diverted the retreat to Larissa 
onto side roads until the Germans were killed. At first it was thought that there were at 
least "fifty Germans firing, throwing grenades and calling for surrender."3• 1 Eventually the 
party was overrun and killed; it was found that the Force was composed of only four men. 
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Allen force had held the Tempe-Sikourion road until 0300 albeit the gallant German force 
had caused some major disruption. The 21 st New Zealand Battalion had been pushed into 
the hills above Tempe; most of the 212nd into the hills above Evangelismos.342 
As usual the New Zealand gunners and Divisional Cavalry had fought gallantly. The 
retreat of the Battalion was not one of cowardice, but the defence of Tempe village could 
have carried out with more determination. The historian Ian Wards was of the opinion that 
the battle itself was not very intense. 343 
No matter how well Macky and his battalion fought a defensive battle at Platamon, his 
orders when he first arrived were that 'there was no retirement'. Then on 12 April Macky 
received instructions that the position should be held for as long as possible to deny the 
coast road and the Platamon position to the Germans. Although the Battalion was surprised 
by the arrival of panzers, contrary to Freyberg's assurance that the there would only be an 
infantry attack, the conditions were not conducive to the use of tanks and they did not play 
a significant role in the battle. It does appear that C Company was too far forward, 
vulnerable to being surrounded and without support from other companies. It also appears 
that no attempt was made to set up an ambush position on the track leading from 
Pandeleimon to the rear of the battalion's positions. When he withdrew, Macky had his 
wish and the 'battalion had been bloodied'. To his own lights he had obeyed Freyberg's 
orders to delay the Germans for as long as possible and then withdrawn the Battalion in 
good order to the Pinios Gorge. 
If the orders at Platamon were open to interpretation, it was at the Pinios Gorge that Macky 
disregarded a direct order. He was ordered by Brigadier Clowes to deny the gorge until 19 
April 'even if it meant extinction'; then ''to fall back to a position astride the point where 
the road and railway crossed seven miles south of the western exit if the enemy broke 
through the gorge".344 His relayed instructions to O'Neill 'that there were to be no 
withdrawals' indicated his awareness ofthe_seriousness of the situation and that he 
342 Long, p.122. 
343 Wards to author, comment October 2002. 
344 Long, p.122. 
159 
certainly expected his subordinate to fight to the last. When the German panzers came 
through the gorge, the Battalion was too dispersed to deal with them. Macky and his 
company commanders, unused to modem warfare, were unaware that well dug in men can 
sustain a considerable bombardment without too may casualties. One is left with the 
impression that the sight of the 'welter' of fire that was directed at O'Neill's position 
demoralised Macky and his senior officers and influenced their decision to withdraw. 
There is, and was criticism of Macky's decision to retreat into the hills. Freyberg, 
Kippenberger and Thornton thought it was a bad decision to give his men this order. 
Kippenberger in particular believed that as Macky had been ordered to fight to the lastm he 
should have done just that. Kippenberger believed that 21 Battalion should have formed a 
defensive position as did the Gloucester's at the Imjin River and fought until their 
ammunition ran out.346 Only then should they have attempted a breakout. The fact that 
Macky never held a command again was not sufficient enough punishment for 
Kippenberger. He believed that Macky should have been court-martialled for deserting his 
position: Bad orders, bad dispositions, and I would add absence of determination and 
fighting spirit in the C.O. were the causes of the disaster."347 Strangely, in an earlier 
opinion, Kippenberger defends Macky, for in a letter to J.L. Scoullar he states: "no other 
battalion could have done better -we simply were not trained to the standard that was 
required then and there. "343 Kippenberger in his attempt to be impartial is excusing Macky; 
there were times in Greece that the New Zealanders outclassed the Germans, notably at 
Thermopylae and at Kalarnata. 
A Colonel ordered to hold a position by his General is duty bound to do so, even if it means 
the destruction of his unit. Macky was no coward; this had been demonstrated in World 
War I. He certainly did not lack in moral courage; he was one of the rebellious 'Four 
Colonels' and suffered the humiliation of being dismissed by the Government. Macky was 
petulant and arrogant. He also displayed a remarkable lack of initiative in battle, 
complaining about his lack of orders during the day. Hargest, his Brigadier, appears to be 
345 Most last stands are not like the Alamo, to the last man or bullet. They are more like the Gloucesters stand on the Imjin, where 
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too easy-going to unpose his personality on a man that was a contemporary in New 
Zealand. A telling comment is found in a letter to Brigadier Miles. Macky writes, 
referring to the Minister of Defence, the Honourable F. Jones: "°I am afraid I am too much 
of a Tory to 'kowtow' to a bootmaker as a Minister of Defence was too much for me". 149 At 
Pinios Gorge, Macky failed to display the determination that is required to win battles. At 
times consideration for the safety and welfare of subordinates has to be subjugated by a 
greater need. But when ordered to hold a position to the last, and then when threatened 
with being overrun and failing to provide a rallying point for the survivors to reform, 
Macky allowed not only the Australian positions to be compromised but also jeopardised 
the Anzac Corps retreat to the Thermopylae line. The evidence that 21 Battalion had not 
been destroyed as a unit is in a letter from Bill Davies to the historian J.F. Cody. He gave 
the opinion of Company Sergeant Major Jack Bro\VTI of 'B' Company: "The reason for so 
many men going into the bag in this area, [ was because] so many had stuck together in 
large gangs. Major Le Lievre had 72 with him when he as taken."350 
Bill Davies the bushman eventually fell in Captain Dickson of B Company. Here he 
was informed that the battalion had: "taken to the hills and would endeavour to reach the 
coast."m That large parties attempted to break out is another indication that the fighting for 
the rest of the battalion was not particularly heavy. Five infantry battalions and the Army 
Service Corps had heavier mortality rates then the 21 Battalion in Greece, and they were 
not required to make a last stand. A 'territorial' battalion such as 21 Battalion, would take 
on the strengths and faults of its commanding officer. Lacking a cadre of professional 
NCO's a good colonel was responsible for engendering esprit de corps within the battalion. 
The behaviour of the 21 Battalion goes to the very heart of one of the significant faults with 
the New Zealand Division in the first two years. Of the three Brigades, the commanders 
and senior officers of the two other Brigades regarded the 5th Brigade with concern. In a 
letter Kippenberger states about the 5th Brigade: [The J "Battalions never helped one 
another. Units quarrelled with one another. - conformed with mutual dislike. Both the 
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other Brigades thought poorly of 5 Brigade discipline."m Some officers, particularly the 
field and brigade officers were too old and set in their ways. For many men, having a 
commission gave them a social life that they could not achieve in Civilian life. 
Kippenberger comments·: 
His [Hargest] personal standards were not as those of the other brigadiers, he and his 
Brigade were far more socially inclined. He never gripped his Brigade .. . . Both the other 
brigades thought poorly of 5 Brigade's discipline and turn out.·~· 
This weakness was to have fatal consequences for the defence of Maleme aerodrome 
on Crete. 
German tanks burning below the Platamon ridge. German Mk III tank at Pinios. 
"
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The Retreat to tile Vale of Tempe. 
!63 
German Engineers bridging the Pinios river. 
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German mountain troops fording the Pinios river. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
From the gates of fire (Thermopylae) to the Evacuation beaches 
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks 
on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The 
statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer 
the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. 
Winston Churchill 
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From the time that W Force went to Greece, the Royal Navy was preparing for its 
evacuation. Admiral Andrew Cunningham for one was in no doubt that the force would 
eventually have to be brought out. In a reply to the Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound 
asking for confrrmation that "adequate arrangements might be prepared to withdraw on 
their [Australian and New Zealand] forces."m Admiral Cunningham replied: 
The problem has never been far from my thoughts since decision was reached to move into 
Greece .... I can only guarantee that everything possible will be done to withdraw the 
Dominion troops with British.356 
Between 4 April and 7 April the strategic situation m the Mediterranean theatre of 
operations was changed by the intervention of Rommel in the Western desert. The German 
expeditionary force (Deutsche Afrika Korps) captured a clutch of British senior officers in 
its rapid drive for the Egyptian frontier. First Brigadier R.G. W. Rimmington the 
Commander of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, and then Generals Philip Neame and Richard 
O'Connor awoke from a doze in their car to find themselves surrounded by Germans. 
General M. Gambier-Parry was captured at Mechili when he went there to do some forward 
observation. By the time that Bardia fell on 15 April, the British 2nd Armoured Division 
was in headlong flight east. The only check to the Germans was the Australian 9th 
Division. Withdrawing in the face of the enemy, its commander Major General Leslie 
Morshead brought it into the fortified port of Tobruk. Because of the grim situation in 
Cyrenaica even the most sanguine of British commanders must have realised that W Force 
was in an untenable position in Greece. On 14 April: 
[T]he New Zealand Government was told that because of the critical conditions in 
Cyrenaica the Polish Brigade and 7 Australian Division could not be sent to Greece. 
Fearing the worst, it immediately suggested that preparations be made for the possible 
evacuation of W Force. 357 
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On 16 April General Papagos suggested that Force W be withdrawn. Papagos must have 
realised that the hearts of some of Metaxist appointed senior officers, (the pro-British 
Venezilists officers had long been purged) were not in a war against Germany and the 
British had sent too few units for a successful defence. 
During and after Easter, Athens was thronged with Greek soldiers on leave. McClymont 
describes them as being 'bewildered and angry' 358 , but surely the predominant emotion 
would have been confusion and then relief from being away from the battle zone. Koryzis 
accused the Minister of War of treachery for giving some of the soldiers on the Albanian 
front leave, but it was too late. Taking the burden of the disgrace on himself the Prime 
Minister, Alexandros Koryzis shot himself, a futile gesture as he had done all that was 
within his limited powers to avert the disaster. Six years of divisive rule by the pro-
German Metaxas administration had divided and demoralised the country and the patriotic 
fervour with which had nurtured the Greeks in the war against the Italians could not be 
sustained in the battles against the Germans. 
Churchill was enthused by the news of the successful withdrawal to Thermopylae, and 
undoubtedly buoyed by historic significance of the position, did something that his 
illustrious ancestor, Marlborough would never have done, he changed his objectives. 
Writing to Anthony Eden, still marooned in Egypt, he counselled: "victory in Libya counts 
first, evacuation of troops from Greece second. "359 Elaborating, and moving further from 
the reality of the situation, Churchill indicated his intention to seek the approval of the 
Australian and New Zealand Dominions: 
I am increasing of the opinion that if the generals on the spot think that they can hold on in 
the Thermopylae line for a fortnight or three weeks, and we can keep the Greek Army 
fighting, or enough of it, we should certainly support them, if the Dominions will agree. 
... [ A Jnd if the troops were British only and the matter could be decided on military grounds 
alone I would urge Wilson to fight if he thought it possible. Anyhow, before we commit 
358 McClymont, p.363. 
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ourselves to evacuation the case must be put squarely to the Dominions after to-morrow's 
Cabinet.360 
Wavell also believed that if the Thermopylae line could be held then this would enable the 
situation in the Western Desert to be stabilised. Then evacuation plans could be properly 
prepared. General Wilson at first thought that his forces could hold for another month but 
doubted whether the Germans could be held at the Thermopylae position.361 The only other 
alternative was a withdrawal into the Peloponnese with a defence position at the Corinth 
canal, but this position could easily be outflanked at Patras. 
Wavell had already advised Wilson that because of the situation in the desert, Wilson could 
not expect any more reinforcements. 362 At this moment of time the ubiquitous 'Freddie' de 
Guingand was in Athens. General Smith had sent him there as a member of the Joint 
Planning Staff. 363 On 15 April Wavell phoned de Guingand in Athens, to give him 
permission "to discuss all our plans with certain officers whom he notified."364 Obviously 
these certain officers did not include Major Generals and those below. For on the 20 April 
both Generals Mackay and Freyberg were still "impressing on their subordinates that there 
would be no more withdrawals."365 
On 17 April Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Groham was sent to Athens to prepare for the 
evacuation. Earlier in the campaign British Naval officers had checked certain beaches 
suitable for evacuation in southern Greece. When this was commented on, it was explained 
that they were being considered for landing stores and equipment as the main port of 
Piraeus was partially blocked. 
On 18 April there was a meeting at General Wilson' s Headquarters with the British and 
Greek High Command. Those attending the meeting were: King George of the Hellenes; 
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Sir Michael Palairet the British Minister to Greece; General Papagos; Air Vice-Marshal J. 
D' Albiac and Rear-Admiral C.Turle. The decision to withdraw had already been made but 
the Generals still considered whether W force could hold the Germans at the Thermopylae 
line for a time. Wilson was of the opinion that: 
The arguments in favour of fighting it out, which [it] is always better to do if possible, 
... were: the tying up of enemy forces, army and air, which would result there from; the 
strain the evacuation would place on the Navy and Merchant Marine; the effect on the 
morale of the troops and the loss of equipment which would be incurred. In favour of 
withdrawal the arguments were: the question as to whether our forces in Greece could be 
reinforced as this was essential; the question of the maintenance of our forces, plus the 
feeding of the civil population; the weakness of our forces with few airfields and little 
prospect of receiving reinforcements; the little hope of the Greek Army being able to 
recover its morale. The decision was made to withdraw from Greece. 3th 
On 19 April General Wavell again arrived in Athens and immediately went to a conference 
at the Tatoi Palace with the same participants as the previous day, plus the leader of the 
Venizelist Republican Party who had al.ready declined the proffered Prime Ministership. It 
was decided at this meeting that the Greek Army in Epirus should continue to fight to 
enable 'W' force to withdraw. Unfortunately for WavelL Wilson and Churchill, events had 
moved on apace in the Balkans. General Tsolakoglou with support from the Bishop of 
Yannina had overthrown the leader of the Greek Epirus Army (General Pitsikas) and 
started negotiations with Sepp Dietrich the commander of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler 
Division to surrender the Epirus Army. With the change in circumstances and the brevity 
of the time factor Wilson and WaveU thought that only thirty percent of 'W' Force could be 
withdrawn. 367 
On 20 April the effective end of the Royal Airforce's presence in Greece came with the 
aerial 'Battle of Athens'. Roald Dahl, the children's writer, was a pilot in 80 squadron that 
had been sent up in a formation of twelve fighters. According to DahL it was a public 
relations exercise to inspire the people of Athens. German fighters bounced the formation. 
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Long states that the fighters went to intercept a German raid, but Dahl, insists that they 
were taken by surprise and a 'dog-fight' commenced with the German fighterS. 368 Twenty-
two enemy planes were claimed but four British pilots were killed. 369 
The 20 April was the day that Freyberg was given the task of defending the historic 
Thermopylae coastal pass. Coincidentally, although silting had pushed the coastline out 
eight kilometres, the New Zealand positions would be where Leonidas had made his last 
stand. As the artillery would be the determinant force in the battle, the New Zealand 
division adjusted its positions on the 21 April to conform to the artillery's dispositions: 
[T]he observed fire of the artillery and, as the gun positions could be encircled by landing 
on the coast, the occupied area had to be extended far to the rear.370 
To enable maximum co-operation with the divisional artillery 6th Brigade was disposed on 
the right, moving forward to east ofMolos, taking over 28 (Maori) Battalion sector. The 24 
Battalion took a position north of Molos with its right flank protecting the anti-tank guns 
overlooking the coast road and the 25 Battalion covering the road from Alamanas bridge to 
Molos, and the 26 Battalion remaining in reserve. On the left was the 5th Brigade, with 24 
Battalion's positions anchored on the coast, 22 on its left and 28 displaced by the 6th 
Brigade moved to a position overlooking the road. The 4th Brigade, with the divisional 
cavalry would be in the rear on watch for sea-borne landings. 
Notwithstanding Churchill's and his senior Generals enthusiasm for a ' stand' on the 
Thermopylae line, without a Greek force holding the rest of the peninsula, it was a position 
that would soon be outflanked. The Commonwealth force occupied only a third of the 
peninsula defending the two principal passes in the Thermopylae area: the Molos pass (the 
pass that was held by Leonidas) and the Brallos, (known by the Germans as the new 
Thermopylae) pass. The New Zealanders could be outflanked by a movement down the 
island of Euboea and the Australians through the tracks in the surrounding mountains or 
down the coast from Epirus. Supporting the New Zealanders in the Molos area, were the 
368 Dahl, R. (1986). Going Solo.Penguin Books. Middlesex: U.K, pp. 149-151. 
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25-pounders of the 2nd Royal Horse Artillery. Supporting both the Australian and New 
Zealand divisions was the 64th Medium Regiment with its batteries of 4.5" medium guns. 
Both British artillery regiments were part of the 1 st Armoured Brigade by now a shadow of 
its former size. It was pointed out to General Wilson by the Anzac commander, General 
Blarney at a roadside meeting with Wilson and Baillie-Grohman that the Thermopylae line 
was too long for two divisions to defend. Wilson then announced his intention of putting 
forward the evacuation to 24 April because of the surrender of the Epirus Army. 
In the Australian sector elements of the German 5th Mountain Division reached the Brallos 
pass on 21 April. The first German unit to make contact; No.3 Company 8 Panzer 
Reconnaissance Unit was driven back by the intense fire from the heavy and medium 
artillery, mortar and medium machine guns. On 22 April the 5th Mountain Division was 
further held up when the 5th Panzer Division was given preference on the road between 
Larissa and Lamia. McClymont describes the situation: 
As the former [5th Panzer Division] had priority the mountain troops had, very often, to 
' stand uselessly round' while a bakery company or the postal services of the panzer division 
went through to Lamia.371 
This period of inactivity ended when Genera] Georg Stumme reached Lamia and re-
energised the plans of XXXX Corps. The 5th Panzer Division would attack the Australian 
positions on the Lamia-Thermopylae line driving down the Brallos pass. Simultaneously 
the Baacke Group312 would advance towards New Zealanders at Molos. Jais Group would 
endeavour to outflank the Australians and New Zealanders in an attempt to prevent their 
withdrawal. At 7.30 a.m. on 24 April the main attack commenced when the Luftwaffe of 
the Eighth Air Corps came seeking out the Anzac and British gun pits and troop 
concentrations. m 
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The German attack on the Australian positions in the Brallos pass fell upon the Australian 
19th Brigade. The 19th Brigade comprised of the 2/11 th Battalion with elements of the 
218th under its control; the 2/1 st Battalion covering the eastern flank; whilst the 214th 
Battalion covered the western flank. The 212nd Field Regiment firing from their 
camouflaged gun pits supplied the artillery support. Under accurate artillery fire, the 
German attack stalled almost immediately. 55th Motor Cycle Battalion advancing without 
any artillery support was quickly pinned down in a ravine near Kalivia by the 2/1 lnd 
Battalion and its attached machine gunners. Oberst Maximillian Jais believing that he 
made contact with the withdrawing Commonwealth divisions took a battle group to cut the 
highway south of Brallos. Elements of his unit Jais Group reached the 55th Motor Cycle 
Battalion that was still pinned down. Because of the intensity of the artillery and machine-
gun fire Oberst Jais and his unit could not go any further. 1131 Panzer Regiment 
augmented by four tanks from 3 Company and some 88mm guns moved forward to the 
'new Thermopylae' and met the same resistance. The 88mm guns then entered into a duel 
with the 25-pounders. As the Australian field guns fired, the 88mm 'dual purpose' guns 
searched for their positions. The shells were: 
[B]ursting closer and closer until they were landing within 15 feet of the gun pits. One 
German shell hit a truck carrying smoke shells which exploded and covered the area rotmd 
the Australian gtms with smoke for half an hour. A trailer carrying high-explosive shells 
was set on fire and the shells began to explode.m 
Meeting unexpected resistance in front of the Australian positions, General Stumme came 
forward and decided that because of the resistance at the Brallos pass, the road to Molos 
would not be strongly held. General Stumme was determined that he was going to force the 
Molos position and destroy the artillery. Therefore one platoon of tanks was told to push 
through to Molos where the New Zealanders were entrenched. 
Artillery fire and then a stuka attack announced that an attack on the New Zealand 
division's positions was not far away. The efficiency of the camouflage and the fire 
discipline which ensured the field guns of the New Zealand artillery ceased firing when the 
374 Long , p.146. 
172 
stukas were overhead meant that no guns were lost to air attack.375 Then four tanks nosed 
their way around the bluffs leading from Brallos pass. The field guns opened fire and one 
tank was quickly destroyed and the other three retreated. This unexpected resistance 
appears to have surprised the Germans. 316 As the elements of the 5th Panzer were coming 
down from Lamia there must have been some disagreement between the commanders of 
the infantry and the tanks. Captain Karl Baacke wanted to take command of the tanks, but 
the panzers' regimental commander decided that his unit would advance to support the 
infantry. Unusually for the Germans, there was no co-ordinated attack and the infantry and 
tanks acted independently. This was not going to be the 'drive to Molos' that General 
Stumme anticipated. The German: 
infantry clambered over ridges and through gullies to lever 25th New Zealand Battalion off 
its hillside positions commanding the road. The 700-odd NZ soldiers, who had only come 
under fire for the first time in the last week, were deployed almost exactly along the line of 
the ancient pass fought over the ancient Greeks and Persians.377 
The intense fire from 25 Battalion drove the German infantry into the ground and they soon 
faded away. Support from the panzers was then called for. Once again, Germans 
underestimated the opposition in front of them. One tank was lost in the swamp that 
surrounded the alluvial Sperkhios River and then the panzer commander sent the tanks 
recklessly down the road in file in a tactic that had been used successfully elsewhere in the 
Balkans.'78 Under the command of Hauptmann (Captain) Prince von Schoenburg, the 
nineteen tanks charged into a 'twenty-five' and 'two-pounder' hell. "A heavy tank was hit 
direct.. .in the middle of the road sat three other tanks, all on fire .... "379 Von Schoenburg 
reached the site of the Spartans' last stand before a two-pounder gun knocked out his 
tank.180 Attempts to silence the guns were then attempted by the 88mm troop, but to little 
avail. Then the stukas were called in, but the Divisional Artillery cunningly held their fire 
again whilst the bombers were above them. 
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Although the Gennans seriously under-estimated the size of the force that opposed them 
the extremely skilful German infantry were able to infiltrate their way behind the forward 
positions of 25 Battalion's C Company who were unable to withdraw when the Divisional 
Artillery shortened its range. While many of25 Battalion had seen battle, several had been 
wounded, captured or killed; more had not any direct action at all. Second lieutenant C111 
had only seen the Germans at a distance through his binoculars. This is one of the enigmas 
of war that people can be involved in heavy fighting over the hil~ whereas on this side of 
the hill, nothing is happening. Second lieutenant C went forward to check on his forward 
sections. As he was going forward the order for retirement was given. When he reached 
the forward positions no one was there. Another platoon had gathered up his men and 
taken them with them. Lieutenant C then started walking in a futile attempt to catch up 
with the division. He was captured six months later whilst swimming in a lake. He had 
been in hiding at a Greek monastery.332 
This was certainly the artillery' s day for: 
This concentration [of fire] halted the supporting tanks and infuntry so effectively that one 
German afterwards wrote of the shell and anti-tank fire performing a ' danse macabre'. In 
the cruder language of the New Zealand Divisions the artillery had fired its first 'stonk': the 
terrifying concentration of the fire of all the division artillery upon a single crucial point.313 
The efficacy of this tactic was demonstrated as not one German tank involved in the action 
remained undamaged and twelve or thirteen tanks remained burning on the road. To keep 
this bombardment up, ammunition was ferried continuously forward under stuka attack; the 
Germans suffered at this stage of the battle from not having as much artillery in their 
panzer divisions, as did the Commonwealth infantry divisions, or having sufficient artillery 
forward. When the German artillery attempted to support their attack the guns of the 
British 64th Medium Regiment sought for, found, and dealt with the German artillery. 
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No matter how successful the defence was, to conform to the evacuation timetable the 
Anzacs had to withdraw. Much must be said for the determination of the German troops 
facing the Anzacs. While the 55 Motor Cycle Battalion was pinned down by machine gun 
and artillery fire, the Germans were still attempting to turn the flank. 111141 Mountain 
Regiment had made a wide hook and was by early evening engaging the Australian 2/11 th 
Battalion. This 'right hook' was slowed by the intense fire, but the threat was such that at 
6.00 p.rn. Brigadier G.A. Vasey took the decision to move ahead the withdrawal by half an 
hour to 8.00 p.rn. The Australian 2/1 Ith Battalion was successfully withdrawn and the 
German trap snapped futilely on their empty positions. As the three Australian battalions 
'embussed' the Very lights of the 11/141 Mountain Regiment could be seen behind them to 
the south indicating their locations. But: 
The German attempt to turn the left flank of W Force had failed. The country had been to 
rough, food had been short and the supporting artillery could not be brought within range. 
The Australian defensive fire, particularly that of 2/2 Field Regiment, had been most 
effective. And now on the morning of 25 April 19 Brigade was through the New Zealand 
rearguard south of Thebes and moving back to the olive groves at Megara and the beaches 
from which it was to embark that night 25-26 April.384 
As night fell, the battles around Thermopylae ground to a halt. The Germans there could 
only advance with their tanks but too many were being destroyed before they reached the 
New Zealand positions. The New Zealanders later claimed that twenty tanks had been 
destroyed in front of their positions. "The Germans admitted that all the tanks in the 
action-18 or 19-were damaged, 12 of them being total losses."385 
No matter how successful the defence was, the Germans would eventually outflank the 
Anzacs. Sooner or later, the Germans were bound to occupy the island ofEuooea and flank 
the Thermopylae position from the west. To stay would mean that W Force would be 
surrounded and destroyed. To prevent this they had to withdraw again. The plan for the 
withdrawal of the New Zealand division was for the majority of 6th Brigade to leave the 
Brigade lines at 9.00 p.rn. on 25 April. This withdrawal would be covered by a rear-guard 
384 McClymont, p.395. 
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of one company each, from 24 and 25 Battalions and a regiment of field guns under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Page. General Freyberg specifically ordered that some of 
these guns must not be destroyed but were to be withdrawn with the infantry. 
This withdrawal was not without incident. Some of the drivers of C Company 25 
Battalion, wishing to shorten the walk of the infantrymen as much as possible, ignored 
several warnings and drove straight into the lines of I/31 Panzer Regiment. 186 The 
windscreens of the trucks were shattered by machine gun fire. Most of the drivers escaped 
into the dark leaving quantities of tinned fruit for the grateful German recipients. What was 
more serious, the 25 Battalion carrier platoon was mistaken for a German column and 
engaged by New Zealand anti-tank fire as they drove past a burning German tank. Of the 
ten occupants, three were killed and the other seven were wounded and later captured.387 
The night then went quiet. At 10.30 p.m. D Company, 25 Battalion withdrew from their 
positions. By midnight 26 Battalion less the company detailed as a rearguard was away 
from the Molos area. With the exception of 33 Battery the gunners were told to destroy 
their guns. Gunner Karl Yortt remembers Captain (later Lieutenant General, Sir) Leonard 
Thornton sitting absolutely 'shattered' as his beloved guns were destroyed around him, 
conveying the distress that all gunners feel when their weapons are destroyed. 388 . 
Whilst this was going on, there were periods of levity. Lieutenant Robert Crisp of the 3rd 
Royal Tank Regiment had acquired a damaged 26 Battalion truck, patched up its damaged 
radiator, placed his crew on board, who then found to their delight it was the 26 Battalions' 
Officers mess lorry. It was a very happy group of tankers who eventually drove it into the 
26 Battalion lines and parlayed its return for a lift to Athens. 389 
Upon its successful withdrawal 6th Brigade was then instructed to block the road north of 
Tatoi until 6.00 p.m. on the evening of the 26-27 April. It was then to be evacuated from 
385 McClymont, p.393. 
386 McClymont, p.390. 
387 Mclymont, p.39 I. 
388 Yort, K. Interview 30 April 2003. 
389 Crisp, p.187. 
176 
the beaches of Rafina and Porto Rafti. The evacuation was to take over three nights 
commencing on the evening of 24 April and completing by the morning of 27 April. To 
ensure co-ordination and co-operation from the Greek Army: 
British officers were sent south to ensure the support of the Greek commanders at Corinth 
and Tripolis; a senior officer was appointed control the Peloponnese; and a force was hastily 
organised for the defence of the Corinth Canal.390 
There were eight designated beaches, they were: 
Beach 
C Rafina 3000 personnel from the New Zealand 6th Brigade on the 
evening of the 26/27. 
D Porto Rafti 4000 from 5th Brigade on 24 ApriL 4500 from the 
p Megara 
s Navplion 
19thAustralian Brigade Group and the British 1 st Armoured 
Brigade. 
4000 personnel 4th New Zealand Brigade on the evening of 
the 26/27 April. 
HQ Anzac Corps and RAF base details. 5000 personnel. 
T East Navplion 2000 personnel Line of communication personnel on the 
z 
X 
y 
Kalamata 
Yithion 
Plitra 
26 April. 
The beach was designated for 4000 men of the 16th 
and 17th Australian Base details. 
Stragglers only 
As above. 391 
On the 24 April, General Papagos resigned and King George with some of his ministers left 
for Crete. Blarney, ordered by Wilson to leave Greece, flew to Egypt in a flying boat and 
found his way to Admiral Cunningham' s H.Q. in Alexandria "and impressed upon [him] 
390 McClymont, p.400. 
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the full seriousness of the situation."392 With Blarney gone, the Anzac Corps Headquarters 
closed. General Mackay and his divisional staff went to their dispersal point for evacuation 
from Greece. 
Freyberg had the same orders as Mackay but decided to ignore them.393 He was not satisfied 
that the British Movement Control was up to the task of handling the evacuation. It was 
Freyberg's desire that the New Zealand Division was to go to Egypt to refit, re-train and re-
eqmp. 
[W]hen the instructions for the evacuation of Mackay and Freyberg were sent over from 
GHQ Middle East the last suggested night, 25-26 April, was to have seen all units, except 
the rearguard, in their lying-up areas awaiting embarkation. It seems that Middle East 
command was paying attention to the safety of the Dominion commanders. 394 
On the first evening at Port Rafti, of the evacuation went relatively easily. Two cruisers 
with the comforting bulk of the assault landing ship Glengyle with her useful complement 
of landing craft loomed out of the evening gloom. For 'Lofty' Fellows a Private in 22 
Battalion the evacuation went very smoothly. He drained the oil out of his truck and ran 
the engine until it seized. He then marched down to the beach where he was ferried by 
barge to the cruiser Calcutta. 395 Brigadier Hargest had acted with alacrity and ensured that 
all the ships were full when they left for Crete, yet 500 men were still left on the beach. 
These were later crammed into a Tank Landing Craft which only took them as far as Kea 
island 15 miles away then sailed with a hope that they would collect them later, but they 
were warned they should be prepared to make their own way to Crete.396 They were later 
picked up by a caique, and taken to Crete. 
Jack Turvey of 26 Battalion, missed the battle at Molos. After the retreat from Larissa he 
had become very unwell with malaria and dysentery. Because of this he was taken to a 
Greek hospital to Athens. When evacuation came, he and his fellow patients were 
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transported to a beach. When night came they waded out to sea and was picked up by a 
small boat and eventually rescued by the Australian destroyer Vendetta. The Vendetta 
dropped them at Suda bay in Crete.397 As there were few or no ongoing troop ships to 
Alexandria; it was more convenient to drop the majority of troops in Crete. Successfully 
evacuated, the 5th Brigade Group was set to preparing the defences around Maleme. 
At Navplion the embarkation was disrupted when the Ulster Prince ran around, denying the 
use of the wharves. The Royal Navy partially circumvented this by employing caiques to 
ferry the troops out to the warships. 
During the day, at the Port of Piraeus the yacht Hellas turned up unexpectedly and offered 
to take off some of the Commonwealth personnel. Whilst tied up along side, the ship was 
bombed, the gangway destroyed and the ship began to roll over. At this time, around 900 
civilians, troops and wounded were on board. Notwithstanding gallant efforts by two New 
Zealand staff sergeants there were up to 700 casualties, some of which were New 
Zealanders. Some of the killed and wounded were from E Section 4 RMT Company. The 
wounded were transferred to Kifisia Hospital were they were later captured. The twenty-
five non-wounded survivors were evacuated from T beach at Tolos.398 
On 25 of April amongst the chaos of the evacuation General Freyberg set up unsuccessfully 
to find the Headquarters of Anzac Corps 'somewhere in the vicinity of Elevsis' . Freyberg 
found that Blarney had left the previous day but was able to phone Wilson at his 
headquarters in Athens. Freyberg then drove to meet with Wilson. Freyberg 's drive to 
Athens: 
[F]illed me with concern; all the dumps of military stores, petrol, food and trucks that are 
part of the Base organisation of an Expeditionary Force were left completely unattended. 
There were numbers of Greeks looting everything that had been left. This disorganisation 
and appearance of almost desperation had not been evident in the forward areas.399 
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When Freyberg arrived at Wilson's headquarters, Wilson was already in conference with 
Rear Admiral Baillie-Grohman. Both men were very concerned about how quickly the 
situation had deteriorated. At Kriekouki the 4th Brigade was still holding the rearguard. 
Because of the rapidity of the German advance, Rafina and Port Rafti to were now within 
the range of the Luftwaffe. This meant that the evacuation would have to continue from 
beaches west of Athens and south on the Peloponnese peninsula. To allow for the changes 
in circumstances, an extra three days for the evacuation would have to be allowed. These 
changes meant that the 6th New Zealand Brigade would have to cross the Corinth canal to 
be evacuated from one of the southern Peloponnese beaches and that the 4th Brigade Group 
would withdraw south of the Corinth canal and embark from Navplion. Those who did not 
reach the Navplion beaches were to be evacuated from Monemvasia, Plitra and Kalamata. 
Because the change to the evacuation beaches in the Peloponnese, elements of the New 
Zealand Division were required to defend the Canal. Isthmus Force, as it was named came 
under the command of General Freyberg who ensured that: 
The subsequent withdrawal of the New Zealand troops and those under command would be 
directed ' with all possible speed' and in ' approximately equal proportions' to the beaches at 
Monemvasia, Plitra, Yithion and Kalamata. From there they would embark on the nights 
28-29 and 29-30 April.400 
On the night 26/27 April Wilson departed from Greece and Freyberg became the 
commander of the troops in the Peloponnese. The 4th New Zealand Brigade then became 
the rear-guard south of the Corinth canal. The 4th Hussars and the 3rd Royal Tank 
Regiment would embark from the beaches at Navplion. 16th and 17th Australian Brigades 
would embark from Kalamata. 
On 25 Apri~ the Australian 16th and 17th Brigades were hidden among the olive groves 
near Elevsis expecting to be evacuated from Megara over that night of 25/26 April. 
Because of the change of plans and the decision to prolong the evacuation for another three 
400 McClymont, p.409. 
~ cClymont, p.409. 
180 
days these two brigades were instructed to cross the Corinth Canal and to be evacuated 
from Kalamata, a southern Peloponnese beach. In the vicinity at Elevsis were the injured 
and walking wounded from the New Zealand convalescent group. On the orders of 
Brigadier Vasey only fit soldiers were to taken by truck to Kalamata. As this included the 
16th and 17th Australian Brigades, most of the 500 soldiers left behind to make their own 
way across the Corinth canal were the convalescent New Zealanders and their medical 
staff. The majority of those that later found transport, were later captured at Corinth 
Canal.401 Others of the walking wounded who had set off: hoping that the trucks and 
ambulances would pick them up on the way back were disquieted to find out that the 
Germans had captured the canal and the majority of ambulances and trucks. They now had 
to trudge back to Megara Major N. Rattray, the New Zealand liaison officer ~t ' W' Force 
headquarters, was held up in Athens, and then on the way south by slowed down by 
stra:ffing. He, with the convoy of trucks that he had been using to pick up walking 
wounded on the way to the Peloponnese were captured by the Germans near the canal. A 
few of the walking wounded that avoided capture were able to hire a caique in which they 
reached Crete. 
The original orders for 4th Brigade were to hold on for two days at K.riekouki to allow the 
5th and 6th Brigades to get away, "but orders came that they would have to stay an 
additional twenty-four hours. Kriekouki was christened 'Twenty-four Hour Pass'."402 Here 
Kippenberger planned to ambush the German column coming down from Thebes. 
I fully expected a satisfactory butchery, but the plan got no trial The gunners had been 
warned, but I had had no chance to see the Brigadier and get his approval. 403 
Because of this, the unregistered guns fired prematurely and, the Germans promptly fled 
back into Thebes. The artillery on both sides then settled down to a firing duel. What was 
more disconcerting was that the main column was heading "into the hills in the east, where 
our maps showed a bad road leading past our right. "404 The afternoon of 26 April, brought 
401 Sandford, K. (1987). Mark of the lion. Century Hutchison: London. p.57. 
403 Kippenberger, p.40. 
404 Kippenberger, p.41. 
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news of the German seizure of the Corinth Canal. Puttick came up with a plan to attack the 
German paratroopers: 
[S]eizing two hills east of Corinth and close to embarkation beaches. We were fully armed 
and equipped; in fact we had all the British guns in Greece, seventeen of them, and had 
several days' supplies. We would destroy the parachutists, embark if possible later, and in 
any case have a very good fight. At the worst we could pass the Canal on foot, presumably 
by swimming it, and march south. Putt, didn't have his red hair for nothing.405 
This death or glory attack did not eventuate because a message came through directing 
them to the beaches in the vicinity of Porto Rafti. Apart from a mild fright when it 
appeared that the whole Brigade had disembarked the previous evening without them, 
Kippenberger found Puttick and the rest of the Brigade, well camouflaged around the 
embarkation point. With the Germans following closely behind' Kippenberger successfully 
passed his battalion through the lines of 19 Battalion and embarked on the Ajax.406 
Given that the time to prepare for the evacuation was so limited, the efficiency of the 
New Zealand rear-guard ensured that most of the Commonwealth force could be 
evacuated. Once the soldiers were on the beach, their discipline and the 
professionalism of the Royal Navy ensured that the evacuation was extremely 
successful. 
405 Kippenberger, p.43. 
406 Kippenberger, p.45. 
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Demolitions and destruction on the retreat. 
Road-block 
German engineers repair demolitions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Battle of the Corinth Canal 
A shipment of umbrellas expected at the canal 
Brigadier Rankin, British Military Attache, Athens. 
The Corinth Canal 
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The morning of25 April 1941 was fine and clear, if somewhat cold. For the majority of W 
Force this was Anzac day and as, twenty-six years before, an Anzac Corps was once again 
in the Balkans. On this morning the Wellington West Coast Company of 19 Battalion was 
early on parade to greet the dawn for this grim ceremony. Later at 4.00 a.m. Major R.K. 
Gordon, the commander of B Company was given orders to leave the battalion lines at 
Kriekouki and take his company to join Isthmus force which he was ordered to then 
command. Isthmus force would consist of: 
B Company 19 Battalion; 
C Squadron of Divisional Cavalry with the carriers of 22 and 28 Battalions under 
command; 
6 Field Company of the New Zealand Engineers with some British sappers attached; 
A detachment of Royal Hussars and a section of the British 122 light Anti-Aircraft 
battery comprising of three 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns, eight 3-inch, and sixteen Bofors. 
Isthmus force was to guard the Corinth Canal against any surprise attack. The canal is 
twenty metres in width and up to eight metres deep and divides the sandy isthmus leading 
from the northern part of Greece to the Peloponnese. Any troops embarking from a 
Peloponnese beach would have to cross the road and railway-bridge at Corinth or take the 
ferry at Patras. 4th Brigade, of which 19 Battalion was a part, was due to be evacuated on 
the evening of26 April from Megara. If the rapid advance of the Germans•01 prevented this 
then the 4th Brigade would have to be evacuated near Navplion in the Peloponnese. The 
Corinth canal was therefore considered vital for the safety of the 4th Brigade. 
Until they were assigned to ' Isthmus Force' the engineers of the 6th Field Company were 
responsible for the maintenance of the road from Thebes to Corinth. Their responsibility 
included the Corinth Canal road-bridge, to be repaired if damaged and also, to prepare it for 
demolition. On 25 April they had been ordered to join Isthmus force. As with most of the 
preparations concerned with Greece it was haphazard and to quote McClymont there was 
'No unity of command'. The plan was, once these duties were completed: 
407 The Germans advanced 29 kilometres a day in Greece, in contrast with 24 kilometres a day in France. 
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[T] he Company would join Clifton Force408, blow the road behind them, then send the 
bridge up, thus placing a sizeable barrier between themselves and the enemy. 409 
The rest of the Field Company had been based at Megara. Bombing had made their 
positions in the town ofMegara untenable, so they moved south of the bridge. Major L.F. 
Rudd, the officer in command of 6 Field Company, set up his Headquarters with Captain 
H.F. Willis and Lieutenant J.O. Wells in an olive grove, about two miles south of the canal. 
By 25 April the combined road and railway bridge had been prepared for demolition and 
the ferry, the parallel pontoon bridge and the ancillary bridges had been destroyed. 
Sapper Lou Mumford of the New Zealand 6th Field Company described how the girders 
were strapped with gun cotton: 
[ A ]bout a ton of explosives were put under the abutments. On top of the bridge was placed 
a large dump of TNT (Which could have easily have been fired by rifle bullets.) There was 
no electrical connection because we had none. There were only safety fuzes at the South 
end. It was the first bridge of that type we had seen so we made certain of the job. Having 
plenty of explosive. The general plans was that we should blow it up and drop block the 
Canal.4 10 
On the evening of 25 April, exhausted by their exertions and the continual ' straffing' and 
bombing Lieutenant D.V. Kelsall decided to seek shelter in a lemon orchard to enable his 
sappers to get some sleep. 
Also on the move on 25 April were the remnants of ' C' Squadron of the Divisional 
Cavalry. They had been the first to confront the Germans in the Monastir Gap and now 
their force comprised only of eight or nine carriers and two armoured cars. The Squadron 
commander, Major E. R. Harford, DSO, had returned from the divisional headquarters with 
the remainder of his squadron. Their orders were to debouch towards to the Corinth Canal. 
His squadron also took command of the carriers of 22 and 28 Battalions and, as they 
408Cliflon Force was the Divisional rear-guard and included the Divisional Cavalry, carrier platoons of5th Brigade and 34 a-t 
battery, under the conunander of Lt.Col. Clifton the Commander of the Royal Engineers(NZ). McClymont, p.374. 
409 Cody, J.F. (1961 ). Official History Of New Zealand In The Second World War New Zealand Engineers Middle East. War 
History Branch Department oflntemal Affuirs, Wellington, p. l 13 . 
'
10 Mumford, L (Sapper. No.2 ( 1. l PI) 6 Field Company.) to C.G. McClymont, written memoir.Voll , WA II 3/16. N.A. 
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headed south they must have cast envious glances at the administration personnel and the 
headquarters company, who were to be evacuated that evening. South of the Canal on the 
way to Corinth they took petrol from a supply dump. From that moment on all the 
vehicles developed engine problems. Although nothing could be proven, Fifth columnists 
were suspected. (Another explanation was that the dump contained high-octane aviation 
fuel). Periodically, vehicles would drop out and were not able to rejoin the column. 411 
Sometime, during the same period the carriers of the 22 Battalion took a wrong turn, their 
engines broke down and they also never rejoined the column. 412 
On the evening of25 April, Captain O.J. Hutchison, a New Zealand Division liaison officer 
was called up to Athens for a conference with the British military attache, one Brigadier 
Rankin. Rankin was not able to make the rendezvous but Hutchison received an enigmatic 
message (pun intended) "Sorry will not be able to see you tomorrow, very busy as friends 
expected. No pals in town after dawn. A shipment of umbrellas expected at the canal, best 
of luck for the trip."413 
When Major RK.Gordon arrived in the canal area he was somewhat surprised to find 
several companies of Australian infantry under the overall command of Colonel E.G. 
Lillington of the 4th Hussars. The Australians were dug in; occupying positions already 
prepared by the Greek Army on the north side of the bridge, overlooking its eastern end. 
They were part of 'Lee Force'. Earlier the same day the Australian 216th Battalion were 
passing over the Canal at 1.30 p.m. when Major J.A. Bishop, a staff officer of Brigadier 
Stanley Savige, halted them. Three and half companies of the 216th were allocated to 
Brigadier E.A. Lee. Captain K.A. Dean of the 216th was placed on the north side of the 
canal under the direct command of Colonel Lillington. Captain J.S. Jones was sent to the 
southern end of the canal and Captain Carrol was assigned to guard the airfield near Argos. 
On his way back to Corinth Jones met General Freyberg who 'suggested' that he and his 
men clear an evacuation route through the town of Corinth. Only when he had done this 
was Jones to move closer to the canal. Jones and his men must have been exhausted when 
411 Secombe, G . (Sgt-Major C Company Divisional Cavalry) to McClymont, written memoir. Vol I WA II 3/16. N.A. 
412 Henderson, J. ( 1958). Official History of New ?.ea/and in the Second World War 1939-45 22 Battalion. War History Branch 
Department oflnternal Affairs. Wellington, p.31. 
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they were finally able to catch some sleep after digging weapon pits for a second night 
beside the canal. 
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Major Gordon had no inkling of the presence of 'Lee Force', nor had 'Lee Force' been 
made aware of the New Zealanders moving into the position, but Major Gordon was 
delighted to have Jones 's Company of the 216th in close proximity. Realising that he was 
junior to Lillington, Gordon set out to find the senior officer, but was unable to find him. 
rn Hutchinson, O.J . to McClymont, written memoir. Vol 1, WA ll 3/16. N.A. 
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Receiving no instructions to the contrary, he went ahead and set up his positions north of 
Loutraki village with two platoons close to the bridge, where it looked suitable for 
parachute landings. Gordon had already sent the other (the 10th) platoon ahead, under the 
command of Lieutenant Heiford north of the village. Gordon was also concerned that the 
ground closer to the canal was a suitable landing site for the Germans to land aeroplanes 
and gliders near the canal. Consequently Gordon moved the 11 th and 12th platoons closer 
to the bridge on a small, fir tree (in other accounts it is described as being olive trees) 
covered hill 750 metres northeast of the canal. Here he set up his headquarters with two 
platoons. 
Later on in the evening B Company was reinforced by some of the indomitable 4th 
Hussars. The 4th Hussars had been dispersed to patrol both to the north and the south of 
the bridge, an almost impossible task. The regiment was down to twelve tanks, six bren-
gun carriers and one armoured car, all to patrol a front of seventy miles. Also in the area 
were the afore-mentioned anti-aircraft guns. "The sixteen Bofors were dispersed along the 
road from the canal to Argos 30 miles south."41• The increased activity around the canal 
had drawn German attention. The area around the crossing had been bombed and 'straffed' 
constantly for the last four days, increasing to a crescendo on the evening of 25 April, when 
several guns were destroyed.4 15 
Captain J Wells of the 6th Field Company reported that around 11.00 p.m. on 25 April, 
Generals Wilson and Freyberg crossed the bridge to inspect dispositions in the 
Peloponnese. "" Later Freyberg was to be evacuated to Egypt with the 6th Brigade at 
Monemvasia. Wilson was to leave by flying boat the next day (the 26 April) for Egypt. 
At 4.00 p.m. on that day he handed over the command to Freyberg with the words "Bernard 
I hand over Greece to you."m (Blarney had also closed down the Corps Headquarters and 
was also about to leave). 
It was early morning of the 26 April when the depleted column of the combined 
rn Long, p.166. 
415 Long, p.166. 
41 6 In other accounts it is reported about two hours before dawn. 
192 
armoured car and carrier platoons from C squadron Divisional Cavalry and 28 Battalion 
clattered across the bridge. They were the last unit tasked with the Canal's defence to enter 
the area. The instructions of the officer in command of the column, Major E.R Harford 
were: 
[T]o report to the 'OC Isthmus Force' and, on the withdrawal of 4 Brigade across the canal, 
to move his detachment westwards to Patrai and then southwards to Kalamata. 418 
Although he could see vehicles of the 4th Hussars in the vicinity of the bridge, Major 
Harford, also could not find the titular Isthmus force commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Lillington. At first light Major Harford shepherded his command into defensive positions 
overlooking the canal. In his memoir G. Secombe, a Sergeant Major in the Divisional 
Cavalry described the location: 
From memory the growid immediately south of the canal for fifteen to twenty chains was 
more or less flat and then rose in a couple of easy terraces to another flat which may have 
been half a mile wide which was bounded on the south side by a range oflow hills.419 
The position that they moved into was under a few scattered olive trees near the north end 
of the terrace. From their positions they could see Corinth village on the left and the 
bridge on the right. There was no time to admire the view or even get any rest for the 
machines had to be camouflaged and weapon pits dug. The carriers moved on to the ridge 
below and were soon concealed by the straggling vineyards. Secombe was aware that there 
were New Zealand infantry from 19 Battalion opposite them on the other side of the bridge. 
The aerial attack started at 6.30 a.m. when bombs from the Junker 87 stukas hit and 
destroyed several anti-aircraft guns. At 7. 00 a.m. the attack intensified when one hundred 
and twenty bombers escorted by fighters, swooped into the attack. The bombers attacked 
the guns and vehicles whilst the fighters machine-gunned targets of opportunity in the 
general area. For Sergeant Major Secombe the German attack was heralded by the Bf109's 
m Frcyberg, P., p.261. 
m G. Secombc. 
4 19 G . Secombc. 
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and Bfl IO's attacking the British Light Anti-Aircraft unit: " ... their crews were 
magnificent, keeping the guns in action until either the guns were destroyed or the crews 
killed."•20 At 7.15 a.m. the Bofors had hardly been silenced when the tri-motor Junkers 52 
transports flew in from the direction of the Gulf of Corinth. Flying low in 'vies' of three 
they began to disgorge men (Fallschirmjaeger) and equipment. 
Still hidden in the orchard, the exhausted 6th Field Company led by Lieutenant Kelsall was 
awoken on the morning of26 April by the sound of 'straffing'. A sentry informed Kelsall 
that German paratroopers were landing to the east. Kelsall wrote later "he could not see 
the bridge because of intervening trees." However as he admits " ... we were probably not 
seen ourselves in the orchard."•21 Closer to the bridge, Lieutenant Wheeler's No.2 section 
were awakened by the 'usual morning hate'. It was something that they were accustomed 
to and they went on with their tasks of preparing the surrounding roads and bridges for 
demolition when they were startled to see German paratroopers leaping out of Junker 
52' s. 422 
Still concealed in the orchard, Lieutenant Kelsall could see from where he was the German 
fighters, the Bf109's and Bfl IO's were skimming the pine trees looking for any 
Commonwealth soldiers. To his surprise the German Transports were so low that: "he 
could look right into the open doors of the Junker 52 transports that were dropping the 
paratroops".m The British were initially surprised at the low altitude that the German 
Fallschirmjaeger jumped from This not withstanding, Kelsall reacted quickly, before 
they had turned in the previous evening, the orchard had been turned into a defensive 
position. 
As my troops were not trained infantry, told the sec. commanders to husband ammwiition 
and not to fire witil the enemy were at least 400X(yards). No. 3 section a bit eager must 
have fired at 800X and perhaps let the enemy know we were there.424 
42
° Cody, p.91. 
421 Kelsa.11, D.V to McClymont, memoir .NZ Archives WA II 3/16. 
422 Wheeler, C.M to McClymont.,. memoir NZ Archives WA II 3/ 16. 
423 Kelsall . 
424 Kelsall. 
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During this period, Sapper Mumford, who had taken so much trouble preparing the bridge 
for demolition, was very sensibly sheltering in a culvert in a dry stream. He was aware of 
the sudden silence as the 'straffmg' stopped around the bridge. This silence heralded the 
arrival of the gliders. An augmented battalion of around 1,200 men had dropped or glided 
into the vicinity of the bridge. The bridge was quickly captured, and the surrounding 
troops overrun including the sheltering Mumford. "Germans were about with me with 
Tommy guns and there I was. "•25 As this was happening, the German fighter planes were 
drawing further and further away from the centre of the fighting to seal off the area. On 
both sides of the bridge the paratroopers were landing ' like mushrooms'. The anti-aircraft 
fire went on until the bridge was taken. There are some reports that the Germans machine-
gunned some the gunners when they tried to surrender.•26 
The Germans marched six prisoners across the bridge to help with the demolitions. Then 
inexplicably the bridge blew up. It seems that the P.O.W.'s survived although six 
Germans, including a newsreel cameraman, on the bridge were killed.421 An Australian 
soldier later told Mumford that the Germans were slashing at the fuses of the explosives. 
This was hardly the thing to do because the New Zealanders had been using the sensitive 
cortex explosives on the bridge. The Germans guarding the captured troops shrugged their 
shoulders and carried with their task of organising the prisoners. m After the bridge was 
destroyed, the Germans went to a lot of trouble to find out who actually blew the bridge. 
Two British Royal Engineers had also been shooting at the Bridge, and it had been proved 
by experimentation that bullets could explode cortex. The official candidate is a Lieutenant 
J.T. Tyson of the Royal Engineers. Prevented from getting to the bridge by a glider he 
fired at the charges on the bridge with a rifle. After the second shot the bridge blew up, 
and Tyson slipped away to the Navplion area for embarkation. 429 General Wilson was of 
the opinion that it was he that caused the explosion and recommended him for a decoration. 
As is often the way, being an officer and senior to the other ranks involved, he received the 
Military Cross. In a letter to General K.ippenberger Brigadier H.B. Latham, head of the 
425 Mumford, L. to McClymont, memoir. NZ Archives WA II 3/16. 
426 Mumford L The Germans thought that firing at paratroopers in the air was ' unsporting'! 
427 McClymont, p.418. 
428 Mumford L NZ Archives WA II 3/16. 
429 McClymont, p.418. 
195 
Historical Section of the United Kingdom Cabinet Office was disparaging of this account. 
"I am very sorry that the story of the Sapper officer blowing up the bridge by firing at the 
charges is untrue, but it never sounded very likely to me. '30" Other prime suspects were 
Sapper Eastgate as he had been seen crawling towards the bridge with George Quinlan 
another sapper who was suspected of lighting the fuse. "Unless George Quinlan lit a fuse 
when him and I went on the bridge to get Lou Mumford. I don't know."m The Germans 
said that they saw a man with a bandaged head crawling towards the bridge. Sapper 
Eastgate had an injury to his head, which was bandaged, but he denied the honour. 
Another dramatic account is from Gunner H.E. Smith, who had the misfortune to arrive in a 
truck in the middle of the attack, and was just across the bridge on the south side. He 
jumped out of the truck and was sheltering when he met up with two sappers, Lance 
Corporal C. Boswell and Sapper A. G. Thornton. They watched in frustration as the 
Germans dropped down around the bridge and it remained intact. 
One sapper said to the other, 'They're after that bridge Bos' [Boswell]. It was here that the 
idea came to blow the bridge. There was a hurried huddle to see whether the three of us 
went or one or two. It was decided on two and I'd cover them with the bren as the Huns 
were well on the groWJd and making things hot. From where I could give complete cover 
as the bridge was plain to see just ahead .... Quite a fair bunch ofhlllls were coming in from 
the northern end and soon apparently guessed what was going on and endeavoured to stop 
them. Just short of the bridge, one of the boys fell. The other made the bridge for sure as 
he came into sight. For a moment I thought he'd been hit as he seemed to fall but the next I 
saw he was coming back. He looked to have cleared the bridge when it seemed to heave 
and the next moment she was sky high.432 
No trace was found of the two gallant sappers, but their claim is as good as any. Roy 
Natusch a sapper from 6th Field Company also witnessed two New Zealanders blow up the 
bridge: 
430 Latham H.B. to Kippenberger, H.K, letter, 14 November 1955. WA 3/16. 
431G. Eastgate to McClymont, memoir, NZ Archives WA II 3/16. 
432 Smith H. to McClymont.E. memoir NZ Archives WA II 3/16. 
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As the Huns appeared on the far side of the bridge these two [NZ's] made a rush back to the 
bridge, the Hlllls got one of these but the other dived underneath, [pulled] out the fuse near 
the detonator and lit it, and was able to take a few steps when the whole shoot went up.433 
Joe Gretton, a private with W Force Head Quarter's Special Reconnaissance Squadron who 
also witnessed this action asserted that the two men were New Zealand sappers. 
North of the bridge in the orchard, at 6.50 p.m. Kelsall heard a colossal explosion and 
assumed that the bridge had been blown. That was the least of Kelsall' s worries. His 
eager Section three had also drawn the attention of the Germans by their firing. By 9.00 
a.m. Kelsall had decided that the position had become too hot. He ordered that the 
equipment be thrown out of the trucks in preparation for leaving in a hurry. Making a 
quick reconnaissance: "I climbed a tree ...... and saw to my horror blazing tanks of 4H( 4 
Hussars) -at least three (men) had run to them and then been shot at I think, and Bren 
carriers in an open field. "n• Caught in the open the 4th Hussars armoured cars and their 
carriers were being successfully destroyed by the German fighters. 
Overwhelmed by superior numbers and the ' straffing' Dean' s Company surrendered at 
11.45 a.m. Some New Zealanders close by (Their unit is not identified) fought on for 
another fifteen minutes before being overwhelmed.435 The two platoons of B Company that 
were sheltered by olive trees on a hill on the north bank were initially not noticed by the 
Germans. Bravely they counter-attacked but were soon contained by superior forces. 
Captain Gordon, realising that the situation was hopeless decided to withdraw north to 
Megara. Gordon and his two subordinate officers were soon wounded and command was 
handed over to Warrant Officer J.M.C. Jones. Jones was able to clear the remnants of the 
two platoons from the hill and headed north. The Germans, reporting this action 
afterwards (The battle of Blood hill) resorted to a certain amount of melodrama. 
433 Wynne Mason to W.C. McClymont, Letter dated 29 January 1947 quoting R.S. Natusch . WA II 3/16 Vol. 2 
434 Kelsall WAIi 3/16. NA 
435 Long, p.167. 
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"The Britishers with troops from their auxiliary nations had dug themselves in properly. 
Many were placed in the trees barely visible - and didn't they shoot well."•36 South of the 
bridge, the :fighting was still confused. The Divisional Cavalry positions were not 
discovered until the Germans working their way methodically south, started to run onto 
their entrenchments. Eventually the carriers were pinned down by the intensity of the 
fighting. When they tried to communicate with divisional headquarters it was discovered 
that the wireless batteries were flat, so that divisional headquarters could not be warned of 
the success of the German attack. Slowly small groups disengaged and began to make 
their way up the terraces. Major Harford met G. Secombe after he had come back after 
another unsuccessful attempt to contact Lillington. He informed Secombe that Corinth had 
been bombed and their passage through their was blocked by "a mass of bombed and 
burning vehicles". 437 As the Fallschirmjaeger had now got among the Divisional Cavalry 
lines, Secombe was instructed to withdraw to the low hills a mile south. Leaving behind 
their vehicles which at this time comprised: two armoured cars, five carriers from C 
Squadron, and three or four carriers from 28 Battalion Captain Harford's command, now 
reduced to less then fifty men, made their way south to the evacuation beaches. 
Of the other fugitives from the battle, including some of Sergeant Major Jones' group from 
the 19 Battalion, were able to reach Megara and were evacuated with 4th Brigade to Egypt. 
Unfortunately most, including Jones were captured the next day. The inference in a 
survivor' s recollections was that they were betrayed by Fifth columnists.438 
Lieutenant Heiford' s third platoon spent the morning listening to and watching the battle 
unfold beneath them, but they were frustrated that they were too far way and not able to 
take part in the fighting. 439 At midday a villager came to tell them that the Germans had 
entered Loutraki. Cut off from B Company' s headquarters and without any instructions to 
the contrary, Heiford decided that it was time to make for Kriekouki, where he still 
surmised the rest of the Battalion still was. They withdrew northwards capturing as they 
436 D.W. Sinclair(I954) Official History of New Z.ealand in the Second World War. /9 Battalion and Armoured Regiment. 
Historical Section. Dept Internal Affairs. Wellington. p.107 
437 WA II 3/16 G.Secombe. 
438 Sinclair, p.108. 
439 Sinclair, p.408. 
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did a drunken Fallschirmjaeger officer who had somehow managed to commandeer a 
British motorbike. The platoon sheltered for an evening in a cave with their suddenly 
sober prisoner. Obviously their location was not a secret, for the German officer was able 
to get word to some local Greeks who were visiting them, and they were betrayed. In the 
morning, they found their cave surrounded by Germans and were forced to surrender."° 
Now all that was left of B Company were a few determined men desperately eluding 
capture. 
Tripolis is a large town on the cross roads of the Arcadian plain. On 26 April this is where 
Brigadier Harold Barrowclough, the commanding officer of the 6th Brigade was. He had 
heard that paratroopers had landed around the Corinth Canal. He quickly gave orders for a 
relief force of A and C Companies of 26 Battalion to head north. By 11.00 a.m. the 
column was heading towards Corinth. It was not a simple progression. The fine clear day 
was perfect for the German fighters and stukas. Captain T. Milliken commander of A 
Company was exasperated by his soldiers continually having to jump from the trucks every 
time a 'plane (inevitably a German) came over. " ... he ordered the drivers not to stop unless 
absolutely forced to do so.""' Five miles (8 kilometres) from the Canal, the straffing 
became so heavy that even the determined Milliken was forced to order his men to take 
cover. As they were sheltering he was astounded to see "German helmets ...... bobbing up 
and down in the defile. " 442 Milliken shouted a quick warning to his troops. There was a 
sustained volley and a small enemy scouting party was quickly taken prisoner. It was with 
some satisfaction that they released some ten previously captured Australian and New 
Zealand soldierS.443 This was as far as the two companies could progress, as now the 
opposition began to stiffen, but D Company had the satisfaction of ambushing and shooting 
up a captured 28 Battalion truck killing the German driver. Just before they withdrew 
Lieutenant J. Beale, the Intelligence Officer of 4th Brigade, came through the lines (his 
must have been an exciting journey) with the news that the Canal bridge had been blown. 
It was decided to withdraw to the port ofNavplion and wait for evacuation. 
440 Sinclair, p.409. 
441 Norton, F.D. (1952). Official History of New Z,ea/and in the Second World War 1939-45. 26 Battalion. War History Branch 
Department oflntemal Affilirs. Wellington, p.6 I 
442 Norton, p.61. 
443 Norton, p.6 I. 
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Brigadier Barrowlough's fast reaction in sending the two companies of 26 Battalion north 
had enabled organised groups of British and Anzac soldiers to escape. Substantial 
numbers of Australians, New Zealand Engineers and Divisional Cavalry were able to 
withdraw through 26 Battalion lines. This included the 6th Field Company, their job done 
in destroying the bridge also made fighting retreat southwards, meeting up with the two 
companies of the 26 Battalion at 9.00 p.m. 
As Kelsall had observed the Headquarters of the 4th Hussars were overwhelmed at the 
Canal but three squadrons in the Patras area were able to withdraw to Kalamata, where later 
most of them would be captured. 
Some other New Zealanders used a considerable amount of initiative in escaping: Sappers 
George Quinlan, ( one of the candidates in blowing the bridge) Bruce Henderson and J 
Dalziell escaped in a 'Pommy' military police car. The two British military policemen had 
had enough and wanted to surrender. Other sappers were not quite so lucky. Some 
sheltering in an air-raid shelter just outside of Corinth were betrayed by a Greek officer and 
conveyed to a Prisoner of War cage in a cemetery in Corinth. Other sappers heading for 
Milos found a large party of Cretans, some other ranks from the 4th Hussars and assorted 
British and Australians who were trying to hire a caique to sail to Crete. Sadly three 
German launches captured them as they were leaving Milos. The fact that the Germans 
knew of their location indicates betrayal.-
The remnants of C squadron of the Divisional Cavalry were still withdrawing in good order 
south. Just south of the bridge Lieutenant van Slyke, the second in command was initially 
captured but was freed in a determined counter attack."5 Some of the carriers became 
casualties in a gully and some of the crews were taken prisoner but the majority reached the 
highway to Tripolis. Others destroyed their carriers before withdrawing towards the 
embarkation point in Navplion guided by Greeks and hoping that they would be in time for 
the evacuation. Regrettably they reached the water edge at the evacuation beach only to 
,.. McClymont, pp.420421. 
"
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find that the last ships had sailed. In the confusion this group was split up and a few made 
it down the coast where thirteen bribed a fisherman to take them to Crete."'° 
The success of the German 'airborne' troops in seizing the canal bridge by 'coup de main' 
possibly gave the German High Command the optimistic expectation that their invasion of 
Crete would be equally as successful with equally low casualties. For the Commonwealth 
forces the battle of the Corinth Canal was symptomatic of, and symbolised the whole 
campaign for Greece. The Greeks and Commonwealth forces, from the outset, were ill-
organised, resorting to 'ad-hoe' tactics. This is all the more inexcusable as the 
Commonwealth forces did have notice on the previous evening that airborne troops were 
going to be used against the canal. ... 1 There is no indication that this information was 
communicated to the soldiers defending the canal. For example once at the canal Major 
Gordon discovered that he was not the commander of 'Isthmus Force' , and he could not 
find and report to Colonel Lillington. Disparity of objectives and lack of unity of command 
meant, when they came up against the German forces, individual courage was as naught. 
The Commonwealth forces were attacked in force and defeated in detail. This of course 
was due in no large part, to the German control of the air. The fighters and bombers were 
frrst able to destroy the anti-aircraft screen and then pin down each individual unit and 
prevent them from reinforcing each other. This not withstanding, the German attack was a 
strategic failure, the bridge was destroyed and that although it inconvenienced the British 
evacuation plans it did not prevent the majority of W force from withdrawing in good 
order. 
=WA II 3/16, Secombe. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Battle of Kalama ta 
The only occasion in Greece when British troops advanced to the attack and made their 
ground good. 
Major Topham R A 
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On 28 April 1941, the elan of a panzer regiment was pitted against the dogged 
determination of a small group of New Zealand, Australian and British soldiers. Although 
the Commonwealth troops were forced to surrender the next morning to the Germans it was 
not in ignominy or disgrace. Major Topham a British Gunner described the action as "the 
only occasion in Greece when British troops advanced to the attack and made their ground 
good."448 Disparate groups of men, unwilling to surrender, overcame a well-disciplined and 
equipped unit comprising of the elite of the German Army. 
Not all the members of the New Zealand Division were up on the line on 21 April 1941. 
There is a convention that approximately ten percent of a battalion is 'Left out of Battle' 
(LOB), to act as a cadre for rebuilding the battalion should be it be destroyed. The reserve 
generally comprises of two officers and up to eighty men per battalion. This reserve was 
left in the reinforcement camp at Voula, "a pleasant resort along the coast. .. Southeast of 
Piraeus". 449 Later during the campaign a convalescent hospital was also set up near the 
camp. 
Two officers who were constrained in Voula Camp and have left reports about its 
conditions were Captain O.J. Hutchison and Lieutenant K. Simmons. Simmons, 
notwithstanding the pleasant surroundings, found that life at Voula camp was difficult and 
disorganised and the contradictory orders from the British 80-Base Sub-Area subverted the 
camp's organisation. The reinforcements, that should have made up the losses of their 
respective units could not be sent forward because of the rapidity of the retreat. The LOB 
troops had to content themselves with guard and provost duties in the Athens area. 
Captain Hutchison, in command of 26 Battalion reinforcements, had also been placed in 
command of the New Zealand soldiers guarding Hassani aerodrome. He was horrified by 
the casual way the Royal Air Force regarded protection. At one time he had to drive Greek 
soldiers off the aerodrome with force when they came to destroy and loot the RAF 
property. The proximity of the German Army and the inevitability of evacuation were 
448 Canavan C.A. to McClymont. , memoir containing Major Topham R.A, remarks. WA II 3/16 Vol II.National Archives. 
449 McClymont, p.11 9. 
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made apparent as more and more weapon-less soldiers and Cypriot drivers drifted into 
camp. 
On 22 April the New Zealand liaison officer, Major N.A. Rattray gave instructions to 
Major A.P. McDuff, the senior New Zealand officer at Youla to form a battalion out of 
reinforcements and released convalescents, and to be ready to move at short notice. 
Simmons found to his horror, that only half the men in the reinforcement battalion had 
weapons and that there were only two Bren guns. The Cypriot drivers detailed to provide 
the transport for the reinforcement battalion were too scared to drive it and had to be 
replaced by New Zealanders. McDuff gave Captain Hutchison instructions to destroy the 
stores at Youla. In anticipation of the evacuation truck convoys had begun to leave Youla 
on 21 April. Before he left Youla, Captain Hutchison was ordered to burn the RAF camp at 
Hassani. He first collected the eighty-five New Zealanders, who were guards at the 
Aerodrome, one of which was Sergeant J. Hinton of 20 Battalion. On his own initiative 
Hutchinson stripped the machine guns from the damaged planes at the aerodrome. One 
convoy comprising of convalescents, New Zealand Medical Corps and Postal Unit 
personnel was placed under the command of Captain J. Ritchie of the Divisional Cavalry. 
His instructions were to head towards the Peloponnese via Corinth. However, Ritchie only 
got as far as Megara where the troops were ordered into olive groves near the village whilst 
the British Movement Control Authorities sent the trucks back to Athens. Fortunately, one 
of Ritchie's officers, making his way back to Athens, found that the convoy had been 
forgotten, and arranged for the forgotten convoy to be picked up.•50 
Lieutenant Simmons was particularly lucky that his convoy was able to get through Corinth 
before the canal fell to the German paratroopers. Whereas Captain Ritchie just avoided 
being captured by a group of paratroopers some distance from their drop zone, before being 
rescued by the carriers of 19 Battalion and driven back to Elevsis. 
Sapper Gourlick of 19 Field company New Zealand engineers was one of the drivers on a 
convoy leaving Youla for Kalamata (Gourlick thought the destination was Navplion). At 
•so McClymont, p.368-369. 
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6.45 p.m. on 25 April. At 7.00 p.m. they were discovered by a 'spotter-plane' and 'done-
over' by the bombers that soon arrived.•51 By the early morning the trucks were across the 
Corinth canal and, as dawn was breaking they reached Argos. Because of the confusion of 
where to embark, some of the senior officers thought that Navplion was the evacuation 
beach. This belief was reinforced by the fact that they could see the houses in Navplion 
from a distance, and not unreasonably believed that this was where they were to go. 
What was more disconcerting, was that on the way to Navplion they passed a burning ship 
the Ulster Prince that had been bombed and beached. Several convoys, including that of 
Lieutenant Simmons, set off towards Navplion meeting vehicles that had been turned 
around by Movement Control and were returning from the town. A traffic jam inevitably 
occurred and Freyberg arrived to sort it out and sent the convoy back towards Tripolis. It 
was at this time that Captain J.A.D. Ritchie observed Freyberg directing traffic alone on a 
small bridge, while being 'straffed' and bombed 'with little effect' by the Germans.'52 The 
traffic jam was not helped by an Australian convoy passing through in a hurry at 9.00 a.m. 
The NZMC doctor, J Kennedy Elliot was quite dismissive of the Australian road discipline 
in the evacuation. "Making as fast as they could for the south. Australian trucks piled up 
like a mob of sheep."03 Finally, because of the number of Australian troops congesting the 
port ofNavplion, and the destruction of the Ulster Prince the convoy was then diverted at 
T ripo lis to Kalamata. 
Inevitably in this confusion, some of the trucks went the wrong way and had to be 
abandoned, while the troopso set out on foot. Some, containing 28 Battalion personnel, 
survivors from the Corinth Canal battle persevered on, going over a badly maintained track 
up a hill. One of the trucks went off the road injuring some of the soldiers on board. This 
small convoy was then caught at the top of the pass by bombers, adding to the confusion. •s. 
Bereft of their trucks the soldiers joined the others walking over ploughed fields while 
being continually bombed and 'straffed'. In one of these groups that eventually reached a 
45 1 Gourlick, W.P. memoir to McClymont WA 3/16 N.A. 
mRitchie, J.A.D. Memoir for McClymont. WAil 3/16. N.A 
453Kennedy Elliot. J. Account of the Greek Campaign. MS Papers 6002-3 . Alexander Turnbull Library. 
454 Gourlick. 
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Ulster Prince before the Evacuation. 
Ulster Prince after the evacuation 
-
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small village outside Kalamata, was Sapper Gourlick. In the village they met up with 
ambulances that had come to collect the wounded. However the travail of the wounded 
was not over for the German bombers in what appeared to be a deliberate attack targeted 
the ambulances. Those wounded that were unable to walk were put under a culvert. 
On the evening of 27 April most of the remaining trucks of the 'strung out convoy' drove 
through the town to reach an orchard north-east of Kalamata, which was the parking area 
for the trucks. Later arrivals parked on the road leading north which was the secondary 
dispersal point that had been set up the previous evening to muster stragglers. The first 
thing the troops in the olive grove had to do was to dig slit trenches. Major McDuff set off 
to find Brigadier Parrington, the officer in command of the evacuation. As the 4th Hussars 
was providing a screen thirty kilometres to the north it was believed that the evacuation 
would be successful. There were now approximately 16,000 personnel at Kalamata under 
the command of Brigadier L.C. Parrington The scene is described by Pringle and Glue the 
authors of20 Battalion Official History: 
Kalamata, however, was becoming congested with thousands of survivors of miscellaneous 
units-Base Details, RASC, signallers, drivers, Lascars, Cypriot and Palestinian pioneers, 
and some Yugoslavs who claimed to have authority from Mr Anthony Eden for a high 
priority in embarkation.05 
Parrington emphasised that he would ensure that the :fighting soldiers would be got away, 
but also the New Zealand reinforcement battalion would also be expected to form the rear-
guard. The previous evening 16,000 men, predominantly Australians, from the Allen 
Group ( 16th and 17th Brigades and the supporting Corps troops), had been evacuated. 
The majority of the troops of the Reinforcement Battalion went down to the beach on the 
evening of the 27/28 April and attached themselves to the lines of soldiers awaiting 
evacuation that evening. At midnight the soldiers were told that there would be no more 
evacuations that night.•56 Most troops appeared to have drifted back to the New Zealand 
assembly area when the ships left but some like Sapper Gourlick stayed on the beach. He 
m Pringle, D.J.C. & Glue, W.A. (1957). Official History of New 'Zealand in the Second World War 1939-/945 20 Battalion and 
Amoured Regiment. History Branch Internal Aflairs Department. Wellington. 
456 McClymont, p.451. 
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was recognised as a New Zealander and put into a group commanded by a Lieutenant 
George. (an excellent fellow according to Gourlick). In the afternoon of the 28 April, 
George ordered him to take a truck and check the Hospital for New Zealand wounded and 
bring those that could be moved down to the beach. Around 5.00 p.m. Gourlick was just 
walking up the 'marble' steps of the hospital entrance when he heard firing and excited 
Greek women and children rushed up to him to say that Germans were in the town. 
It was an enemy column of the 5th Panzer Division, consisting of four companies of 
motorised infantry plus one anti-tank company.m This attached company appears to have 
brought at least two very large 15.00cm (5.9") field guns and several anti-tank weapons, 
which were described as ' two-pounders, probably a 3.7-cm or possibly a 5.0-cm weapon. 
Both weapons resembled the British 'two-pounder' anti-tank weapon. This advance party 
of the 5th Panzer Division had crossed the Gulf of Corinth via Megalopolis and pushed 
aside the remnants of the 4th Hussars at 4.45 p.m, they were guarding the road entering 
Kalamata from the north. The Germans also captured several New Zealand officers 
including Major G. H. (Two pill) Thompson, a doctor in the New Zealand Medical Corps, 
as they moved through the dispersal area"" of the Reinforcement Battalion at 4.45 p.m. The 
captured troops were sent back to the rear of the column, but the Germans asked Major 
Thompson if he would like to come with them to succour the wounded. Thompson readily 
agreed as "he told the enemy they (the Germans] were sure to have plenty of wounded."m 
As the Germans made their way to the water front they also captured Captain Clarke-Hall 
RN, the Naval liaison officer with his staff and codes. This was to have disastrous 
consequences for the majority of soldiers awaiting embarkation. 
The first organised resistance to the Germans came from Major Basil Carey of the 3rd 
Royal Tank Regiment and Major Pemberton of the Royal Signals, who were 'policing ' the 
quayside area. They heard firing and then noticed men fleeing the scene of the action. 
Pemberton went back to warn Brigadier Parrington, while Carey acquired a Bren gun and 
engaged the German guns being set up on the quay. The German description of the account 
457 McClymont, p.448. 
458 Canavan, W.A.. Memoir to McClymont-reported comment ofThompson, G.H .. WA II 3/16. N.A 
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implies that the Germans fired off a quantity of rounds, but British accounts record only 
two salvoes were fired before the guns were silenced. It was here that Sergeant Hinton 
found Carey when he jumped into his 'dug-out'. It appears that Hinton who was making 
his way to McDuffs comer where Major McDuff had set up headquarters in Beach Road 
leading down to the waterfront. Hearing firing McDuff began to distribute weapons from 
the holding area in the olive groves when he heard the firing, and acting on his own 
initiative decided to do something about it. Hinton said: "He had two 'mills bombs' and 
what could he do? Carey said "[I] told him to go over the wall and throw them at the 2 
guns."460 
By this time Gourlick had driven back to the edge of town by the olive trees, where McDuff 
had established his Headquarters 'McDuff's comer'. McDuff was initially surprised when 
told by Gourlick that there were Germans in the town and told Gourlick that he was 'bomb 
happy' and then on second thoughts, he thought that they were German 'Paras' ... , There 
was a hyper-awareness of parachutists throughout the campaign, yet the only occasion they 
were actually used, the allied troops were badly dispersed to deal with them. McDuff then 
asked Gourlick to volunteer himself and his truck and with some other volunteers to go 
back into the town to deal with the 'Para' penetration in the town. Gourlick readily agreed, 
and according to him, the party to deal with the German guns comprised two Bren-gunners, 
a Lewis gunner, one soldier carrying a 'Boyes' anti-tank rifle and two or three soldiers 
carrying tommy-guns. At 3.00 p.m. Private A.M. (Jonah) Jones, who had been in the main 
dispersal area decided to go into the town. He just avoided being captured by the Germans, 
who had captured some soldiers looking for 'vino'. He then joined a group of nine 
including his friends from 20 Battalion, Sergeant J. Hesson and Private O'Rourke and one 
other Bren-gunner. Working along a street parallel to the beach they ran into Sergeant 
Jack Hinton who had already wiped out one German machine gun position. "There were 
dead Germans lying around and one (presumably not quite dead) groaning. " 462 Jones, who 
by now had the Bren-gun, lay down covering fire while Hinton, who was described as 
460 H.K.Kippenberger to McClymont, letter dated 2 March 1956, reporting part ofa letter from Lt Col. Basil Carey RTR. WA II 
3/16 Vol II N.A. 
460 Gourlick 
461 Jones, W.A to McClymont, memoir. WA II 3/16. N.A. 
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having a bag of hand-greanades, went down towards the waterfront and wiped out another 
machine gun position. Around this time, according to Jones, the truck without a canopy, 
driven by Sapper Gourlick 'and full of Kiwis, whizzed past me [Jones]' heading for the 
quay to confront the German advance party.463 
Private O.R Lewis of 22 Battalion had contracted dysentery in the Mount Olympus area 
and had been sent to the Base Hospital in Athens. On the 27 April, around 8.00 p.m. , he 
left the convalescent camp at Youla to go south to Kalamata in a group under the command 
of Lieutenant H.R. Harris. According to Lt Harris, Lewis appears to have been somewhat 
of a ' hard-case'. As with most of the Reinforcement Battalion, he had failed to get on an 
evacuation ship on the evening of the 28 April, and next morning had decided to go for a 
swim. After the swim Lewis had fallen asleep in a vineyard. This was while the German 
fighters and bombers were constantly 'straffing ' the troops in Kalamata. 
Around quarter to five in the afternoon Lewis "heard machine-gun fire in town. "464 
Obviously a curious man, he went down the track to find out what was happening. On the 
way to Kalamata he found crowds of soldiers lying in ditches in general confusion. 
Arriving in the town he met the Australian Colonel W. Harlock with some men already 
aboard a ' flat-bed ' truck with low sides and without a canvas top. Harlock was asking if 
there was a light machine gunner in the group. "Surely there is a Bren-gunner among 
you?465 "I [Lewis] said I could use the gun if they had one - Harlock produced it, I got into 
the truck, the others being ready off we went."466 Among this small band of very well 
armed-heroes was, not only the afore-mentioned Private Lewis and Sapper Gourlick but 
also Privates C. Snooks, G. Turner, W. Flint and two or three others, including some 
Australians and some members of the Maori Battalion, to clear out the German penetration. 
As the truck made its' way down the road Lewis asked what the mission was. "I was told it 
was to investigate what was going on and report, a suicide job. There was a hectic drive 
462 Jones, W.A to McClymont, memoir. WA II 3/16. N.A 
463 Jones. 
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down to the beach. Ahead we could see flares going up and tracers fire all around." 461 The 
truck drove. into beach road, ... "it seemed alive with small arms fire, went really fast. 
Drove around a comer and nearly turned over in bomb crater. Nearly bumped into the 
Germans with two guns. "468 
The guns were described as large, split trail with pneumatic tyres. Lewis adds somewhat 
unnecessarily. "They appeared to have heard us".•6• The truck 'broad-sided' along a wall 
and into a gutter, and the soldiers in the back jumped out of the truck firing at the Germans 
who were trying to traverse the gun while bringing others up to the beach. Evidently one 
of the anti-tank guns was fired at the truck whose occupants "ducked and yelled out and 
they scarpered."470 This was not so easy as this first sounds. They captured the German "'2 
pounder' which was then trained on the 5.9 and some dozen rounds fired."471 The soldiers 
were all firing the automatic weapons from the hip as none of the weapons had bipods. The 
Germans who did not retreat were shot down among the guns. Around about this time the 
group containing Hinton, Patterson, Hesson and Jones turned up and Lieutenant Canavan 
who was close to the action reports that they put in a bayonet charge to finish off the 
Germans. Hinton who still had his 'bag of grenades' lobbed two among a remaining field 
gun and destroyed it. It must have been around this time that Hinton was severely wounded 
in the stomach when a German soldier shot him. 
The two groups had driven off the Germans, but couldn't continue their battle as they had 
run out of ammunition. Undoubtedly a demonstration of bravery, this bloody little battle 
had an element of farce, because the group then had a conference to find out who was in 
charge! Now out of ammunition Goulick's group made its way back to McDuff's comer 
and was halted by a challenge from Lieutenant Harris. They could not have got very far 
from the scene of the action as Harris said he could see the tyres and wheels of the guns 
burning. As for Lewis's story, who in some previous incarnation was Harris's batman: "I 
took it with a grain of salt". 472 Major Carey met Hinton, now wounded when he was carried 
,.;7 Lewis. 
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back. He reported him as saying "I threw those two bombs and I have two bloody holes 
now."m 
Doug Patterson of 20 Battalion was another who was drawn to the sounds of firing. He 
came out of the olive groves near McDu:ff's corner and found Major Carey busy handing 
out ammunition. Exhorted by McDuffto 'Get into it', Patterson made his way down to the 
quay where the firing was the heaviest. His own section dissolved when the officer in 
charge disappeared so he joined his friends from 20 Battalion. The Germans appeared to 
have set up their machine guns to 'enfilade' the streets running parallel to the beach. A 
block before Patterson reached the quay some Germans suddenly ran out of a nearby 
building. Patterson was of the opinion they had been looting when the New Zealanders 
cornered them Initially they had been firing from the upper windows before trying to 
make a break for it to their armoured vehicle. Private Jones quickly shot down the 
Germans. Jones friend, Sergeant Hesson, was wounded in the arm in the exchange."' 
By now it was getting dark and although the field and anti-tanks guns were destroyed there 
were still some Germans around. In a building just up from the water in the second block 
'were some Jerries' by this time Jones' blood was up. As he confided to Patterson, " it was 
the best time he had during the whole campaign"m. Jones' luck was not to last. An 
Australian officer called upon a group of Germans ' holed-up' in a building by the 
waterfront to surrender. This officer was shot and wounded. As he lay on the ground he 
instructed the others behind him not to rescue him or they also would be shot. In the same 
building a German was firing from a balcony with a 'schmeisser' sub-machine gun. Jones 
was hit and was wounded in the throat and the chest by bullets and flying masonry. 
Patterson then swept the veranda with his Bren-gun and killed the German. At the same 
time, other New Zealanders had set fire to the rear of the building. A New Zealander then 
threw in a hand grenade. About sixty Germans came out and surrendered. It says a great 
473 Kippenberger, to McClymont, letter reporting Carey' s letter 2/3/ l 956H.K.K. 
474 Jones, AM. to McClymont memoir. WAIi 3/16.N.A. 
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deal about the self-control of the New Zealanders that the Germans were not shot out of 
hand.•16 
Of the several roadblocks the McDuff had ordered to be placed around the town, the one 
manned by Lieutenant Canavan was the most successful. Coming up to his position he met 
a bloodthirsty Sergeant Graham of the 9th Australian Field Ambulance. The sergeant had 
personally destroyed two German half-tracks and a 30-cwt truck. Lying around were half-
a-dozen bodies. "Some of the bunch of the bastards I shot"m. In the trucks were the 
German reserves of small arms ammunition. Sergeant Graham said exultantly "we've got 
Jerry fucked and nobody knows but us."m Graham was to increase his tally of enemy killed 
through the evening. 
As the night progressed the fighting became more confused. "The enemy were constantly 
on the defensive, constantly attacked and constantly withdrawing."m The majority of the 
troops in this action were between two hundred and two hundred and fifty New Zealanders 
accompanied by some Australians from the 10th Brigade and 1/1 Field Regiment AIF. 
Because of the confusion, many of the New Zealand casualties were caused by the German 
fire from areas that the New Zealanders though they had already cleared. The Germans 
however, were also using tracer, and in consequence were easy to locate. Eventually the 
firing died down when the Germans surrendered. The casualties were eighty Germans 
killed and 140 wounded. Ninety-two Germans under the command of a Hauptmann 
Hertzog surrendered. The New Zealanders lost sixteen killed and forty wounded. 
Lieutenant H. Harris was given the task of interrogating Hertzog, later in his 
correspondence with McClymont he says that he was glad that he had been pleasant to 
Hertzog as they had to surrender the next day.48° Contact was then established with the 
Royal Naval flotilla comprising of the cruisers Perth and Phoebe and the destroyers 
Nubian, Defender, Hereward, Hasty and Hero. The Hero made contact with the shore and 
her first lieutenant came ashore to ascertain the situation. A signal was sent to Perth at 
416 Patterson. 
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9.30 p.m.: "Troops collecting on the beach Southeast of town. All firing ceased in town. 
Consider evacuation possible from beach. Brigadier is reporting." m 
It was possible for a destroyer to embark a thousand men. The problem for evacuation is 
the arrangement of boats that are to be on the beach to ferry men to the waiting ships. Eight 
thousand men had been evacuated the previous evening so there should have been 
sufficient boats and caiques to ferry the troops to the awaiting warships. However Captain 
Sir Philip Bowyer-Smith RN of Perth had already made up his mind and the evacuation 
was abandoned at 9.29 p.m. 
The cruiser he[Bowyers-Smith] had commanded had not yet taken any part in the 
evacuation from Greece, and the appearances on shore might well have seemed much worse 
than they were. 432 
From a perspective of over sixty years it is difficult to understand this decision, but fatigue 
and stress obviously had their effects. Given the courage of the Royal Navy in the 
evacuation of Crete, it certainly cannot be attributed to cowardice. Only the Hero remained 
to ferry troops with her whalers. At midnight, three more destroyers arrived. 
[T]he naval authorities in Crete, having been told that there were 1500 Yugoslavs and 
thousands of troops still in Kalamata had sent over the Kandahar, Kingston and Kimberley 
to assist the original force"'. 
These destroyers suffered under the same constraint as Hero and had to move out by 3.00 
a.m. or they would fall victim to the German stuka attack. In an attempt to get off those 
New Zealanders that had been so effective in the defence of the town twenty four were 
taken down to the beach in a lorry. They got there to see the last boats full of soldiers 
leave. They were told that the boats would return, but the only movement was the 
destroyers slipping out of the harbour. It is doubtful whether the initial two cruisers and 
four destroyers could have evacuated all the eight thousand including the Palestinian, 
"
1 McClymont, p.459. 
412 Elstob. p.41 9. 
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Cypriot and British Base personnel in Kalamata but the cohesive 'fighting' units could have 
been evacuated. The success of most the other evacuations was due to the presence of 
troop and landing ships. 
Late on the evening of the 28 April, Parrington had decided to surrender the next morning. 
There is some doubt whether Parrington's heart was in the battle. He was about to 
surrender the previous evening when the Germans first arrived and had an argument with 
Hinton who threatened to have him court-martialled for defeatism484 
Canavan had gone back to see Major McDuff, to be told "Due to Navy's inability to take 
us off the Brigadier had decided to surrender at 5.30 a.m. that morning. "Those that wanted 
to take to the hills could do so."485 Some did escape. Determined parties of men acquired 
caiques, rowing boats and small dinghies. Patrolling British destroyers picked up some and 
some eventually sailed their way to Crete, but for most, the wounded, the tired and the 
dispirited it was the railway back to Germany and four years of boredom and inadequate 
food in a prison camp. One of those captured was Sergeant 'Jack' Hinton; a tough, 
independent and adventurous man that New Zealand was so good at producing in the 
1930's. He was later awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallant action in a prisoner of war 
camp. 
That so many were captured at Kalamata was due to several factors: the inefficiency of the 
British Base Units tasked with the evacuation; the capture of the Corinth Canal; the rapidity 
of the German advance across the Peloponnese; the inadequacy of the 4th Hussars screen; 
the inability of Major McDuffto set up a defence screen around Kalamata and allowing his 
men to drifted off; the capture of the Royal Naval liaison officer and his signal rating; the 
unwillingness of the senior British Naval officer on the Perth to remain near the port whilst 
there were Germans in the area and perhaps the defeatism of the senior British officer, 
Brigadier Parrington. Hinton accused him of defeatism by, but he was disadvantaged by 
484McDonald, p.81. 
434 Canavan. 
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being in nominal command of a ' rag-bag' of units and nationalities, many of which were 
non-combatants or combatants without weapons. 
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Warships involved in the Evacuation at Kalamata. 
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CONCLUSION 
The affair appears to have been handled with po.liticaJ and strategic frivolity, and the 
British Government did not deserve to get off so lightly as it did. 
Cyril Falls 
The Second World War 
Marching back to a Prisoner of War Camp. 
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On the 3 April 1941, while in Greece, Freyberg noted in his diary, that: "The situation is a 
grave one: we shall be fighting against heavy odds in a plan that has been ill conceived and 
one that violates every principle of military strategy."•86 These principles of military strategy 
(they are also known as the principles of war) have been distilled from the experience of 
centuries of warfare and are essential for ''the planning and conduct of campaigns, movement 
and disposition of forces and the deception of the enemy."m Warfare may be one of the most 
unpredictable of human activities, but to quote T.E. Lawrence, "With 2,000 years of 
examples behind us we have no excuse when fighting, for not fighting well."ffl "Sun Tzu 
defined 13 principles in his The Art of War while Napoleon listed 115 maxims. American 
Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest required only one; 'get there furstest with the 
mostest' .489 Some of these principles will be used to elucidate the answers to the five 
questions that were asked in the introduction. These are: 
1. maintenance of the objective: maintaining the 'raison d'etre' of the campaign or 
battle. 
2. unity of Command: in practise one of the most difficult of the principles to 
achieve. This means co-ordinating the leadership of the force to ensure that all its 
arms are effective. 
3. economy of Force: The careful husbanding of resources to enable the application 
of combat power where it will be most effective; 
4. mass (concentration): This is best summed up in the quotation of Nathan Bedford 
Forrest (above). It means that victory normally goes to the force that can place 
the most combat power on the battlefield at the schwerpunckt the point of contact; 
5. manoeuvre: The ability to move forces around to achieve victory; The Germans 
were particularly skilled at the difficult tactic of Blitzkrieg which is a specific 
military technique of manoeuvre warfare. Lack of manoeuvre; can only bring 
stalemate and a war of attrition; 
486 Freyberg, diary 3 April 1941. DA40l.2l.3 in WA 11/1 Greek Narrative. N.A, p.12 
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6. security: The use of counter intelligence to prevent the enemy finding out ones 
plans and thwarting ones objectives; 
7. surprise: This comes from the application of security and enables the enemy to 
be attacked at the time and place of ones choosing; 
8. morale: is an abstruse factor in battle, an complex amalgam of several factors: 
''training, comradeship, leadership and discipline all play their parts in its 
creation. "•90 It is a commodity that can palliate against an Army that has superior 
equipment; 
9. flexibility: The ability to adapt to changing circumstances, other wise known as 
common sense; 
10. initiative: Taking advantage of a situation, and leaving the enemy less 
opportunity to deal with one ' s moves and plans. m 
Question one asked: "What was the political and strategic rationale for sending the 
New Zealand Division to Greece?" 
A definition of "Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political 
purpose."m From 1940 Britain had committed herself to the political and military 
purpose of: 
Victory, even if this meant placing the British empire in pawn to the United States; 
victory, even if it meant Soviet domination of Europe; victory at all costs.493 
By early 1941 Britain was running out of the economic and materiel resources 
necessary to combat the military strength of a Nazi Germany that had the assets of all 
the conquered nations in Europe. Apart from loans from the wealthier Commonwealth 
nations, Britain had the hope that it would be the recipient "of ' lend-lease' first mooted 
by President Roosevelt this in December of 1940. This was a contrivance by which 
490 Keegan, J. & Holmes, R. (1985). Soldiers A History Of Men In Battle. Hamish Hamilton Ltd: London, p.39. 
49 1 The above Principles of Strategy were obtained from: Dunnigan, F. (1993). How To Make War. William Morrow and 
Company Inc. New York, p. 16-18. 
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American goods could be provided without cash payment."0 • To obtain the goods and 
services provided by 'Lend-Lease', The British needed to persuade the United States 
Congress to pass the 'Lend-Lease' Bill. To achieve this Britain needed to prove that it 
was a worthy recipient, by confronting nazism and fascism and supporting other 
nations doing so. 
When the Greek Government invoked the April 1939 Agreement of Assistance in early 
1941 it gave the British Government an opportunity to display its assiduity in 
confronting the axis by achieve a coalition of Balkan states. 
The strategic objectives of this coalition were to: 
enable the return of British Forces to the continent of Europe; 
protect Britain's northern Mediterranean flank; 
deter the Germans from striking at British and her allies possessions in the 
Middle East, whilst being in the position to strike at Italian and German interests 
in southern Europe. 
However by 1941 the strategic situation had changed radically. Only Britain and the 
Commonwealth were confronting the axis powers, and the British were already fully 
committed in the Middle East theatre of operations in Libya and ·Ethiopia The original 
promise to support Greece was made in the early months of the war prior to France' s 
defeat in June 1940 when Britain' s strategic and military options were greater. 
The intention of the political coalition was to achieve mass, and to achieve this, Britain 
would have had to combine the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish Armies with their own 
forces. The Turkish administration was sympathetic but unwilling to ally itself with 
the British. The Turks did not have the equipment or training of their Armed Forces to 
ever be involved in offensive operations against the Germans even had they wanted to, 
04 Taylor, p.513. 
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Gavin Long, author of Australia in lhe War of 1939-145 Greece, Crele and Syria 
comments that: 
There is a case to be made against the U.K. Govt (sic) for insisting that British aid be 
sent to Greece in the hopes that Jugoslavia and Turkey would come in, when all the 
evidence indicates that Turkey would remain neutral and Jugoslavia was not reliable. 
The U.K. Government did not inform the Dominion Governments of all the risks 
involved in sufficient time . .,, 
The Yugoslavs hoped that Hitler would leave them alone and were never really willing 
to co-operate with the British forces prior to and after the coup by General Simovic. 
The Greek Army was never able to co-operate or conform to the fully mechanised W 
Force in the field and by March 1941, the fighting on the Albanian Front had 
exhausted the Greek Army. Had the Yugoslav and Turkish Governments been willing 
to commit their forces, the problems of mobility would have been the same difficulties 
multiplied by three. The achievement of mass also requires unity of command, and in 
Greece, during the campaign there never was any actual unity of command. Although 
General Papagos was the titular commander; General Wilson tended to ignore him 
when it suited his purpose and in reality there was very little co-operation with the 
Greek Army. Even among the British, there was only a negligible amount of co-
operation between the two British headquarters, D' Albiac 's (Operation Barbarity) and 
Wilson's (W Force - Operation Lustre). 
Prior to the decision to go to Greece, the principle military objective in early 1941 was 
the destruction of the Italian armed forces in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. 
As they were in substantial numbers in North Africa, it was common sense to strike at 
them there. Once Churchill's decided that Greece was to be the British principal area 
of effort in the Mediterranean, this contradicted maintenance of the objective. Wavell, 
on Churchill' s instructions, had to halt the offensive in Cyrenaica and divide his forces 
in the face of the enemy and send the only units that were not actively engaged in the 
m Long, G. comment on Chi of the draft narrative To Greece WA 11 3/16.National Archives. 
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Western desert to Greece. This prevented General O'Connor's driving the Italians out 
of Libya. 
W Force was effectively Wavell's reserve. Once Rommel attacked the British forces in 
North Africa Wavell could not even send the Force that he originally earmarked for 
Greece. In splitting his forces to achieve two objectives instead of one, Wavell's 
forces were defeated in Greece and in North Africa, contradicting economy of force: 
To gain an ill-conceived political objective the military objective of destroying the 
Italians was forfeited. By the time W Force embarked for Greece the 'Lend-Lease' 
Bill had been passed. Sending Barbarity Force to Crete and Greece would have 
fulfilled Britain's treaty obligations. Given the ambiguity of the Greek Government 
about fully confronting the 'axis' forces. This gesture was probably enough to comply 
with the Greek request. 
Wavell, it appears gave up trying to prevent Churchill's interference with the running of 
his command, and ignoring the military reality of the situation, sent only a token force 
to Greece. In a memorandum to the Editor in Chief of the New Zealand War Histories 
(Howard Kippenberger) dated 3 October 1949 Wards writes: 
The inference was that Mr Eden's enthusiasm outran his discretion and that General 
Wavell lost sight of these military considerations that should have been kept 
prominently in view.496 
Wavell further compounded The British Government's duplicity by g1vmg the 
impression in his communications with the Australian and New Zealand Governments 
that Blarney and Freyberg were better informed than they really were. The New Zealand 
Government was very proud of its military commitment and wanted the division to be a 
fully integrated unit within the British Army. In return the New Zealand Government 
expected to be fully apprised of the risks that the Division would have to run. It was the 
responsibility of the Divisional commander inform the Government of any concerns that 
496 Wards to Kippenberger, memorandum. Paragraph 5,3 October 1949.WA II 3/16. N.A 
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he might have about a campaign, and it does not reflect well on Freyberg, that he did 
not disclose his doubts to the New Zealand Government. 
It was to both New Zealand' s and Britain' s strategic and economic interests to have the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force based in Egypt in 1941. However examined in 
isolation there were negligible strategic reasons for New Zealand and Australia to have 
a significant element of their armed forces sent to the Balkans, but it would have been 
churlish not to contribute to a force if requested. It would have been equally churlish 
of the British had they ignored New Zealand and Australia' s proper concerns about the 
Japanese threat in the Pacific. 
Greece in 1941 was a neo-fascist country. George King of the Hellenes had actively 
assisted Metaxas to overthrow and then ruthlessly purge the members of constitutional 
Venezilist government. Quite rightly, much is made of the kindness and assistance of 
the 'ordinary people' of Greece; but scattered throughout the Official Histories and 
personal accounts are with references to the less then committed behaviour of the 
Greek High Command, the Greek Police and some citizens. This included the gross 
treachery of General Tsolakoglou and the betrayal of escaping soldiers and prisoners of 
war by the Greek civil authorities. . This less the committed attitude prevented the 
retreating allies from fully destroying bridges and tunnels and other infrastructure 
including oil-refineries. This meant that when the allies retreated to Crete, the 
Germans were able to bring their forces and equipment to the Greek airfields closest to 
Crete. 
To engage in a high-risk activity, the expectation is that the return justifies the higher 
risk. Even with the luxury of hindsight, there were at the time doubts about the success 
of the campaign. It is apparent from Churchill's correspondence with Anthony Eden in 
Cairo that Churchill was tom between breaking his word to the Greeks and the looming 
probability that the campaign would be doomed because of the inability to bring 
Yugoslavia and Turkey into the coalition. Towards the end of his life, Ian Wards stated 
to author of this thesis that he believed that it was Anthony Eden who was the 'principal 
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villain of the piece.' 497 "When Churchill and the war cabinet for once hesitated, the men 
in Egypt regarded this as a challenge, which it was no doubt intended to be."498 Wards 
suggested that Eden, disregarding his caution of November 1940, took up Churchill's 
'challenge' with enthusiasm and carried along the implementation. Not withstanding 
Eden's new found enthusiasm, at this stage of the war, only one man could have 
prevented W Force going to Greece. That was Winston Churchill. 
A campaign that had its origin in an attempt to achieve a difficult coalition of the 
forces of four nations confronting the axis in the Balkans, finally became one of British 
Noblesse Oblige; sharing the suffering of a dubious ally with the divisions of their 
most loyal Dominions. 
Question two asked how well did the training and composition of the New Zealand 
Division prepare them for a war in Greece? 
No matter how good training is, nothing ever prepares a soldier for war, except war 
itself Most of the soldiers that went to Greece had only a rudimentary idea of what 
real war would be like, as observed by John McLeod: 
Despite these problems, it was still not difficult to bring a man to a level of physical fitness 
sufficient to sustain the rigours of combat, or teach him the basic rudiments of soldiering -
handling weapons, the application of fire, minor tactics, both individuals and collective, and 
routine administration. Of greater difficulty, however, was the need to prepare the soldier 
for the mental stresses of battle. Not only was he required to kill fellow human beings, but 
also to cope with a multitude of unparalleled noises, sights and fears. It was believed that 
realistic collective training could enable the soldiers to overcome this, thus encouraging him 
to go on with "his job of killing when he meets enemy fire" .'99 
This not withstanding the New Zealanders behaved extremely well under fire and 
excepting Colonel Macky' s premature retreat, one is inclined to agree with Professor 
497 Wards, I.McL ., comment to author October 2002. 
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Murphy that: "the New Zealand Division did not put a foot vvrong."500 The New 
Zealand Division was fortunate that the composition was relatively homogenous. This 
benefited the two offensive arms, the artillery and infantry. The artillery had a leaven 
of professional and long term territorials officers and non-commissioned officers . The 
infantry had the advantage that the infantry were able to obtain men of average and 
better intelligence, good mechanical skills and physically fit. 501 Some vvriters have 
stated that there was some competition between units recruited from different 
provinces, but this has not been apparent in the oral or written interviews of the 
participants. 
After World War II, Brigadier S.L.A. Marshall made a study of the efficacy of the 
training methods used by the United States Army and it indicated that only fifteen to 
twenty five percent of United States infantrymen used their personal weapons.5')2 This 
survey so interested Kippenberger that he arranged for Marshall's questions to be 
circulated around some of the officers that served in the 2nd New Zealand Division.501 
General L. W. (Bill) Thornton compiled the answers in a summary and although the 
officers tended agree with some of Marshall's findings did offer some useful 
observations that: 
[T]he New Zealander in action is more dour, more objective, and constantly aware of 
his place in a mutually reliant 'team' then his American counterpart [and] the New 
Zealand infantryman tended to hold his fire until he saw a definite target. 504 
However lest we think that New Zealanders make natural killers, Thornton also 
observes that: "New Zealanders had an aversion to killing and would prefer to take 
prisoners."505 One of the areas where the former officers disagreed with Marshall is his 
assessment: "Our infantry, in the great majority, held a low opinion of the importance 
of their arm."506 Upham and Andrew disagreed strongly with this opinion, and stated 
500 Professor Murphy, comment to Aurthor, interview October 2004. 
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that the infantrymen had a very high opinion of themselves, (morale) especially after a 
few battles. Marshall also postulated that only quarter of the infantrymen actually used 
their weapons in combat. Upham in particular disagreed with this statement. The 
general consensus was that only quarter of the infantry get the opportunity to use their 
weapons in a battle, but that "seventy-five percent persist in firing"so, What is 
somewhat disquieting is Upham's statement that: "Most of the enemy bayoneted would 
be men surrendering. Two thirds of our men would not exactly be in at the kill, often 
because they were loaded up with too much gear to be able to grapple with anyone."sos 
The New Zealand Army that confronted the Germans in 1941 was an Army well aware 
of the sacrifices that would have to be made. All were aware of the heavy casualties 
that New Zealand had suffered in World War I all of its personnel were either, 
volunteers or Regular Force. Some had served in, and most would have had relatives 
who had served in World War I, and yet they still volunteered. In some ways the 
Territorial Army of 1914 was better trained as it had a reservoir of young men who 
were compelled to join the Territorials by the 1909 Defence Act. It also must be 
remembered that there were a large number of unemployed and others in low paid 
employment, for whom joining the Army gave a degree of stability. An army, 
especially a volunteer army, reflects the social structure and mores of the society from 
which it arose. New Zealand of the late nineteen thirties was a New Zealand where a 
degree of initiative and adaptability were necessary for survival. These skills initially 
were initially not valued or encouraged in the Army. "You aren't paid to think soldier." 
This was not a deliberate policy, but one of expediency. Apart from Freyberg, Puttick 
Miles and Weir the senior officers were well meaning amateurs, who had experience in 
World War I but would find it hard to adapt to the rapidity of warfare in the Second 
World War. The last thing that they wished was people criticising their efforts. The 
New Zealand Army was also, in many ways an Army designed for the battles of that 
World War. The changes to the New Zealand Army from the time of the First World 
War were ones of increment. Its equipment and philosophy was that of an army, of 
1918, whereas the German Army that they were going to fight had undergone a 
507 Upham to Thornton, memorandum dated 29 March, 1949, p. I . 
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generational equipment and philosophical change. Few officers in either the British or 
the New Zealand Army would have been aware of the innovations in manoeuvre 
warfare. 
The Germans were particularly skilled at the difficult tactic of Blitzkrieg, which is a 
specific military technique of manoeuvre warfare. When confronted with a strong 
static position, the Germans would frrst attempt to force it, then manoeuvre around it. 
Consequently the allies constantly had to conform: firstly to the German attack, and 
secondly to the imperatives of the withdrawal to the evacuation beaches. The element 
of surprise was always with the Germans. The geography of Greece was thought to be 
one limitation for the Germans, but the terrain also did not work to the Allies 
advantage as much as it was expected. The passes led directly into Greece and once 
these were breached the mountains in between prevented the allies from stabilising or 
holding their lines of defence. Advancing rapidly the Germans were always able to 
turn the allies left flank. The only advantage that the W Force had was that, it was 
mechanised, and in most cases could retreat faster than the German Army could 
advance. The allies did not have the flexibility that years of planning and training gave 
to the German Army. Nor did they have a fully compatible communication system that 
manoeuvre warfare requires. From the moment the Germans attacked the allies, the 
allies were always on the defensive and the initiative was always with the Germans. 
The retreating Commonwealth forces were also hindered by the paucity of planes of 
the Royal Air Force. The German advance was advantaged by its command of the sky. 
Two more squadrons of Hurricanes could have made observation and bombing by the 
Luftwaffe a lot more difficult. As Freyberg observed in a memorandum written to the 
New Zealand Prime Minister after the completion of the Balkan campaign: 
[F]or the last twenty years the R.A.F. has been practising a doctrine that has led to the 
existing state of affairs as regards air support for the Army in the ME. (Middle 
East) .... In so fur as air co-operation was concerned, [it]was marked by almost complete 
lack of absence(sic) support by the R.A.F. We practically never saw Reconnaissance 
sos Upham to Thornton, p .3. 
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planes, fighters or bombers upon our front, whilst the enemy completely dominated our 
position to a great depth.509 
Not withstanding that the British generals visiting Greece in 'mufti', there was 
certainly any real attempt at security. From the moment 'W' Force arrived in Piraeus 
the German ambassador was aware of the strength and composition of the force. It is 
surprising that British Intelligence either was not aware of this, or did not make the 
respective military authorities aware of this. All the Greek Generals were all Metaxist 
appointees and some like General Tsolakoglou were actively pro-German and it is 
likely that there must have been leakage of intelligence to the Germans. The British 
compounded this by their limited intelligence about their allies. The Yugoslav Army 
in 1941 was expected to perform as stubbornly as the Serbian Army had in 1914-18, 
but instead broke up into disorder some Croatian regiments surrendering 'en masse' 
and some of Yugoslavia's Volkdeutsche behaving as a fifth column. 
Defence calls for attack in order to become a complete concept in terms of the very 
nature of war."510 Once the attacker has made the first move, a counter attack is 
expected. Defeat is the likely outcome for any commander who always waits for 
something to happen. Unfortunately the British forces not only lost the advantage of 
the attack but also of the counter attack and the initiative was always with the 
Germans. The destruction of Piraeus, the only substantial port able to supply W Force 
(Salonika was too close Bulgaria's borders), limited the allies flexibility in response 
even more, by placing more pressure on the fragile internal and external lines of 
supply. 
Question 3: How suitable for command were the major protagonists in the New 
Zealand Division? 
The Division's commanding officer, General Freyberg's conduct, courage and humour 
in Greece only reinforced his legend. Because of the previous separation of his 
509 Freyberg to Peter Fraser, memorandum, 3 June 1941 . WA 118 Freyberg Papers: The air component of Greece and Crete. N.A 
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command, Freyberg was feeling his way into the job with senior officers that were not 
of his choosing, he did not know, only knew him by repute, and in some instances were 
resentful and jealous of him. The Division's disposition to Greece came, as no surprise 
to Freyberg, for in his earlier papers there are estimations that Greece, sooner or later, 
would be a theatre of war.511 The disposition enabled Freyberg to unite his Division 
and render it safe from the depredations of the Middle East command. When ordered 
up to Northern Greece, he expressed to Wilson and his staff the grave doubts he had 
about the Division's ability to hold the Aliakmon line with only two brigades. 
Although he had differences with Wavell over the disposition of the division he had no 
reason to doubt Wavell's integrity. As a British General commanding a New Zealand 
Division within the framework of the British Army, coupled with the desire for his 
Division to see action and his loyalty to Wavell probably led him not to tell Fraser of 
his doubts about the expedition. Freyberg was also aware that Wavell was 
communicating directly with the governments in Wellington and Canberra. When 
ordered to withdraw from Greece, his concern about the inadequacy of the evacuation 
plans for the New Zealand Division, unlike Blarney, caused him to ignore the order for 
the Corps and Divisional Generals to withdraw. 511 As later observed by Montgomery, 
"Freyberg was the best fighting General he had ever met."m He created an elite 
division that was one, if not the most feared and respected by the enemy in the 
Mediterranean theatre of operations. 
The other senior officers of the New Zealand Division all behaved competently in 
Greece. These were men who had served in the Territorial and Regular Force between 
the wars with very little governmental and public acknowledgement. Their sacrifice of 
time, and sometimes their lives gave the country the opportunity to produce younger 
more experienced commanders. The fatiguern that was to handicap Hargest in Crete 
was not evident in Greece. Despite Kippenberger's criticism, his leadership of his 
511 Freyberg to Fraser, Cable27l, 13 January 1941.WA II 3/16. NA 
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Brigade in the Olympus pass and his strength of character in ensuring that most of the 
5th Brigade were evacuated from Porto Rafti. 
Brigadier Hargest went aboard early and so impressed upon Captain Petrie of HMS 
Glengyle the urgency of the embarkation that when the converted liner was full over 
700 men were taken aboard HMS Calcutta.''' 
However Hargest's laissez-faire attitude to the training of the battalions within his 
Brigade may have contributed to the less than satisfactory performance of21 Battalion. 
5th Brigade also was negligent in properly preparing the Olympus passes for 
demolition, which jeopardised the retreat of the other two brigades. 
Brigadier Puttick proved to be an aggressive leader quite prepared to shoot his way 
through the German paratroopers that had captured the Corinth Canal. This somewhat 
extreme manoeuvre was obviated by a message from Brigadier Charrington who had 
picked up a New Zealand Divisional signal directing the Brigade to the beaches east of 
Athens. Like Hargest, Puttick displayed uncharacteristic hesitation in his allocation of 
forces when he had temporary command of the Division in Crete. 
Brigadier Barrowclough's insistence that his Brigade engage in long forced marches 
while in Egypt paid off during the retreat from the Aliakmon line. The defence of the 
Molos pass fell predominantly on Barrowclough's 6th Brigade and was conducted with 
skill and aggression. Barrowclough also reacted with alacrity when he heard that the 
Corinth canal had been attacked and 26 Battalion was responsible for the rescue of 
many of the retreating Commonwealth soldiers. It was fortunate that Barrowclough 
and his Brigade that they were taken back to Egypt and consequently were able to rest 
and recuperate. 
Brigadier Miles created artillery forces that the stukas could not silence. At 
Thermopylae, the Commonwealth guns ended the invincibility of blitzkrieg. For 
515 McClyrnont. P.402 
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Brigadier Crump, logistics was never a real problem as the New Zealanders were only 
in Greece for three weeks. The primary problem of supply was protecting the convoys 
from Egypt from the half hearted attacks of the Italian Airforce and then, with the 
major port of Piraeus substantially damaged, unloading the ships once they reached 
Greece. One of the reasons that the Commonwealth forces were able to retreat in good 
order was that ammunition was never in short supply as they were falling back on their 
supply 'dumps'. This was just as wel~ for in the Balkans the German Army was 
substantially larger, better equipped and operating on internal lines of supply whereas 
the British forces were dependent on a rackety sea-borne supply line. The problems of 
the allied forces were compounded when the German Luftwaffe destroyed most of the 
Port facilities at Piraeus on the first day of their attack on Greece. 
Question four asked how well did the New Zealand Army's equipment compare with 
that of the German Army-das Heer? 
The cause of casualties on a battlefield is normally an inverse relationship between the 
type of weapon and the proximity of the enemy. For example, in "World War II 
artillery caused nearly 60 percent of all casualties"516 much more than an infantryman 
with his rifle. With the notable exceptions of the 'Boyes' anti-tank rifle the British 
equipment issued to the New Zealanders was adequate to the conditions in Greece. As 
an Infantry Division, the New Zealand Division was particularly well suited in a 
defensive role. It is noted in several publications that the Greek Campaign was a 
'gunners' campaign. The Germans never had an answer to the Commonwealth 
artillery that out-gunned them at every opportunity. The New Zealand Division's 
Artillery compared to other New Zealand units was fortunate that it had a 
disproportionate amount of professionals, because of the New Zealand policy of 
ensuring that officer cadets sent to Duntroon were trained as gunners. Although the 2-
pounder was inadequate for penetrating the heavily armoured Mark III's and Mark IV 
panzers, this was partially rectified by mass firing by a 2-pounder battery when the 
opportunity occurred, and by using twenty-five pounders in anti-tank roles. Professor 
516 Dunnigan, p.107. 
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Walter Murphy points out however, that it is only necessary to damage a tanks trac~ 
no matter how large, to render it useless. The gun of the campaign was the twenty-five 
pounder gun-howitzer. The twenty-five pounder batteries could form a 'curtain of fire' 
using high explosive through which the panzers would not venture, it could also revert 
to a twenty-pounder solid shot for individual targets. The twenty-five pounder has 
sometimes been criticised for not having the 'killing-power' of larger guns, but its 
portability and once unlimbered from its tray, was a gun that could rapidly switch 
targets. Much is made of the German 88cm dual-purpose gun, but in the 25-pounder 
the Commonwealth had an adequate weapon adaptable to anti-infantry and anti-tank 
roles. 
The Divisional cavalry also had an adequate vehicle in the Marmon-Herrington 
armoured car. Although it was not as good as some of the better German 
reconnaissance vehicles, such as the Sd 222 or Sd 231 it was a very good 'on-road' 
vehicle quite suitable for 'finding' the enemy, but not fixing them as the German 
reconnaissance vehicles were expected to do. The Bren-gun carrier also performed 
adequately. With its' thin armour and open top it was not designed to charge tanks, 
and those soldiers that did, generally paid for it with their lives. The Commonwealth 
soldiers made this most of this rather strange looking vehicle that could place -several 
light or medium machine guns close to enemy infantry with a degree of impunity. 
The section weapons appear to have performed adequately. Neither the Vickers or 
Bren guns had the rate of fire of the German MG 34, nor was the Vickers machine gun 
as quickly transportable, but neither of these drawbacks appear to have affected the 
performance of their teams. The section mortar also appears to have performed 
adequately, notwithstanding that it was not as powerful as its German equivalent. R 
Boord who later became a company commander was an operator of a three inch mortar 
at Platamon, and wrote of the deadly effect of the 3 inch Mortar."m Section weapons 
have the advantage that the operators work in a 'team' which is mutually reassuring. 
m R. Boord to L.W. Thornton, questionnaire 7 October 1948. WA II 3/16 vol 11. N.A, p.12. 
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Because of this reassurance, section weapon operators do not suffer from the weapon 
paralysis that besets the individual rifleman. s,s 
Those soldiers that had 'tomrny' -guns seemed to have handled them well and they 
made a welcome addition to a section's fire-power. The Lee-Enfield behaved as well 
as it was expected to and was equal to the German Mauser, as a general infantry 
weapon, although the Mauser was more accurate. The 'mills-bomb' hand grenade, 
also appears to have worked well, although its use did require close contact with the 
enemy. It is noticeable that on several occasions the German equivalent, the 'stick-
grenade' did not explode when thrown and they often littered the ground after an 
engagement. However, studies have shown that personal weapons are either not used 
by a majority of soldiers or are not aimed at an enemy. 
A weapon requiring more than one person to operate, such as a machine gun that needs 
another man to feed the armmmition and look out for targets, is more likely to be fired-
an isolated soldier will tend to not fire. 51 9 
Question five asked; how did the morale of the New Zealand citizen soldiers stand up 
after their first campaign? 
The majority of the interviewees and personal commentaries mention that the soldiers 
felt that 'man-for-man' the Germans were not as good as the New Zealanders and it 
was only sheer numbers and equipment that forced them to withdraw. 
An armed force's strength is calculated by multiplying nwnbers of men, weapons, 
munitions, and equipment by the quality factor. Quality is a nebulous thing, but it 
includes the effectiveness of leadership, training, morale, weapons and equipment. 
Numbers alone are not the standard by which you can calculate a nation's combat 
strength. Units with equal nwnbers of men and equipment can vary substantially in 
terms of combat effectiveness.520 
518 Marshall, S.L.A (1978). Men against Fire - The Problem of Command tn Future War. Peter Smith: Massachussets, U.S.A, 
p.57. 
51 9 Dunnigan, J.F. (1993). How to make War. William Morrow and Company. New York, p.30. 
520 Dunnigan, J.F. How to Make War. P.19. 
239 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 1 
This optruon appears to have been substantiated on the few occasions that the 
protagonists came to grips. The New Zealand male of the late 1930's was a keen 
sportsman and most males would have played the national game at some time. Rugby 
is a game that requires not only physical robustness but also the courage to physically 
confront players that are bigger than one' s-self. In the words of Colonel Page of the 
26th Battalion, a former All Black: "We've beaten the Germans in ever battle we've 
had with them, and there's not a man in this division who does not believe we can do it 
every time. "m 
It is apparent from those who met or served with the New Zealanders that there was 
something special about the New Zealand soldier. The New Zealand writer John 
Mulgan said of his compatriots when meeting them later in North Africa 
They had confidence in themselves ... knowing themselves as good as the best the world 
could bring against them. like a football team in a more deadly game, coherent, 
practical, successful. Everything that was good from that small remote country had 
gone into them-sunshine and strength, good sense, patience, the versatility of practical 
men.522 
The New Zealand Division was also fortunate that it was a relatively homogenous 
force. Some writers have stated that there was some competition between units 
recruited from different provinces, but this has not been apparent in the oral or written 
interviews of the participants. For the volunteers in the New Zealand Division were 
normally allocated to units on a basis of need not preference and this ensured a 
uniformity of quality. No democratic nation can produce natural soldiers and the New 
Zealanders were by no means natural soldiers, but New Zealand in the 1930's 
produced men that had attributes which suited soldiering, for example: an eye for 
country, the ability to survive in the outdoors, mechanical ability and initiative. 
521 Crisp, R. Direct quotation from Page. The Gods Were Neutral P.187. 
m Mulgan, J. ( 1947). Report on Experience. G eoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press: London, p.8. 
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Morale is a fragile commodity that does not stand up too readily to retreat and defeat, 
among the soldiers interviewed and were not captured during the campaign, exireme 
fatigue seems to have deadened any other emotions. Once they were aboard the 
transports and the warships most fell into a deep sleep. For the individuals, Stocker 
Boyd threw his last can of 'bully beef overboard that he had been carrying, in 
celebration at being rescued. Harry Spencer was profoundly depressed when he 
arrived in Crete only to find a few of his squadron there, although more did turn up 
later. His companions however, were glad to see him as he had the only toothbrush in 
the unit. Peter Winter was angered when a petty officer threw his rifle overboard when 
embarked on the Glengyle. He was however, glad to be away from the constant 
'straffmg' and bombing and could safely fall asleep. Always an individual, he dropped 
out of the marching column in Crete to go absent without leave so he could see the 
sights. Charles Upham remembered the pall of smoke over Suda Bay as he 
disembarked from the cruiser Ajax. Then he and his men marched to an olive grove. 
"'like a good camping spot in New Zealand.""' Dan Davin had become separated from 
his urut through illness in Greece. He reached Suda Bay around midnight on the 27 /28 
April. What he recalled was the wounded that were left lying on the beach on a very 
cold night. At the reception camp, angered by a solitary 'pedantic clerk' who was 
taking down the particulars of a long line of fatigued soldiers. Davin using his 
'officer's' trench coat to disguise his lowly commissioned rank, ordered him to "Get 
your colleagues out of bed.""' For Walter Murphy, it was the beginning of several 
days of marching 'to and fro', for the group of weapon-less men he was with, before 
being evacuated on a troopship.m 
Most interviewees and commentators echo Colonel Page, they thought that 'man for 
man' the Germans were not as good as they were. They may have been driven out of 
Greece but in no way had they been defeated.'" Of course they had been, but this 
comforting thought was a way of dealing with defeat. 
m Uph.i,m to Simpson, interview, [979. Simpson. A OHColl...0200. Alexander Turnbull Library. 
mDavin to Simpson, interview. 
}24Murphy, W. comment to Author, October 2004. 
mcrisp, p.187 
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This thesis has been a ' snap-shot' of a small period in time but the problems that 
confronted a government sixty years ago are just as relevant now. The enthusiasm, 
courage and youth of this COWitry was placed in the hands of political and military 
leaders of another coWitry, and in the main were badly served by them. For New 
Zealand, the Greek Campaign was strategic dead end. Poorly planned and badly 
executed, it was only due to the courage of the Commonwealth soldiers and the stolid 
endurance of the Royal Navy that so many were able to escape. 
New Zealand is still a small country with a long vulnerable coastline. New Zealand 
still prefers to solve international problems through international law in international 
fora Our trade routes to the rest of the world are still open to incursion by hostile 
nations. New Zealand Armed Forces are still too small to operate, except for the 
smallest of operations in isolation. Consequently the situations faced in 1941 are still 
relevant today. 
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APPENDIX ONE. 
The New Zealand Charter 
The General Officer 
Commanding the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force Overseas 
5 January 1940 
The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he 
receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject 
only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. He will, in 
addition to powers appearing in any relevant Statute or Regulations, be vested with the 
following powers: 
( a) In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which 
he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions directly to the New 
Zealand Government, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extra-ordinary cause 
such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of 
communication indicated in the following paragraphs and which for greater clearness 
are also indicted in an attached diagram. 
(b) To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government and with the Army 
Department concerning any matter connected with the training administration of the 
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. 
(c) To communicate directly either with the New Zealand Government or with the 
Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, in respect of all details 
leading up to and arising from policy decisions. 
(d) In all matters pertaining to equipment, to communicate with the War Office 
through normal channels, and through the liaison officer of the High Commissioner' s 
office in London, the former to be the official channel. 
( e) In matters of command, to adhere to the normal military channels between the 
War Office and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force overseas. 
(f) To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of 
communications units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation 
[including training], and administration with which he has been invested. 
(g) To organise [train], change, vary, or group units and formations in such manner 
as he considers expedient from time to time. 
(h) To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as the 
exigencies of service may in his opinion require from time to time. 
After the Third Echelon has left New Zealand no officer above the substantive rank of 
captain will be sent overseas without the concurrence of the General Officer 
Commanding. 
M.J. Savage, 
Prime Minister 
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APPENDIX TWO: 
Strengths and casualties in Greek Campaign.s21 
Strength Killed 
New Zealand 
Australia 
British Army 
Royal Air Force 
Palestinians and 
Cypriots 
TOTAL 
16,720 
17,125 
21,880 
2,217 
4,670 
62,612 
New Zealand casualties by unit: 
HQ NZ Division 
Divisional troops 
Divisional Cavalry Regiment 
4 Field Regiment (Artillery) 
5 Field Regiment 
6 Field Regiment 
7 Anti-tank Regiment 
5 Field Park Company (Engineers) 
6 Field Company (Engineers) 
7 Field Company 
19 Army Troops Company (Engineers) 
2 Divisional Signals 
27 Machine Gun Battalion 
Sub-total 
4 NZ Infantry Brigade 
Brigade HQ 
18 Battalion 
19 Battalion 
20 Battalion 
Sub-total 
5 NZ Infantry Brigade 
Brigade HQ 
21 Battalion 
22 Battalion 
527 Figures based on those in McClymont, pp. 486-487. 
291 
320 
146 
110 
36 
2 
7 
4 
3 
2 
18 
17 
3 
3 
8 
72 
21 
24 
24 
69 
14 
12 
Wounded Prisoners 
599 
494 
87 
45 
87 
5 
12 
16 
7 
14 
22 
2 
11 
3 
11 
13 
116 
2 
42 
20 
45 
109 
26 
19 
1,614 
2,030 
6,480 
28 
3,806 
13,958 
10 
49 
69 
36 
23 
73 
3 
121 
19 
11 
25 
33 
472 
4 
117 
149 
80 
350 
235 
22 
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23 Battalion 9 8 36 
28 (Maori) Battalion 10 6 100 
Sub-total 45 59 393 
6 NZ Infantry Brigade 
Brigade HQ 2 1 
24 Battalion 8 6 138 
25 Battalion 16 13 159 
26 Battalion 15 32 57 
Sub-total 41 52 354 
NZ Army Service Corps 26 33 116 
NZ Ordnance Corps 3 3 7 
NZ Medical Corps 8 5 107 
Miscellaneous units 2 10 57 
Sub-total 39 51 287 
TOTAL 261 387 1,856 
Embarkations: 
Night Kalamata Monemvasia Tolos Rafina Megara Kithira Milos 
Navplion and 
Porto Rafti 
April 
24/25 6,685 5,700 
25/26 5,900 
26/27 8,650 4,527 8,223 
27/28 4,640 
28/29 332 4,320 760 
29/30 33 
30/l 202 700 
May 
..2J.!1 4,320 .!bill ~ S,900 760 700 
Total Embarked: 50,672 
Lost when Troopship Slamat was sunk: SOO 
S0,172 
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A9 
AlO 
A12 
AA 
AFV 
AIF 
Anschluss 
Arty 
ASC 
A-tk 
Barbarossa 
Bde 
BGS 
BM 
Bn 
BREN 
BTE 
Bty 
CGS 
CIGS 
co 
Coy 
CRA 
CRASC 
CRE 
CRS 
CSM 
DAQMG 
DAK 
Das Heer 
Div 
DivPet Coy 
GHQ 
GOC 
Gp 
APPENDIX THREE. 
Glossary 
Fast but lightly armoured British tanks. 
" 
Anti-aircraft. 
Armoured fighting vehicle. 
Australian Imperial Force. 
The forced incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich in 1938. 
Artillery. 
Army Service Corps. 
Anti-tank. 
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Named after the Holy 
Roman Emperor (Red Beard). 
Brigade. 
Brigadier General Staff. 
Brigade Major. 
Battalion. 
Combination ofBR(Bmo, town in Czecho-slovakia where the weapon was 
first designed) and EN(Enfield where it was made under license). 
British Troops in Egypt. 
Battery. 
Chief General Staff (New Zealand). 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (United Kingdom). 
Commanding Officer. 
Company. 
Commander Royal Artillery. 
Commander Royal Army Service Corps. 
Commander Royal Engineers. 
Commander Royal Signals. 
Company Sergeant Major. 
Deputy Ad justant and Quartermaster General. 
Deutsche Afrika Korps. 
German Army. 
Division( al). 
Divisional Petrol Company. 
General Headquarters. 
General Officer Commanding. 
Group. 
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Grw 
GSOI 
HAA 
HE 
HQ 
HMGs 
4H 
Granatenwerfer. Mortar. 
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade. 
Heavy Anti-aircraft artillery. 
High Explosive. 
Head quarters. 
Heavy Machine Guns. 
Fourth Hussars. 
2 i/c Second in command. 
Km Kilometre. 
Kommisbrot Bread baked in a German field kitchen. 
Kriegsmarine German Navy. 
LCA 
LCM 
LCT 
LMG 
LOB 
LRDG 
Luftwaffe 
Matilda 
MG 
MMG 
MO 
MT 
NCO 
NZA 
NZE 
NZEF 
NZMC 
oc 
OP 
OR 
Pioneer. 
PI 
2-pdr 
25-pdr 
POW 
Pz 
QMG 
Landing Craft, Assault. 
Landing Craft, Mechanised. 
Landing Craft, Tank. 
Light Machine Gun. 
Left out of Battle. 
Long Range Desert Group. 
German Air Force. 
British infantry tank. 
Machine Gun. 
Medium Machine Gun. 
Medical Officer. 
Mechanical Transport. 
Non-commissioned officer. 
New Zealand Artillery. 
New Zealand Engineers. 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force. 
New Zealand Medical Corps. 
Officer Commanding. 
Observation Post. 
Other ranks. 
A soldier employed to do basic labouring tasks, not to be confused with an 
Engineer. 
Platoon. 
Two pounder, anti-tank gun. New Zealand's principal anti-tank weapon. 
Twenty five pounder gun-howitzer. New Zealand's principal field gun. 
Prisoner of War. 
Panzer. Means 'mailed' or armoured. Normally refers to Tanks. 
Quarter Master General. 
256 
RA 
RAMC 
RASC 
RE 
Reece 
Regt 
RE 
RHA 
RMO 
RMT 
RTO 
RSM 
RTR 
Sappers 
Schwerpunkt 
Sigs 
SMLE 
Sqn 
SMG 
Tps 
Tpt 
Royal Artillery. 
Royal Army Medical Corps. 
Royal Army Service Corps. 
Royal Engineers. 
Reconaissance. 
Regiment. 
Royal Engineers. 
Royal Horse Artillery. 
Regimental Medical Officer. 
Reserved Mechanical Transport. 
Railway Transport Officer. 
Regimental Sergeant Major. 
Royal Tank Regiment. 
Military Engineers. 
The place of maximum effort; a term first coined by Clausewitz, this is the 
area that military force should be applied, to have the maximum effect. 
Signals. 
Short Magazine Lee Enfield (Rifle) 
Squadron. 
Sub-machine gun. 
Troops. 
Transport. 
Volkdeutsche People of German race living outside Germany. 
WIT Wireless Telegraphy. 
X yards 
Waffen 
Wehrmacht 
Weapon. (Armed) 
German Armed Forces. 
German Ranks. 
(A German soldier was accustomed to hold greater responsibility then his British or New 
Zealand equivalent). 
Generalfeldmarschall 
Generaloberst 
General 
Generalleutnant 
Genera/major 
Oberst 
Oberstleutnant 
Major 
Field Marshall. 
General. 
Lieutenant General. 
Major General. 
Brigadier. 
Colonel. 
Lieutenant Colonel. 
Major. 
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Hauptmann 
Oberleutnant 
Leutnant 
Stabsfelwebel 
Hauptfeldwebel 
Oberfeldwebel 
Feldwebel 
Unterfeldwebel 
Unteroffizer 
Stabsgefreiter 
Gefreiter 
Oberschutze 
Schutze 
Captain. 
First lieutenant. 
Second lieutenant. 
Warrant Officer First class (Regimental Sergeant 
Major). 
Warrant Officer Second class. Battalion Sergeant 
Major. 
Staff Sergeant. 
Sergeant. 
Lance Sergeant (Acting Sergeant's rank). 
No equivalent. 
Corporal. 
Lance Corporal. 
No equivalent. 
Private. 
Fallschirmjaeger Paratrooper. 
Pioneeren Engineer. 
German Airforce -Luftwaffe In 1941. 
Heinkell III 
Messerschmitt Bf 109 (Bayerischejlugzeugewerke) 
BfllO 
Junker (Ju) 52 
(Ju) 87 
(Ju) 88 
Stuka (Sturzkampfflugzeug) 
Germany's principal bomber. 
Germany's principal fighter. 
Two engine fighter-bomber. 
Germany's principal transport 
plane. 
Single engined dive bomber. 
Two engined dive bomber. 
Dive-bomber ( Ju 87 and 88) 
Principal weapons used by the German Army (Das Heer) 
Feld Kanone Field artillery. 
Gewehr 98 General rifle carried by infantry 
in 1941. 
Leichte Feld Haubitze Field Howitzer. 
Maschinenpistole (Schmeisser) 
MG. (Maschinengewehr) 34 
PAK(PanzerabwehrKanone) 
Panzer 
Pz.Kpfw. (Panzerkampfwagen) 
Pz.Kpfw. II. 
Pz.Kpfw. III 
Pz.Kpfw. IV 
9 mm sub-machine gun. 
Incorrectly called a 'tommy gun' 
by the New Zealanders. 
General German light and 
medium machine gun in 1941. 
Anti-tank gun. 
Armoured vehicle or tank. 
Armoured fighting vehicle. 
Light tank with a 2cm gun. 
Medium tank with a 5cm gun. 
Medium tank with a short 
barrelled 7.5cm gun. 
258 
Sd. Kfz. 8 (Sonderstab Kampfzugwagen) 
Sd.Kfz.221 
Sd.Kfz.231 
German prime mover, used for 
towing heavy artillery. 
A light 2 man armoured car 
similar to the British Daimler 
armoured cars. 
Large, powerful eight wheeled 
armoured car. 
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